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CHAPLAIN ROLES IN HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

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BY

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When called upon to intervene in crises, United States Armed Forces effectively provide humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) for fellow countrymen and suffering people around the world. Missions to protect and preserve life are very demanding physically, emotionally, and spiritually. Sometimes, the helper becomes hated in the process. Army Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) minister to military members, relief workers, and civilian victims in these stressful situations. Even though their ministry is acknowledged as essential for mission accomplishment, almost nothing has been written about chaplain roles during HCA operations. UMTs should possess some understanding of the present world situation, differences between domestic and international missions, legal issues, the roles of other players, and Army doctrine on operations other than war. This paper reviews chaplain ministry and duty performance during four HCA operations: Restore Hope in Somalia, JTF Andrew in southern Florida, National Guard response to Midwestern Flooding, and Garden Plot in Los Angeles, California. It also discusses chaplain organization, responsibilities, logistical support, and training. The best training for HCA duties is combat readiness. An extensive review of literature and UMT experiences was used to develop lessons learned

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CHAPLAIN ROLES IN HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

A Paper Presented in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for Advanced Course, 670
"Directed Study, Writing Option"

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ABSTRACT

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When called upon to intervene in crisis, United States Armed Forces effectively provide humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) for fellow countrymen and suffering people around the world. Missions to protect and preserve life are very demanding physically, emotionally, and spiritually. Sometimes, the helper becomes hated in the process. Army Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) minister to military members, relief workers, civilian victims in these stressful situations. Even though their ministry is acknowledged as essential for mission accomplishment, almost nothing has been written about chaplain roles during HCA operations. UMTs should possess some national missions, legal issues, the roles of other players, and Army doctrine on operations other than war. This paper reviews chaplain ministry and duty performance during four HCA operations: Restore Hope in Somalia, JTF Andrew in southern Florida, National Guard response to Midwestern Flooding, and Garden Plot in Los Angeles, California. It also discusses chaplain organization, responsibilities, logistical support, and training. The best training for HCA duties is combat readiness. An extensive review of literature and UMT experiences was used to develop lessons learned and suggest some recommendations for improving chaplain readiness and ministry in HCA operations.

PREFACE

During my year of study at the U.S. Army War College, I became impressed with the tremendous expansion of missions undertaken by the U.S. Army in recent years. As the nation's trusted moral force, the Army is often designated as the leading agency of the United States in providing humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). That assistance is given freely to American citizens and peoples of many other nations around the globe. Since the end of the cold war in 1989, the United States is viewed by many governments as the only remaining superpower and international leader. Its power and resources play vital roles in maintaining world order, promoting democratic values and human rights, and rendering rapid response to human tragedy and need.

Where the Army goes, Unit Ministry Teams accompany it. Chaplains are always there by the side of soldiers ministering to their spiritual needs. Often times their religious mission extends to allied soldiers, prisoners of war, refugees, civilian detainees, and victims of all kinds of disaster. Human need sometimes transcends human institutions.

Coming to understand these trends, I searched thoroughly for resources to guide chaplains accompanying units performing Operations Other Than War (OOTW), and in particular, HCA missions. Except for a few after-action reports buried in scattered files, nothing could be found. That situation seemed to contradict everything I had learned about national expectations for future Army involvement in these types of missions. Appendix H contains "A Study on Using Military Forces in Humanitarian Assistance Programs," wrote last September, 1993.

In the process of researching data, experiences and literature for determining the chaplains' role in HCA and OOTW, I am indebted to the many chaplains listed in the bibliography under "interviews" for sharing their experiences and insights. I deeply appreciate the patient and thoughtful guidance provided by Chaplain (COL) Tom Norton, my USAWC faculty project advisor. And I am most thankful for the loving encouragement and understanding support given by my wife, Joyce, who inspired me to continue the project during the three hundred hours invested to complete it, especially when the research and writing came to several "deadends," and after the hard drive crashed on our computer in the midst of writing the final product.

Gary R Councell

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18 March 1994

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CHAPLAIN ROLES IN
HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

by

Chaplain (LTC) Gary R. Councell

America's Army is a moral force, trusted by the nation to uphold, project, and protect our national values and interests. By its very presence, particularly overseas, the United States Army (USA) represents the government of the United States of America as well as the collective ethics and morality of her citizens. Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) help shape and strengthen that moral dimension of the Army by serving as its conscience and fostering spiritual development and vitality for soldiers.

In the "new world disorder,"[1] GEN Frederick Franks stated in a speech given 17 September 1992 to the Command and General Staff College Class of 1993, "The military's role is changing... What we will be asked to do as a military force, and how we will do it... will be different from what we were expected to do in the past."[2] He then quoted from Martin Van Creveld's book, The Transformation of War, "Future people will look back on the Twentieth Century as a period of mighty empires, vast armies,

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), p. 40.

2. GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., "Matters of the Mind and the Heart, Military Review, LXXIII (March, 1993), p. 3.

and incredible fighting machines that have crumbled into dust. Conventional war seems to be in the final stages of abolishing itself."[1] While that dream is desired, it has not yet come true.

Since 1989 the United Nations (UN) estimates more than 250 political conflicts around the world have erupted into armed conflict. The USA has fought two wars and conducted numerous operations other than war (OOTW): counterdrug, crisis control, disaster relief, humanitarian and civic assistance - using forces as well as force in a changing world. GEN Franks believes soldiers should be guided by "matters of the mind (professional growth) and matters of the heart (personal commitment)" in dealing with change.[2] UMTs must continue to speak prophetically and credibly to those matters. Their voices must proclaim a message of faith and action, hope and reality, love and justice.

> In a world where chaos and conflict are endemic, at a time when violence and votes are sweeping away the political contours we once thought permanent, in countries battered by economic collapse, internecine wars, and revolutions, when great nations are disintegrating into unworkable ethnic enclaves, and survival seems secure only in clan structures, when hatred and massacres, hunger and epidemics run rampant, there is, nonetheless, a glimmer of hope in the growing recognition that, for better or worse, we are all neighbors on a finite globe, and that the oppression and starvation and illnesses of others are ultimately our own.

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1. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 224. The author contends nations are at a turning point in the evolution of warfare - that the amount of destruction involved in modern warfare outweighs its utility.

2. GEN Frederick M. Franks, "Matters of the Mind and the Heart," Military Review LXXIII (March, 1993), p. 10.

By building on common objectives and universally accepted values, by defining the core needs of all human beings and proposing ways to satisfy those needs, we may be able to create a better framework for survival in a new century. Focusing on health, human rights, and humanitarian assistance offers an innovative approach to foreign policy that may be more effective in many cases than the conventional military, economic, and geopolitical "solutions" that have so often been flawed. Time is not on the side of those who believe we can maintain the status quo, that we can continue to confront reality with old rhetoric and allow the past to happen over and over again.

With today's instant communication, it is impossible to hide from distant catastrophes. Bloated bellies and destroyed societies are no longer only sad stories to be debated by statesmen far removed in time and space from the carnage. Now the images are on our television screens; they are a major force in our own and our children's continuous education. Unless we intend to give up being human, we can no longer feel warm and secure in our homes while disasters swirl through the cold world outside.

The fact that we know, instantly and vividly, that terrible wrongs are occurring creates a moral and legal burden that did not weigh on previous generations. No amount of sophistry can ever again dehumanize the horrors of war or the waste of innocent lives into dull statistics that soften the harsh fact that it is real people who suffer and die. We cannot simply talk about problems, deceiving ourselves that words - even heartfelt concerns - can substitute for corrective actions and compassionate deeds.[1]

Americans are a compassionate and generous people. U.S. national values are based on "certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."[2] We wish no country or people ill will, and have freely given national resources and frequently deployed U.S.

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), pp. 1,2.

2. "The Declaration of Independence," 1776.

armed forces to assist other nations, even former enemies. No other nation in history has been so beneficent with its wealth, and no doubt America will continue to be so in the future.

But as Dr. Cahill noted, the world has changed. The bipolarity of the cold war has turned into multiple centers of competing military, economic, and political power. Boundary disputes, ecological and natural disasters, poverty, radical nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and religious fundamentalism make the world a dangerous place. Those factors and many others contribute to its instability and unpredictability. "Our task is to shape our defense capabilities to changing circumstances," said President George Bush.[1]

The national security and military strategies were reworked and built upon four essential foundations: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. On these foundations rests the Army's capabilities for conducting those OOTW and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions that serve national defense and interests.

An extensive review of literature and research surfaced very little in print about Army chaplains' vision for the future, or their role and responsibilities in all this change. While this paper was being written, one article appeared in "The Army

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1. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1992), p. 1-2.

Chaplaincy" on ministry in the midst of need.[1] Deducted from the recorded experiences of various Army units and from interviews with chaplains who have actually participated in HCAs, several recommendations were formulated for chaplain ministry and roles during HCA operations. These recommendations are neither Army doctrine or Chief of Chaplains' (CCH) policy.

In order to minister effectively in HCA operations, UMTs should possess some understanding of the following: present world situation, differences between international and domestic missions, legal issues, the roles of other players besides Army Forces (ARFOR), and Army doctrine. Lessons learned are drawn from chaplain experiences in four sample HCA operations: Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Joint Task Force Andrews in southern Florida, Operation Garden Plot in Los Angeles, and the Iowa Army National Guard's response to Midwestern flooding. Implications for chaplain ministry, roles, responsibilities, logistical support, and training are also discussed.

Most UMTs currently lack specific guidance, training, and experience for HCA operations. It is hoped this paper will stimulate thinking about the subject and help UMTs provide a more excellent ministry when they deploy on HCA operations. Every passing day increases the likelihood of their participation, "For

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1. Chaplain (CPT) Albert W. Bush, Jr., FLARNG, "First In: Unit Ministry Teams Hurricane Andrews, Miami, Florida," The Army Chaplaincy, PB 16-93-2, pp. 3-7.

nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom. And there will be famines, pestilences, and earthquakes in various places. All these are the beginning of sorrows."[1]

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1. Matthew 24:7,8, The Holy Bible.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

WORLD TODAY. The end of the Cold War heightened man's expectations for global peace and greater prosperity. It gave a chance for positive change. Instead, regional instability increased and long-simmering ethnic conflicts erupted, leading to brutal wars where mostly innocent and vulnerable people became the victims. "Weak states" claimed they were strong,[1] and challenged the powerful and wealthy nations that dominate international relations with the politics of self-interest (fifteen percent of the world's population control over seventy percent of the world's trade returns).[2]

In spite of all the scientific and technological advances made since World War II, the majority of the world's population live on the brink of survival in poverty. Ten percent of the world's population are undernourished, and some fifty million people face famine. The global population increases nearly one hundred million annually, mostly in lesser developed

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), p. 27. Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University defines a "weak state" as one that is in the grips of a war of internal fragmentation, or that is in any sense ungovernable, either as a consequence of civil strife or overwhelming humanitarian crisis. Walter S. Clarke, "Somalia, Background Information for Operation Restore Hope," Special Report, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 9; defines a "failed state" as one that "can no longer provide its citizens protection or services."

2. Ibid., p. 64.

countries,[1] which only adds to the misery index. Almost half the world's population has no access to sanitation services; one in four people do not have safe drinking water. One fifth of all babies die at birth. Over two million children die annually from vaccine-preventable illnesses (30,000 die daily from intestinal disorders). Such massive international need is beyond comprehension for most citizens of the G-7 nations,[2] that cannot resolve problems of relative modest poverty within their own borders.

SCOPE OF PROBLEMS. Since the start of the 1990s numerous natural disasters have buffeted the U.S. costing billions of dollars in property damage and some deaths. As severe as those events are to Americans, their effects are overshadowed by the devastation caused by disasters afflicting less developed countries. By some perverse logic, an earthquake of 5.3 on the Richter scale in California barely damages property, while a quake of 3.5 in Nicaragua or remote Turkey produces thousands of casualties. Hurricane Andrew's fury killed 55 persons and damaged over an estimated twenty billion dollars of property when it blew across southeastern U.S. 24 August 1992.[3] One cyclone struck Bangladesh

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1. Ibid., p. 309.

2. The Group of Seven industrialized nations consist of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan.

3. LTC Douglas L. Horn and MAJ Robert M. Ralston, "Engineers Respond to Operations Other Than War," Engineer, PB 5-93-2, p. 10.

29 April 1991 and caused the deaths of over 130,000 people and the loss of two and one half billion dollars of property. Florida's losses represented only a portion of the state's net worth; the losses in Bangladesh were the equivalent of two years national development expenditures.[1]

CONDITIONED RESPONSE. Responses to human suffering are conditioned by several factors: awareness, values, magnitude, distance, expectations, wealth, and capabilities. As has been pointed out earlier, graphic media reporting of the grim realities of human suffering has increased public awareness and has raised common concerns about responding to disaster situations.

Modern media also has helped to link the world together and strengthen the bonds of brotherhood between perceptive men and women. "The emotional demand of mass suffering is strong and direct."[2] It motivates individuals to contribute funds to disaster appeals and nations to give generous humanitarian assistance to governments on which they have placed political bans.

Despite some justified criticism from the public about response to particular disasters, years of effort in responding to famine and natural disasters have honed humanitarian relief efforts to commendable levels of effectiveness. The world has come to expect an appropriate response to any disaster,

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1. Ibid., p. 226.
2. Ibid., p. 73.

regardless of whether or not they intersect geopolitical, statist, normative, logistical, and psychopolitical dimensions. The law of humanity must prevail over all other considerations.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (ENDS). That law should govern the "new age" of the twenty-first century. Thoughtful world leaders have reached consensus that the "new world order" cannot be confined to questions of collective military security, nor notions of one superpower playing the role of world arbiter. A framework for the survival of mankind should be structured around the following six imperatives:

1. Establishing international peace and security.
2. Developing sustainable economic opportunity and growth.
3. Curbing population growth and environmental degradation.
4. Providing adequate global health care.
5. Fostering democratic values and human rights.
6. Strengthening international and regional institutions.[1]

That structure provides any society with a greater resilience to external shocks, greater preparedness to cope with natural catastrophes, and greater political stability. That linkage must be kept in mind at all times.

The primary goals for dealing with disasters of any type are to prevent loss of life, help the victims, and restore normalcy. Preventing loss of life incorporates vulnerability reduction, risk management, and disaster preparedness. Risk management involves two processes: assessment and evaluation. The perception of risk is based on four factors: exposure,

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1. Ibid., p. 12.

familiarity, preventability, and dread.[1] Military intervention is often required to help the victims return to normalcy.

The goals and objectives for military involvement in humanitarian relief efforts intertwine closely with the stated mission of the HCA operation. The Army deploys in HCA operations to provide ground security for relief efforts until imminent danger passes and civilian agencies can reassume responsibility for law and order. In the process of maintaining established control and order, the Army may work to prevent further loss of life by assisting survivors with immediate care for life support needs. Once civilian agencies and/or foreign governments can assume again the burden of providing assistance, the Army's job is over and it should exit the region promptly.

CONCEPTS OF HCA (WAYS). As early as 1792, Congress sanctioned the Army's involvement in HCA operations. According to the Army Chief of Staff, "Disaster relief is a traditional Army mission."[2] As the level of experience grows and lessons are learned from conducting HCA operations, military doctrine is being constantly refined. A proliferation of after-action reports, articles, and new manuals have produced numerous concepts on military involvement. The reader is directed to the bibliography for a listing of currently available publications on the subject. A review of

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1. Ibid., p. 301.

2. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army, 43 (January, 1993), p. 22.

that literature revealed several main concepts that are summarized below:

1. Well-trained, disciplined, and combat-focused military units possess tremendous adaptive capacity - as well as necessary equipment and supplies - to conduct HCA operations effectively and efficiently on short notice. To facilitate a rapid response, contingency plans must be formulated, incorporated into the mission essential task list (METL), and tested beforehand. As in any other military exercise, planning, preparation, intelligence, logistical support, mobility, and morale are vital to its success.

2. Conducting HCA operations in foreign countries is remarkably similar to performing domestic support operations in the U.S. Both missions require systematic coordination with local governments, adherence to laws or treaties, and logistics. HCA operations in foreign countries generally require additional forces, more logistical support, and longer time to accomplish the mission. UN sponsorship and/or multinational involvement also complicates the matter; more players, less clear C3I.

3. Combined (multinational) military forces will be used of joint military forces overseas and for most HCA operations in the U.S. Present military leaders do not favor establishing a separate, standing force dedicated to fulfilling OOTW missions,[1] like the Danish Army has formed.

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1. Ibid., p. 20.

4. Military forces must always remain under military command and control. Even when participating under the UN umbrella, U.S. armed forces should be commanded by U.S. military officers.

5. Every HCA operation should be viewed as a potential low-intensity conflict. Implementation of combat SOPs for limited war, rules of engagement (ROE), and security measures are sound practices to preclude mission shift surprises.

6. Civil affairs, intelligence, and PSYOPs specialists provide critical functions for HCA operations; their work with civilians can help ensure the success of the mission. Other essential personnel whose skills are essential include linguists, engineers, vehicle and generator mechanics, communications operators, medical support teams, and UMTs.

7. Military forces in HCA operations are there to support humanitarian relief efforts, rather than conduct them. Obvious human need for life-saving actions would take precedence. Balance, coordination and flexibility are important qualities for peacetime contingency operations.

8. Emergency crises can be divided into three stages: I - Response, II - Recovery, and III - Restoration.[1] They tend to overlap. The level of effort in each stage follows a predictable curve. Military support should diminish during each stage and completely fade out in Stage III.

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1. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 5-5.

9. When the predetermined culmination point of the HCA operation is reached, military forces must transfer their roles to civilian agencies and leave the area. See Appendix C for further details about criteria identifying the transition times.

10. Military actions during OOTW must be conducted in accordance with all applicable laws and treaties: international, U.S. statutes, and state laws. Human rights must be respected.

ISSUES. Using military forces for HCA operations raises many ethical, legal and political issues. The examples addressed below are intended to stimulate further reflective thought on HCA operations, and obviously only touch on surface aspects of the questions. The scope of this paper does not permit restating subjects thoroughly covered in Army field manuals and joint publications. See the bibliography for current references.

Legal. An ancient role of the Army has been to preserve the authority of government. And in many nations, the military has become the government. This problem has never threatened U.S. government. The U.S. Constitution, statutes, and unique American concepts of separated powers and civilian control of the armed forces govern the relationship between the military and civilian sectors. "The basic rule is that the military plays a subordinate and supporting role to civilian authority."[1] However, in an era of disappearing external threats, the military's natural

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1. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 3-6.

temptation has been to seize upon the trend toward greater domestic involvement in order to justify itself.[1] In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, the *Washington Post* summed up positive public support for the military in a 3 December 1992 editorial:

> "Freed from cold war restraints and obligations, the American military may turn out to be the ideal organization for global humanitarian emergencies. Somalia could be a turning point in the Pentagon's search for vital new missions."[2]

Authority for military involvement in HCA operations rests in U.S. public law. Two important laws affect soldiers participating in HCA missions. The *Posse Comitatus Act* prohibits using the military to execute public laws or to perform civilian law enforcement functions. There are many legal exceptions. The *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act* provides procedures for declaring an emergency as well as the type and amount of federal assistance. UMT members should be aware of references that outline the legal parameters of HCA operations such as Chapter 3 of FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, dated July 1993. UMTs and other military leaders also have the services of the Staff Judge Advocate to advise them on legal matters.

Commanders and UMT members should consider other legal implications concerning HCA operations: international human

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1. Joel J. Sokolsky, "Domestic Disturbances and the Military: The Canadian Experience," Parameters, XXIII (Spring, 1993), p. 97.

2. David J. Lynch, "When the Mission Is Aid," Air Force Magazine, 76 (February, 1993), p. 60.

rights and agreements, laws of armed conflict on land and sea, rules of engagement, and seizures of property and weapons.

Unique. Military involvement in HCA operations surfaces many other emotional and political tensions. Discussion about those issues often reflects more bias than facts; consequently, this paper will not attempt to offer resolutions. Again, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive; it is offered only to prompt further investigation of these matters.

1. What role should the UN have in HCA programs? What is the appropriate level for UN involvement? Some Third World leaders have charged that the "Security Council is being slowly turned into a war cabinet which will mandate the use of military force to police the world in the name of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peacemaking."[1] The same questions and concerns could just as well apply to regional coalitions.

2. Should standing forces be created that are dedicated to OOTW missions, either at the UN level, or within the U.S. armed forces? How can improved interoperability be achieved between combined and/or joint forces, between active and reserve components, and between military and civilian agencies? MG Lewis W. Mackenzie of the Canadian Army advocates total overhaul of the UN's command and control and logistics structures.[2]

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), p. 7.

2. Peter Saracino, "Polemics and Prescriptions," International Defense Review, 26 (May, 1993), p. 371.

3. How can the Western world act resolutely to promote peace, prosperity and human rights without appearing hypocritical to Third World countries? Throughout the developing world many leaders believe the UN and the U.S. use humanitarian assistance to advance their own economic and political agendas. They are concerned with the Western view that the "law of humanity" supersedes state sovereignty. Some feel even the noblest of gestures are nothing more than a guise for neo-colonialism. Where are the boundaries between individual human rights and the rights of groups/states?

4. In cases of mass human catastrophes resulting from internal conflict, what factors determine whether outside intervention will be humanitarian help or military action? "Humanitarian assistance does no service if it is used merely to put off a political solution" such as occurred in Kurdistan and Bosnia.[1]

5. How much short-term relief effort should be given to victims? Where is the line between dependency and development? Development is the only instrument that will remove the stigma of charity that accompanies all humanitarian relief efforts. Lasting security comes from a full stomach, adequate shelter, ample health, education, and employment. As laudable as it may seem, humanitarian assistance can never be an end in itself.[2]

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), p. 317.

2. Ibid., p. 70.

While the issues above have been presented within an international context, substituting the federal government or Army for the UN, Western, or Northern nation states would reflect issues on the domestic scene.

RESOURCES (MEANS). Another legitimate concern about HCA programs is the cost. Who is responsible for funding them? Federal law details what personnel, services, and supplies the Department of Defense (DOD) can provide, and how much reimbursement is required. The cost of using military forces to conduct HCA missions detracts from the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) accounts, which fund the readiness posture. For example, Operation Restore Hope cost the Army more than a billion OMA dollars. Reprogramming does not generate new money. "The sensible thing to do... is to start budgeting for peacekeeping, so we can make these budget tradeoffs up front as part of the... general defense budget debate."[1] An attempt to program three hundred million dollars for OOTW in the FY 94 budget was not well-received. So, who pays for what?

Cost for UMT participation and unit religious programs are minimal. Cutting them out to save dollars would have negligible effect on reducing the overall budget. UMT members should make their budgetary needs known and ensure those costs are included in the total estimate for funding every HCA mission.

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1. The Honorable Les Aspin (Secretary of Defense), "Somalia: Finding Funds for Humanitarian Operations," Defense Issues, Vol. 8, No. 23.

CHAPTER III

PLAYERS

HCA missions have become a serious playground for four groups of organizations: international, nation states, nongovernmental, and private volunteers. Though the flow of help tends to run from North to South and from developed to undeveloped nations, even small Fiji has supplied soldiers for OOTW.

> Humanitarian aid in our times springs from the universal acceptance of the principle of international cooperation, as a necessary component and expression of our common humanity. The idea of the interdependence of states has become a major fixture of our global reality. The need to help one another is a cornerstone of the philanthropy that has accompanied all religions and cultures since time began.[1]

INTERNATIONAL. Though no super government for the world exists, many political forums for international concerns function well; i.e., the UN and regional coalitions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They have begun to assume greater roles on the "intensity spectrum"[2] which runs from Chapter VII "peace enforcements" down to HCA operations. Regional coalitions, whether formal or improvised, are very practical, because nations providing military forces to address problems within their region of the world have greater interest in achieving resolution than a nation from the opposite side of the continent or globe.

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), p. 63.

2. GEN Sir Peter Inge, "UN Operations in a Changing Security Environment," International Defense Review, 26 (May, 1993), p. 372.

United Nations. The UN mandate of peace, development, and human progress is often superseded by three other challenges facing the world in the post Cold War era: deterring aggression, achieving peace, and rescuing failing states. More and more frequently the UN has orchestrated an international response to those challenges. Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter have been employed to protect the lives of innocent people. Civilian populations are often targets for achieving political purposes by all sides in civil conflicts. Regional instability has produced over nineteen million refugees in the world.

"The end of the Cold War allows definitions of what is acceptable [sovereign government treatment of its citizens], based not on ideological terms, but on internationally recognized humanitarian principles."[1] The Declaration of Human Rights has universal applicability. The UN is actively promoting the principle that all people are protected by that agreed-upon set of rights.

UN Under-Secretary for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is responsible for coordinating humanitarian relief and achieving the following UN HCA objectives:

1. Keep the emergency from happening.
2. Minimize human casualties and destruction of property.
3. Reestablish self-sufficiency and essential services.
4. Ensure that relief action promotes and does not impede rehabilitation and longer term development efforts.

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), p. 199.

5. Protect the main effort.
6. Find durable solutions for the population.[1]

The UN umbrella offers legitimacy and reduced requirements/risks for Americans. (The U.S. needs to pay what it owes the UN). Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations and the International Organization for Migration also render humanitarian aid. But many more players get involved in HCA.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. A multiplicity of U.S. and state government agencies have significant responsibilities for HCA related missions. UMTs should be aware of five.

1. When a state governor declares a "state of emergency," the Army National Guard (ARNG) can be called to respond. The Adjutant General (TAG) commands state ARNG forces called to state active duty. Every state has an office of emergency services that serves as the governor's coordinating agency for crises.

2. The Secretary of the Army uses the inherent authority of his office to direct Army assistance in domestic support operations. This is accomplished through the Director of Military Support (DOMS) and Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified Commands. Taskings for UMTs will come from the FORSCOM Chaplains Office to installations.

3. The Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy has responsibility for developing military policy involving U.S. military

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1. FM 100-XX, Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Draft version 3 (Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: Air-Land-Sea Application Center, 1993), p. 2-13.

forces in international humanitarian assistance/foreign relief operations. Administration of the policies and existing statutory programs falls under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. His Deputy Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs actually executes the policies.

4. Corresponding to the state office of emergency services on the national level is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA is the federal government's executive agency for implementing federal assistance to state and local governments. FEMA administers support programs through ten regional offices.

5. Along side of the Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) coordinates relief efforts on the foreign level through the auspices of its Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance. The bureau coordinates its efforts through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).[1]

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs). Over 350 organizations have registered with AID as relief agencies. Unregistered, scores more of foreign NGOs are known to help relieve suffering around the world. Highly motivated, NGOs with their pragmatic approaches to problems have become welcomed partners in distress. Many donors, concerned about government bureaucracy and corruption prefer to channel relief aid through these NGOs.

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1. Readers are encouraged to become familiar with Chapter 2 of FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, dated July, 1993.

Many NGOs are sponsored by religious faith groups like Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). ADRA frequently receives funds from AID and other governmental agencies for its superb disaster relief work and community development programs; i.e., teaching methods for improving food production and working with indigenous peoples to produce safe water. ADRA has offices in over sixty countries and operates programs in about one hundred nations. Though denominationally sponsored, ADRA takes pains not to proselytize, and keeps its work on a purely humanitarian basis. PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS (PVOs). Characteristics of PVOs and NGOs blur into similarity; the distinction is gradually being dropped from the literature in preference of NGOs. Most PVOs are smaller, non-profit, and focused locally.

So who does what best? NGOs and PVOs often provide a valuable, though limited first response. But only governments (actually their armed forces) have the capacity to furnish and move vast amounts of costly supplies needed in major disasters. In reality, all players are needed. However, more C5[1] is also necessary between the players. Improvement in several HCA areas would greatly enhance the credibility, effectiveness, and professionalism of all care-givers.

A HCA code of conduct should be established to govern players' actions. Standards for accountability, competence, and

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1. Communication, coordination, collaboration, connectivity, and cooperation.

ethics are urgently needed. Collegiality and common purpose and/or action is often lacking. Political and religious agendas often override the victims' best welfare. Sometimes relief efforts have perpetuated complex crises inadvertently. And, unfortunately, some charity organizations are bedeviled with reoccurring problems of mismanagement, waste, misrepresentation, and outright fraud. Far too frequently, well-intended assistance lacks sensitivity to the concerns of aid recipients.

The Republic of Ghana's representative to the UN, Mr. Kofi N. Awoonor, has offered the following suggestions for relief workers rendering aid to victims in undeveloped countries:

1. Screen relief agencies more carefully to weed out the charlatans, racists, religious bigots, and agents of dubious political causes.
2. Limit the proliferation of charity organizations in a crisis; send a few, and have others work through them.
3. Consult the victims of disasters to determine needs.
4. Avoid associating aid with degrading paternalism.
5. Recognize the humanity, resilience, and courage of the victims - most of whom have eked out a precarious existence all their lives from a harsh environment.
6. Abjure arrogance and patronizing self-aggrandizement.
7. Work to remove the Western inbred superiority complex that abuses and denigrates the culture and people of poorer Southern nations - they are no less human than the exalted representatives of richer, donor nations.
8. Understand that economic development is at the core of the search for the better life. Underdevelopment is not a condition necessary to perpetuate humanitarian relief work.[1]

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1. Kevin M. Cahill, editor, A Framework for Survival (New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Basic Books, 1993), pp. 79,80.

CHAPTER IV

ROLES OF THE U.S. ARMY IN HCA OPERATIONS

On any given day approximately 25,000 service members of the U.S. armed forces are deployed somewhere around the world performing OOTW. In spite of surface appearances to the contrary in Somalia, U.S. military forces are welcomed as "ambassadors of goodwill" by many peoples around the globe. Because of their big heart, democratic values, organization, mobility, modern equipment, and advanced technology, U.S. military forces excel at conducting HCA missions. While not discounting the valuable capabilities and contributions of the air and sea services, land forces ultimately determine the success of major HCA operations. The U.S. Army is best suited to fulfill the nation's HCA missions, whether foreign or domestic.

ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC). Although the Army's mission has always been to defend the nation and its interests, the Army has also engaged in many noncombatant type of activities throughout its history. The Army has administered frontier territories, built canals and roads, conquered disease, rescued citizens, and helped rebuild the nations of former enemies. Military OOTW can precede, follow, or occur simultaneously with war in the same theater. They may occur in the U.S. And OOTW will not always be peaceful actions. "The entire Army - active, reserve, and civilian component - is involved daily in OOTW.[1]

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1. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 13-1.

The Army's primary mission in HCA operations is to provide security for relief efforts, and as the situation dictates, to provide life-saving support for victims. All other activities take a secondary priority. This strongly implies that the primary mission for UMTs is to minister to soldiers performing their very stressful duties. The principle applies that care-givers must also receive care. One cannot give from an empty cup.

Foreign Disaster Assistance. When the U.S. commits to assisting another nation with HCA, the senior U.S. diplomat in that foreign country is responsible for coordinating the overall U.S. effort. AID/OFDA administers the President's authority to provide assistance and has the following responsibilities:

1. Organize and coordinate the total U.S. Government disaster relief response.
2. Respond to mission requests for disaster assistance.
3. Make necessary procurement of supplies, services and transportation.
4. Coordinate assistance effort with operational-level NGOs and PVOs.[1]

OFDA can request certain types of help from DOD directly (See DOD Dir 5100.46). This is only one of a whole array of civilian agencies that impact on military involvement in HCA operations. C5 between civilian and military ac ..ities is imperative for a successful HCA operation.

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1. FM 100-XX, Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Draft version 3 (Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: Air-Land-Sea Application Center, 1993), p. 3-6.

Once military assistance has been directed, the selected CINC of the Unified Command in the theater of operations will establish operational objectives and usually create a joint task force (JTF) to conduct the operational level actions (tactics). UMTs should note that most foreign HCA missions will be joint exercises, and in many cases will involve combined forces of several nations under regional or UN auspices. This affects the administration and scope of ministry. Plan accordingly.

Domestic Support Operations. Federal assistance for domestic disasters is requested by state governors to the President, who in turn authorizes use of federal assets in accordance with law. Under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) DOD is the lead agency for two of the twelve emergency support functions[1] (ESFs): 3 and 9. It has support roles in the other ten ESFs. The Secretary of the Army (SA) serves as the DOD executive agent for providing DOD domestic support operations. The SA develops guidance, plans, and procedures. He has the authority to task and commit DOD

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1. The twelve emergency support functions are listed below:
   1 - Transportation.
   2 - Communications.
   3 - Public works and engineering.
   4 - Firefighting.
   5 - Information and planning.
   6 - Mass care.
   7 - Resource support.
   8 - Health and medical services.
   9 - Urban search and rescue.
  10 - Hazardous materials.
  11 - Food.
  12 - Energy.

resources in response to civilian requests for military support. The DOMS is a military general officer who serves as DOD's primary contact for all federal agencies and as chairman of a joint staff that ensures the planning, coordination, and execution of domestic support operations.[1] Almost all Army domestic support operations are joint in nature and will involve many civilian agencies at every level. UMTs should become familiar with unit contingency plans, SOPs, and contacts as part of their readiness preparation for HCA operations.

RESERVE COMPONENT (RC). Much of the Total Army's combat service support and field medical capabilities are located in U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units. Reserve personnel can be ordered to active duty for the purpose of assisting in domestic disaster situations under the provisions of 10 USC 672. That statute allows the SA to place reservists on active duty involuntarily for a period not to exceed fifteen days annually, or the SA can accept volunteer reservists for active duty thirty days or longer.

Arguments have been raised for forming and utilizing USAR units solely for the purpose of performing OOTW. Proponents believe such a force of independent brigade size would free AC units to concentrate solely on their warfighting mission. They also think it would be more cost effective than using active duty soldiers for such purposes. Taking RC units from the home towns

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1. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-5.

would raise community level awareness across the nation about how many OOTW missions the U.S. Government had committed soldiers to perform. Others argue such a force should belong to the AC, while most senior military leaders presently do not favor having a separate, dedicated unit for OOTW.

NATIONAL GUARD (NG). Ever ready, NG soldiers have demonstrated their capabilities to respond to federal activation and state emergencies since the days of Lexington and Concord in 1775. Activation of a state's NG force mirrors the process for committing AC and RC forces to support HCA operations. The governor serves as the commander-in-chief and determines if the state of emergency merits calling out the NG. Commanded by TAG, the NG fulfills a full spectrum of military support missions until the governor ends their involvement.

When not in federal service, ARNG forces have arrest powers. Their primary purpose is to maintain law and order at disaster scenes. When sent to quell civil disturbances, their mission is to protect lives and public property while restoring public order. If the situation exceed the capabilities of NG, state, and local officials, certain laws permit AC and activated RC troops to supplement their efforts.

CHAPTER V

MISSION

PRINCIPLES. Just as there are well-established principles for warfighting, so there are principles for peacetime contingency operations/OOTW. Some of the principles overlap, while others must be modified to meet specific operations. The six principles for OOTW are briefly outlined below (See FM 100-5, Operations, dated June, 1993, for further explanation):

1. Objective - Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

2. Unity of Effort - Seek unit of effort toward every objective.

3. Legitimacy - Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

4. Perseverance - Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

5. Restraint - Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

6. Security - Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

ACTIVITIES. OOTW include many types of activities as shown by the examples listed in Appendix A-2 and 3. Many different military tasks must be accomplished to successfully conduct the OOTW activities listed in Appendix A-1. Descriptions of various activities/types of operations are given in FM 100-5, Chapter 13; FM 100-17, Chapter 5; and FM 100-19. Those activities that fall within the scope of this paper are complied from those sources and briefly described for reader convenience:

1. Community Assistance - Ranging from a color guard of soldiers to major Army commitments of personnel and resources, assistance projects contribute to the common good of local communities and the nation. Stringent principles of fairness and purpose guide their implementation, yet many community needs are fulfilled that otherwise could not get met; i.e., air ambulance (MAST) participation, civilian youth opportunities program (Challenge), drug demand reduction programs (DARE), exhibits, physical and social improvements, and speakers' bureaus.

2. Disaster Relief and Domestic Emergencies - When appropriate governmental authority directs the armed forces to assist in domestic emergencies, the Army has primary responsibility for responding.[1] When crises overwhelm local and state governments' capacities to cope, the NG provides the first level of military assistance in its state. Then, if needed, the AC enters in a supporting role to help civilian agencies respond to natural disasters, NBC hazards, massive power failures, search and rescue, and labor strikes such as the one by air traffic controllers. Military disaster relief can give victims emergency assistance of medical care, food, water, shelter, and protection.

3. Environmental - The Army responsibly practices an ethic of environmental stewardship on its own installations. Army environmental strategy has four pillars: compliance, restoration,

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1. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 13-5.

prevention and conservation. Commanders can authorize allocation of people and resources for environmental assistance missions. Civilian governments are utilizing the Army's technical expertise and equipment to help with environmental projects such as cleaning up oil spills, removing hazardous materials, recycling, fighting forest fires (Yellowstone National Park), creating wetlands, and eradicating animal diseases.

4. Humanitarian Assistance - Whether overseas or in the States, when given the mission, the Army will work to prevent loss of life, relieve human suffering, assist refugees, and protect public property in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters. Army personnel, equipment, and supplies are used to deploy rapidly and conduct HCA operations in the most austere environments. Assistance can take many forms and varies from providing medical care to constructing basic sanitation facilities, distributing food to well-drilling, erecting tent cities to repairing schools, and building roads to evacuating refugees.

5. Nation Assistance - One of the best means of enhancing American interests abroad is through successful implementation of the U.S. ambassador's country plan and the CINC's regional plans. Nation assistance attempts to promote stability, develop democratic institutions, develop infrastructures, encourage free-market economies, and provide for orderly political change and economic progress. In a number of limited ways, the Army can help with these activities.

6. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) - Normally the Department of State initiates requests for military assistance to relocate civilian noncombatants from a threatening environment to safer, more secure places. Under ideal circumstances, little or no opposition should oppose the evacuation; however, commanders should anticipate possible hostilities and be prepared to protect his charges and forces.

7. Support for Law Enforcement - Though carefully defined by law, soldiers can perform many tasks in support of civil law enforcement. In recent years, Army roles have been expanded in combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, and quelling civil disturbances in aid of civil power.

CHAPTER VI

CHAPLAIN ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Over and over again commanders have affirmed the work of their chaplains during HCA operations. Unfortunately, those verbal accolades were never officially documented, except in correspondence written by chaplains. In all the other research performed for this paper chaplains were casually mentioned only four times[1] and chaplain assistants only once. This apparent incongruence does not represent their work well, nor heighten credibility about their inclusion in the Total Army Family.

Just what roles, functions, and responsibilities do UMTs have during HCA operations? How much do they differ, if any, from garrison and wartime duties? With so little published on the subject, the ideas discussed below have been gleaned from the experiences of the UMTs interviewed. The questionnaire used for the interviews covered seven topics: preparation, family support, organization and administration, logistics, ministry, professional relationships, and lessons learned. (See Appendix E). Ministry, logistics, and lessons learned are covered in separate chapters VII, VIII, and IX respectively.

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1. The four references are FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, p. 3-17; FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, p. 4-14 and 15; GEN Gordon Sullivan's article on Hurricane Andrew, p. 19; and MAJ Allen Estes's article on the 43rd Engineers, p. 8. The two documents written by UMT members are Chaplain (LTC) John Flaska's study project on the chaplain mission in crisis response team, and Chaplain (CPT) Albert Bush's article on ministry in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew.

PREPARATION. Religious support is provided for all assigned soldiers, family members, and authorized Department of the Army (DA) civilians by UMTs. Forces of five hundred or more soldiers deploying on a HCA operation should take a full UMT with them. Soldiers arriving on a disaster scene are often not as prepared for the situational shock of reality as they might think they are. The calamity, chaos, and confusion, lack of customary amenities, filth, stench, human misery, and death can be quite debilitating emotionally. UMTs can help diffuse initial reactions, reduce stress, and help soldiers maintain purpose. They are a safe outlet for expressing inner feelings.

UMTs must be deployed as a team. Chaplain assistants are invaluable to chaplain ministry during deployments. They are the chaplains staff, "eyes and ears," security, coordinator, office administrator, driver, and sometimes linguist (many speak a foreign language) and chapel musician. More importantly, as volunteers for the 71M Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), they understand and personally support the Command Master Religious Program (CMRP). Simply stated, without them, unit ministry has no team. The inverse is also true; chaplain assistants must never be deployed without their chaplains.

Due to their unpredictable causes, relatively short advance notices are given for HCA operations. All UMTs interviewed deployed within seventy-two hours of notification to perform HCA activities in the States. Some AC unit chaplains

were enroute five hours after they were first notified that they were going to be part of JTF Andrew. The average was between twenty-four and forty-eight hours. Those few hours were used to load supplies and prep vehicles.

NG UMTs have even less advance notice. When the riots erupted in Los Angeles, California guardsmen were told, "report to the armory immediately." Most call-ups for the NG are "come-as-you-are" events. Flood waters in Iowa forced guardsmen to take circuitous routes in order to assemble at armories. Without formal orders they began gathering *ad hoc*, going to drill and staying on for flood duties. Family members brought them changes of clothing and personal hygiene items later. After TAG authorized mobilization (VOCO), civilian employers were contacted.

UMTs who deployed to Somalia usually got a warning order forty-five to sixty days up front of actual deployment. Official orders arrived two to four weeks before departure. As the pace of preparation permitted, chaplains helped prepare their units for Operation Restore Hope by teaching classes on death and dying and Islam, and updating religious censuses to determine soldier faith needs. Some chaplains contacted their endorsing agencies for the latest information on religion in the area of operation (AO).

Chaplain (MAJ) Steve Fountain, 507th CSG, Fort Bragg, organized a special chapel farewell service and picnic for his unit. A tree outside the chapel was adorned with white lights

and yellow ribbons until the soldiers returned home. Chaplain (CPT) James Hartz, 2nd Bn 14th Inf, Fort Drum, gave soldiers "Spiritual Fitness" packets containing religious materials. Chaplain (CPT) Duncan Baugh, 43rd Spt Gp, Fort Carson, set up a station in the preparation for overseas movement (POM) process, distributed Bibles, and conducted a brief "tarmac" service for each flight chalk of soldiers waiting to board the jets. Obviously, he was on the last plane to depart.

Supervisory chaplains tended to arrive at the scene as soon as possible. Several were part of the unit's advance party. One chaplain remained behind several days to resolve some family crises for soldiers, then joined the unit later. Arguments for the advantages of one approach over another can be made for each case. Chaplains and commanders should appraise their unit's needs and decide accordingly which works best for them.

FAMILY SUPPORT. Most Army units have established family support groups (FSGs) that are well-organized and meet at least monthly, though some units' FSGs could improve their level of activity beyond looking organized on paper. A few state area commands (STARCs) employ a full-time civilian to help units with their FSGs. Strong FSG programs proved effective in minimizing problems of single parents with small children, and prevented a host of other family related problems.

Chaplains helped give families pre-deployment briefings in which spouses were instructed how to contact the unit's rear area support for assistance. Army Community Services (ACS) also

proved helpful. In spite of the Army's repeated emphasis on preparing families for times of separations, chaplains reported the usual problems associated with deployments: financial, marital, and parental. On the longer overseas deployments many soldiers expressed a sense of estrangement from their spouses. Back home, infidelity ran rampant. "Rear detachment commanders should be married," observed one chaplain. "They understand family concerns better than young single lieutenants." While deployed in Florida, one chaplain contacted the unit's FSG representative to facilitate communication flow between the home base and duty location. Prearranged religious support plans (RSPs) identified which UMTs at the home installations would provide families pastoral care.

Providing religious support to families of deploying and deployed soldiers is a critical mission of garrison table of distribution and allowances (TDA) UMTs. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm some installations were stripped of their table of organization and equipment (TOE) UMTs. Chapel attendance and demands on chaplains increased significantly, but only a few TDA UMTs were left to cover a greater workload. Sufficient installation postmobilization staffing must fill MOBTDAs by individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs), RC UMTs, or recalled retirees.[1] Mobilization planning is as critical for ministry in OOTW as war.

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1. For further information see FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1992) p. 3-17.

ORGANIZATION. Military support to civil authorities for HCA operations rest solely with DOD; it is not a service responsibility, except for emergencies on the state level that involve only that state's NG. Selected CINCs of the Unified Commands carry out HCA missions given them by DOD. Based on the severity and scope of the crisis, the supported CINC determines the level of response. He has the option of establishing a joint task force to provide comprehensive military support, or designating one particular service to conduct the operation. Every military force response is configured to meet the special needs of each specific operation.[1]

The military organizational structure for each HCA operation will vary slightly, which adds to the initial confusion commonly prevalent in the early hours and days of HCA operations. Because few UMTs have much experience working in the joint arena, it is imperative that they think through the technical relationships that might develop and initiate extra measures to perform C5. Perhaps the following scenario will help surface some of the challenges facing a UMT on their first HCA operation.

Imagine a nuclear power plant meltdown at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. The President has declared a national emergency, and CINC, USACOM, has formed a JTF to respond. Panic reigns among the local population. Mass evacuations have begun,

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1. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), pp. 5-8,9.

and a huge security perimeter has been initiated. Units are plugged into action as fast as they can arrive on the scene. As a brigade chaplain, you wonder who is providing religious coverage for the two U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) companies on the left flank of one of your battalions, and you are concerned how the soldiers of one of your combat service support companies can see a chaplain; they are far beyond the Marines and the roads are impassible. Even military personnel are nervous about the radiation threat, and rumors are circulating that some have left their posts for safer areas. Many requests are coming from units asking for a chaplain to come talk with soldiers. You have learned the NG battalion on your unit's right flank has a Roman Catholic priest as its chaplain; your brigade has two Protestants and a Jewish rabbi. You hear the senior chaplain on the ground is a Navy captain. In the rush to deploy, your UMTs could not obtain sufficient religious supplies, so you seek help from the Navy chaplain, who listens sympathetically, but suggests you contact the FORSCOM Chaplains Office. Obviously, there are some significant differences between the training for combat many UMTs have received at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, and real-world HCA operations. Many similarities exist, too.

During the first few hours after arriving on a disaster scene, UMTs must deal with their own reactions to the apparent hopeless state of things. UMTs interviewed described situations they encountered as "chaotic" and "confused." Organization and

communications were not readily apparent. Units labored to set up bivouac sites and their own internal structures. But order came surprisingly fast. Military forces are adaptable and flexible; they are accustomed to tackling apparently insurmountable tasks against many obstacles and succeeding. The federal response to the calamity caused by Hurricane Andrew illustrates how a military HCA mission gets organized.

Acting on President Clinton's direction and as DoD's executive agent for disaster relief, DA led in organizing the military response. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces Command (CINCFOR), was charged with coordinating the deployment and employment of forces and resources made available by the services. In turn, the CINCFOR directed the commander of the Second Continental Army (CONUSA) to form a subordinate joint task force (JTF Andrew) to exercise operational control over all federal military forces conducting relief operations in southern Florida.[1] CONUSAs are usually tasked with planning domestic support operations. The Second Army Chaplain, (COL) Gerald Mangham, became the senior chaplain of JTF Andrew.

Every UMT coming into a JTF falls under the supervision of the JTF chaplain. Normally, all orders direct UMTs to him. Unfortunately, establishing a technical chain proves easier to accomplish in theory on paper than in practice during a HCA

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1. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army, 43 (January, 1993), p. 18.

operation. Several chaplains reflected that the technical chain fell into place, but seemed to develop *ad hoc* from varying attempts at networking by UMTs than from design. Communication was difficult. Normal means were not always available. Locations and telephone numbers were unknown. One chaplain claimed he never saw another chaplain the whole operation, while others quickly made contact and frequently met for staff meetings, professional reasons, and personal support. Speaking from his experience in HCA operations, Chaplain Mangham advised UMTs, "The next higher headquarters is your lifeline."[1]

In order to accomplish the religious mission for the commander, supervisory UMTs must know the status and location of subordinate unit UMTs. A vignette from Operation Garden Plot shows the necessity for communication and reporting. (When functioning as a state force, the ARNG operates its own chain-of-command and corresponding technical chain). When riots broke out in Los Angeles, STARC Chaplain (COL) Gary Coad for the California ARNG began counting his NG UMTs. He discovered three chaplains had not been notified by their units. Four other UMTs could not be contacted for four days, but were found performing duty with their units; they had not yet contacted higher headquarters. From all he could determine, Chaplain Coad was short seven chaplains for deployed units.

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1. Chaplain (COL) Gerald M. Mangham, interview held in the AMC Chaplains Office, Alexandria, Virginia, March, 1994.

The organizational picture for UMTs during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was murky, due in part to three factors: an initial lack of senior UMT leadership, two separate, but equal commands (logistics and operations), and the frustrations of too many transitions such as coming under UN command. The quick reaction force evolved into a JTF for security purposes, and the Logistics Support Command eventually fell under the UN. One chaplain remarked he never wanted to work with the UN again.

Military units are given sectors of a disaster area much like they control certain sectors of the battlefield. Areas responsibility (AORs) are clearly defined. Because situations change, needs change, and units move just like in combat. Some units redeploy, while new units arrive to replace them. Networking among UMTs is critical.

PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. Ministry is built on relationships. Positive working relations increase communication and influence, both of which greatly facilitate making ministry more effective. In order for UMTs to have an effective ministry during HCA operations, professional relationships with four entities must be positive: combined and/or joint commands (when applicable), command and staff, civilian government agencies, and nongovernmental civilian groups.

Combined and/or Joint Commands. In HCA operations involving combined forces of two or more nations and/or joint forces of two or more services, senior chaplains are responsible for

coordinating religious coverage plans for the command. That level of work is normally done by senior field grade chaplains, although in Somalia company grade chaplains sometimes got involved. In some operations minimal coordination between services occurred, and between organizations even of the same service; i.e., AC with NG. UMTs must improve coordination techniques.

Command and Staff. Without exception, chaplains reported superb support from commanders and command interest in their work. Chaplain ministry is valued. A few executive officers (XOs) furnished information and direction to UMTs (one wanted the chaplain to set up his office in the headquarters and standby just in case he was needed). On battalion and brigade levels, a member of the primary staff, usually the S-3 in the tactical operations center (TOC), became the contact point for UMTs.

Accurate and timely information is a prerequisite for UMT ministry in the fluid situation of a HCA operation. Most units held daily staff meetings, which chaplains attended (for team-building purposes, chaplain assistants should attend staff meetings occasionally in place of the chaplain). Alert UMTs can learn about changing situations, contact points, resources, and key locations. This information will help UMTs establish their priorities and plan for ministry. Staff meetings are also the place for UMTs to share their agendas and concerns.

Many UMTs complained that units rarely informed them about emergency messages. This inhibited ministry to soldiers

who may have just learned of a death in the family or a serious illness. UMTs must exercise more initiative in working up a command policy for including them in the notification loop. Then they must respond in each situation, and demonstrate their value of being included by the quality of the ministry provided.

Normally civil affairs (CA) actions are handled by the G/S-5 on the commander's primary staff. Based on reports reviewed for this study, CA may be the weakest link in the Army's "tactical" level of HCA, or at least UMT/CA relationships could stand improving. When asked about their working relationship with the S-5, chaplains answered, "What S-5?" "Our unit didn't have one." "He was invisible." "Chaplains were the S-5!" Three positive comments surfaced about the work of S-5s in Somalia: S-5s worked well with NGOs, distributed relief supplies, and one briefed the battalion staff regularly. UMTs should make it their business to establish a working SOP with unit S-5s, who are the unit's liaison with civilian groups.

Government Agencies. Remember, the Army's role in HCA is supporting. The civilian FEMA or its equivalent is normally in charge of coordinating the HCA operation. FEMA conducts its own staff meetings, and sponsors sub-committees to coordinate all the various aspects of the overall relief effort. FEMA has no counterpart for chaplains or means to address religious issues. Those UMT members who branched out and got involved in broader activities reported positive benefits from the expanded contacts.

They also noted that FEMA caused as many problems as it solved. "FEMA's no help!" commented one senior observer. Another observed that "they don't know how to coordinate anything." Generally, UMTs had little official contact with other civilian government agencies. Probably, lack of information/understanding about their roles and functions contributes to that distance.

Nongovernmental Civilian Groups. Contact with NGOs, PVOs, and religious organizations ranged from the American Red Cross (ARC) to individual pastors. Without exception, UMTs praised the work of ARC personnel, whether staff members or volunteers. Perhaps, the ARC refreshment bars created the positive image. In Somalia ARC workers informed the chaplain about emergency messages.

One general officer termed NGOs, "selfless disaster junkies." Over sixty NGOs and PVOs helped relief efforts in Somalia. Each group had its own charter, method of operation, and warehouse. None of them especially cared for the military, but all of them preferred its security to the natives hired as armed guards (local nationals often suspected of attacking U.S. forces after dark). When fighting started, the NGOs and PVOs would leave the area. These groups sought out the chaplains for assistance. There was no friction between them and UMTs. Most Somalians are Muslims. UMTs had minimal contact with Islamic clerics or native groups. One regional Islamic leader helped with food distribution (he also held a political office). UMTs visited orphanages and distributed clothing, food, and toys.

After Hurricane Andrew, schools and churches became centers for distributing relief supplies and hubs for medical care. UMTs found the churches and linked up with civilian clergy to set up distribution points. Chaplains became the facilitators through which churches as public institutions could obtain relief supplies and reconstruction materials from the military. Various faith groups[1] contributed valiantly to the relief work. First Baptist Church of Homestead, Florida, fed thousands of homeless victims. The Fort Lauderdale Baptist Church sponsored a retreat for soldiers, including a free meal at a restaurant. Mormon volunteers helped reroof a synagogue.

Chaplain (COL) Paul Mason of the FORSCOM Chaplains Office summed up the ministry of civilian clergy after Hurricane Andrew hit with this succinct evaluation, "They were the Church at its best."[2]

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1. UMTs mentioned Jewish organizations, Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, and Southern Baptists specifically.

2. Chaplain (COL) Paul H. Mason, telephonic interview conducted during January, 1994.

CHAPTER VII

MINISTRY

The *raison d'etat* for UMTs in the Army rests on their ministering to the spiritual needs of soldiers, family members, and DA civilians. During HCA operations, ministry should focus primarily on soldiers, unless victims' needs are obviously urgent and require attention. This approach is based on common sense, and has commanders' support. It works, particularly for HCA operations outside continental U.S. (OCONUS). Virtually all UMTs reported soldiers were their main emphasis in Somalia, whereas in continental U.S. (CONUS) HCA operations UMTs interviewed said ministry was more evenly balanced between soldiers and civilians, both victims and other relief workers.

Problems. Besides personal and family problems, HCA operations thrust their own unique difficulties upon soldiers. Some of them are listed below:

1. When the 10th Mountain Division (Light) arrived in Florida, the soldiers' initial reaction to the devastation was awe.[1] Shock and revulsion are common. Not many Americans ever touch and smell starving children, or pull floating bodies and caskets out of flood waters.

2. Tempers and tolerance were often tested, as young soldiers with loaded weapons faced gangs, looters, and rock-throwing

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1. LTC Peter Madsen and MAJ Wayne Whiteman, "Responding to Hurricane Andrew: the 10th Mountain Deploys to Florida...," Engineer, PB 5-93-1, p. 2.

Somalians. Their cool discipline and understanding of the ROE were frequently challenged at home and afar. Evil knows no territorial limits. News stories nightly describe how many American youth would react if they held the same power in their hands; over half of the twenty-five thousand annual murders in the USA are committed by young people.

3. Soldiers felt betrayed by mission shift in Somalia. American ideals and values sent them on a rescue mission to that repulsive place for humanitarian purposes, but political changes ushered in the reality of killing or being killed. Anarchy reigned. Frustration and fear replaced compassion. Chaplains reported much anger among soldiers about U.S. policies.

4. A host of factors contributed to increased stress: lack of basic amenities, privacy, and off-duty recreational outlets; loneliness, boredom, and fatigue. Soldiers worked twelve-hour shifts. At first the adrenalin flowed; endless energy seemed abundant to meet the demands of the crisis, then exhaustion caught up. The hectic work schedule and uncertainty about how long they would remain created the need for morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities.[1] Morale quickly drops as crises subside and stabilize. Soldiers are ready to return home.

5. Information about the ground situation is often missing, incomplete, and/or misinformation, which complicates planning.

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1. MAJ Allen C. Estes and 1LT Alex Lucas, "The 43rd Engineers Link Up," Engineer, PB 5-93-1, p. 8.

Chaplain Assistant. Chaplains had nothing but praise for their chaplain assistant UMT members. Their ministry complimented that of the chaplains. In addition to their MOS and soldiers skills discussed on page 34, chaplain assistants proved to be very resourceful in finding ways for ministry. One gathered up excess items from various business that could be used by victims. A NG chaplain assistant once lived in the area of the riots and proved invaluable helping the unit and chaplain work to improve community relations. While her chaplain was out performing other duties, a female chaplain assistant in Somalia screened counselees, sometimes ten a day. SSG Edgar S. Epps, HHC, 1st Bde, 10th Mtn Div (L), Fort Drum, arranged for interpreters, coordinated convoys, and set up sorties. He would listen to soldiers talk out their feelings about tragedy and pray with them. As a result of his caring, attendance at services improved. And last, but not least, chaplain assistants looked out for their chaplains' welfare. One chaplain remarked, "since no one else in his unit looked after him, he was especially grateful for his chaplain assistant who did." For obvious reasons anonymity of source is respected.

UMT members are vulnerable to the stresses and strains that HCA operations impose on people. So what protected them emotionally and spiritually from the effects of tragedy? UMTs thought staying focused on the mission, ministering, and keeping busy helped most. Others mentioned their prior combat experience in Vietnam and Persian Gulf War. Training helps said some UMTs.

Supervisory chaplains observed that reactions to HCA operations were similar to what they observed during Operation Desert Storm. When one chaplain had problems coping with a disaster, his senior accompanied him for awhile and walked and talked him through his distress. But most of all, UMTs found strength from each other. They shared feelings, frustrations, and faith during devotionals, informal gatherings, and staff meetings. Sharing experiencies with one another can be an important catharsis for renewal.

Fatigue was a common problem. UMTs got worn-down. The needs were so immense that they appeared overwhelming. One chaplain confessed feeling "numbed." Within a week or ten days, most UMTs fell into a pattern and paced themselves better. Sleep discipline is important. UMTs must care for themselves. SOLDIERS. UMTs should be prepared to apply all the elements of ministry normally performed in a combat zone to HCA operations. Sharing with soldiers their day-to-day experiences is one way to better understand their spiritual needs. That process is called "ministry of presence." The concept of "ministry of presence" is unknown to most civilian clergy and rarely practiced by them; it was developed by Army chaplains to facilitate ministry in the military environment, and has been practiced by them as their methodology to express caring for soldiers. When UMT members love soldiers, "ministry of presence" is easy and natural. Traditionally, they have done it well. It has been their trademark since the Army chaplaincy's earliest history.

During HCA operations stress rises and everybody loses their temper easily. UMTs must model patience and flexibility.[1] UMTs worked along with soldiers clearing debris, distributing food, and helping those who hurt. They donned helmets and flak jackets during Operation Garden Plot and chaplains spent many nights walking with soldiers on patrols through dangerous neighborhoods. In Somalia they shared the same risks from death and disease as did their parishioners.

Worship. The fact that the majority of soldiers do not actively participate in organized religious expression should never be interpreted that they lack spiritual values. The American way of life is founded on spiritual values, and soldiers understand them as much or more than their civilian contemporaries. HCA operations have a distinct manner of confronting a soldier with his[2] inner self. He looks deep into his soul for answers from his religious beliefs to the things he sees. He is open to the gentle leading of the Spirit and the still, small voice of God's Word. UMTs must be prepared to conduct brief, impromptu, and informal Bible studies, pastoral counseling sessions, and offer prayer with individuals and small groups.

UMTS can expect good attendance at worship services during HCA operations. Every chaplain, including supervisors,

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1. Chaplain (COL) Paul H. Mason, telephonic interview conducted during February, 1994.

2. For sake of readability only one gender form is used throughout the paper, which the reader should understand is meant by the author to be inclusive of both female and male soldiers.

should plan on conducting religious services for a broad spectrum of people. While serving in JTF Andrew, chaplains with the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg conducted 132 religious services for 2,869 soldiers and 799 civilians; they counseled 666 soldiers, 388 civilians and 100 children. Their UMTs gave away 900 Bibles and 350 Sony radio sets to people. They also made 34 contacts with churches and an equal number with NGOs.[1] For additional information on ministry provided to soldiers during JTF Andrew, see the after-action reports (AARs) in Appendix G.

Chaplain (MAJ) Steve Fountain, 507th CSG, Fort Bragg, conducted five worship services every Sunday for soldiers in Somalia. He held Bible studies three times a week, and offered movies on Monday and Friday evenings. Six Somalians were converted to Christianity and baptized; Chaplain Fountain helped them enroll in Bible colleges. Another Somalian was so impressed with the practices of Christianity he observed that he converted. He said, "Christianity is a faith of love rather than hate."[2] Not all Somalians were quite so sincere. Three young men claimed interest in Christianity hoping that they would be allowed to live inside the U.S. compound. At other compounds UN soldiers from the Pakistani and Swedish military contingents attended services led by U.S. Army chaplains.

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1. Chaplain (MAJ) Alvin "Sonny" M. Moore, telephonic interview conducted during February, 1994.

2. Chaplain (CPT) Jack A. Woodford, telephonic interview conducted during February, 1994.

Retreats. Soldiers work hard during HCA operations and merit rest and recreation (R&R). Somalia was the first country in which U.S. forces were unable to have R&R or religious retreats (RR) within the borders of the nation.[1] Those wishing a break had to fly from Mogadishu, Somalia, to Mombasa, Kenya. RRs were not conducted, mainly due to security precautions. Chaplains did the best they could to keep morale high with videos, tapes, refreshments, discussion groups, hospital visits to the wounded, and classes. The Army provided AFN-TV and MWR shows. One MWR tour group was so crude and lewd that even the soldiers were disgusted and the CSM wanted it stopped. Wholesome entertainment is needed on extended HCA operations OCONUS.

In CONUS, more outlets for R&R opportunities exist. The Jewish Community Center opened up their facility to soldiers in southern Florida. Chaplain (CPT) F. R. Roberts, 92nd Eng Bn (Cbt Hvy), Fort Stewart, arranged bus transportation to the Florida beaches for soldiers to have a day of R&R. The Miami Dolphins football team donated free tickets to their games.

Redeployment. Chaplain (COL) Paul Mason concisely summed up the Army's policy toward crisis response, "Get in, help, and get out." As a situation begins to normalize, soldiers' interest starts to wane and they become eager to return home. UMTs should conduct reunion classes to help prepare soldiers for resuming

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1. Al Venter, "Testing the Waters," International Defense Review, 26 (May, 1993), p. 361.

family relationships and responsibilities. Use the lesson plans prepared by the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS).

Due to the bonding that develops on deployments, UMTs frequently experienced more openness from soldiers after the unit redeployed to the home installation. Signs of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) sometimes developed. Workshops on reducing stress can prove helpful. Most chaplains had more marital and financial counseling cases following redeployment.

NG Needs. Disaster strikes NG families and homes as well as those of civilians. One hundred FLARNG members lost their homes to Hurricane Andrew, yet performed their military duties when called-up by Governor Lawton Chiles.[1] The same was true in Iowa where five IAARNG members' homes flooded while they were protecting other people's houses. Another female sergeant was activated after her own home washed away. FEMA and insurance companies demanded certain documentation as proof in order to settle claims, but all the paperwork was destroyed. When ARNG UMTs are victims, AD or USAR UMTs must fill in for them.

When SPC Steven M. West, IAARNG, was killed helping put up an antenna, chaplains responded immediately and ministered to his family and unit. The family's civilian pastor asked the unit chaplain to conduct the funeral service. Another tragic situation occurred when the parents of an IAARNG member failed

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1. COL W. D. McGlasson, "To the Rescue," National Guard, LXVII (July, 1993), p. 33.

to realize a bridge had been washed out; their car plunged into the swollen stream and they drowned. The unit chaplain helped notify the soldier of the loss. After returning and completing his tour of duty, the guardsman was killed in an auto accident while driving home. The chaplain ministered to the family again.[1]

Long after the federals leave, ARNG soldiers may stay on the job under state call-up. Frequently, they experience long delays in getting paid; pay problems can linger for up to a year. Being federalized brings some benefits (funding and medical), but it also creates some major problems for units; i.e., arrest powers disappear, UMTs cannot be inserted into unit vacancies without vaccinations, etc. While civil service workers "double-dip," NG members who are privately employed lose out financially. This contributes to losses in personnel after every mobilization. ARNG volunteers fight forest fires, mud slides, and drug enforcement. To date, states have not seen the necessity of providing UMTs to give religious coverage for NG members in those actions.

CIVILIANS. Disasters have a way of making the Divine seem more important to UMTs, soldiers, victims, and civilians alike. Just seeing the cross on their uniform drew people to the chaplain. They wanted to talk. Many had questions. All were hurting, and needed reassurance. The cross seemed to remind them that they were not cast off and forgotten afterall.

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1. Chaplain (COL) John W. Hemann, incidents related in telephonic interview conducted during February, 1994.

Hurting people cannot be ignored in crises simply because they are not wearing a uniform. UMTs regularly ministered to civilians and natives. They were very well-received, and their work received considerable media attention in Florida. One news story caused a reaction from the Staff Judge Advocate Corps, who admonished chaplains to confine their ministry just to soldiers. See the AAR on JTF Andrew, Enclosure 3, in Appendix G for more details.

The military chaplaincy is a unique institution. The only other federal agencies to have chaplains are the Department of Justice for federal prisons and the Veterans Administration for VA hospitals. At domestic disaster scenes all kinds of civil servants and volunteers are present. Many are away from home and their traditional places of worship. People of faith from these groups sought out military chaplains, or were naturally attracted to them as the chaplains interacted with various groups in his duties. Many civilians attended worship services conducted by military chaplains. Sometimes those services were the only ones available. On occasion, military and civilian clergy conducted worship services together, jointly. These contacts produced positive public images and good working relationships. As Chaplain (COL) Paul Mason noted, "The chaplaincy really shines during HCA operations."[1]

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1. Chaplain (COL) Paul H. Mason, telephonic interview conducted during January, 1994.

Victims. Many heart-wrenching stories came from UMTs as they provided pastoral care for victims of disasters. Many victims who became homeless also became jobless overnight.[1] One lady lost everything, including her husband. She did not want her grief featured on national news, and later wrote Chaplain (CPT) P. K. Roberts, 92nd Eng Bn (Cbt Hvy), Fort Stewart, a nice letter of appreciation for shielding her from the media. Another woman tearfully described how the storm had sucked up her fifteen-month old niece along with the roof of their trailer that flew off. Asked if she needed anything, the lady replied, "Nothing except a big hug to let her know God understands."

When visiting with a six-year old boy out front of a church, the chaplain noticed he became frightened at the noise of a C-130 military aircraft passing overhead. The boy related how he had survived his trailer home exploding in the fury of the winds, but that his three-year old sister had been carried off and could not be found. He asked the chaplain, "Do you think God took her?" His reply was not recorded, but the chaplain's actions were noted. With tender-filled eyes, he hugged the little lad.

UMTs conducted services in the tent cities for victims, prayed with them, counseled them, passed out Bibles, food, and clothing to them. They did everything any pastor would do for

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1. MG Thomas B. Arwood and Bob Hunt, "Army Aids Disaster Victims," Army Logistician, PB 700-93-1, p. 21.

them in time of need. Holy communion took on renewed importance to relief workers and victims. Just before administering the Lord's Supper, Chaplain (MAJ) Alvin "Sonny" Moore, assistant division chaplain for the 82nd Abn Div, Fort Bragg, told the congregation he was not there to replace their pastor, but that he came to remind them of God's presence with them in the midst of their troubles. Chaplain (MAJ) Steve Fountain, 507th CSG, Fort Bragg, performed eleven services for over five hundred persons his first weekend with JTF Andrew.

Clergy. Crises affect civilian clergy and churches; they may be victims and suffer, too, or their efforts to help may simply be inadequate for the overwhelming demands of the disaster. Nearly every chaplain interviewed stressed the importance of UMTs seeking out churches and checking on civilian clergy to see if they needed assistance. There are times when care-givers require care. One pastor's family told a chaplain, "We have been given food, water, and shelter, but nobody has met our emotional needs."[1] Perhaps, only chaplains can meet that kind of immediate need.

The Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) identified ten UMTs with special training in trauma ministry and sent them to the JTF Andrew Chaplain for the purpose of assisting civilian pastors. These crisis teams were tabbed the "Added Dimension."

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1. Chaplain (LTC) Herbert E. Kitchens, telephonic interview conducted during January, 1994.

They initiated contact and coordinated with local ministerial alliances, interfaith coalitions, and denominational relief agencies to determine where they could relieve local clergy and help in churches and hospitals.[1]

Before closing this chapter, one last word on ministry should be made. Looking back over what the Army and UMTs had accomplished in southern Florida, the Deputy JTF Commander remarked, "What we have here is a chaplains corps."[2] UMT's give excellent ministry in OOTW and HCA operations. Supervisors must note duty performance not only in AARs, but also in evaluations and through awards. Far too little official record or recognition is bestowed on their labors of love.

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1. Ibid.

2. Chaplain (COL) Paul H. Mason, telephonic interview conducted during January, 1994.

CHAPTER VIII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

HCA operations are essentially exercises in logistical support. Since they begin with relatively short notice, success depends greatly on the state of readiness. An important element of readiness for UMTs centers on having a workable logistical support plan and prior preparation of equipment, supplies, and vehicle. The logistical support plan must cover how the UMT will pack, load, deploy, and resupply its equipment and supplies. UMTS must understand just how much logistical support, particularly for sustainment requirements, can be obtained from the supporting installation and/or through the technical chain on the scene.

Supervisory chaplains in the area of operations must quickly institute a system for handling UMT logistical support needs. Policies must be developed on how sustainment will be accomplished and who pays for what. Even in joint operations, individual services are responsible for providing logistical support to their members and units; i.e., the Army supports Army UMTs. UMTs should requisition as many of their needs as possible through unit supply channels. When units cannot fulfill CMRP needs, then the technical chain should be used to obtain unavailable ecclesiastical items from home installations.

CHAPLAIN EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. What to take and what to leave, that is the question. While it is difficult to predict requirements and requests in an actual crisis situation, keep in mind that most deployments for HCA operations last only a few days

(CONUS) to less than six months (OCONUS). UMTs should keep on hand sufficient numbers of the consumable chaplain resupply kits to enable ministry to the unit for at least sixty days. Appendix B contains a suggested list of items to take. The list was compiled from suggestions offered in interviews with chaplains who have actually participated in OOTW.

Obviously, the nature, location, and length of the HCA mission affects logistical support requirements for UMT ministry. Consider factors su[illegible]s the region's predominate language(s) and religion(s). UMT [illegible]bers with JTF Andrew quickly exhausted supplies of Spanish Bibles. Some unit chaplains in Somalia reported regular attendance at worship services exceeding sixty soldiers. Communion trays were needed, because the chalice in the combat chaplains kit was inadequate.

Chaplains emphasized taking practical items such as a dozen or more easily adaptable sermon outlines to include one for a funeral or memorial service. Some form of musical accompaniment adds to worship appeal; a tape recorder with tapes of patriotic music (the national anthem and taps) often gets used for unit ceremonies. On longer deployments cassette recorders come in handy for making messages to families back home. Pocket-size, whole Bibles were preferred by soldiers over small New Testaments. Lesson plans for classes on reducing stress and reunions were found helpful. Several UMTs mentioned taking along telephone books from the home base.

A laptop computer, printer, and small stock of SSSC items are essential on longer deployments. Surge protectors and voltage regulators keep equipment working. God forbid, but if a soldier dies during an operation, bulletins must be produced within hours. Correspondence and documentation requirements continue in the field just as they do in garrison.

Some chaplains deploying to Somalia found predecessors had left everything they needed; others relied upon what they brought with them, and became the supply point for other UMTs. More than any other item, soldiers and victims requested Bibles. Requests for Bibles also provided legitimate opportunities for opening discussion on other subjects.

Life at a disaster scene is rough, and can be very draining emotionally and physically. Privacy disappears, and becomes much desired. Getting adequate rest is necessary, and according to numbers of the chaplains interviewed, can be quite difficult. Some UMTs slept on the street during the Los Angeles riots. If possible, take sufficient TA-50 and other field equipment to sleep comfortable and stay healthy.

TRANSPORTATION. During HCA operations UMTs require mobility to perform ministry of presence with soldiers, to provide faith balance/religious coverage with other units, and conduct liaison with civilian church leaders. "Enough transportation assets must accompany PKO forces so that every soldier is mobile."[1] What is

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1. LTC Karl W. Eikenberry, "The Challenges of Peacekeeping," Army, 43 (September, 1993), p. 18.

true for soldiers in peacekeeping operations proves absolutely critical for UMTs in HCA operations. When TOEs fail to authorize a vehicle for the UMT section, commanders must ensure each UMT participating in HCA operations has dedicated transportation.

Almost all of the chaplains interviewed were given adequate transportation; the means ranged from a golf cart to helicopters, with loaned civilian cars, CUCVs, and HMMWVs in between. Overseas, security required travel in convoys of three or more vehicles. Chaplain assistants proved invaluable coordinating movement tasks and riding "shotgun" with their weapons. Chaplains often drove, which is why every chaplain should be trained to drive a HMMWV and possess a valid military SF 46. At disaster scenes, debris blocks roads, live power lines are down, and road and traffic signs are missing. Land navigation and travel is difficult and hazardous. Flying is often safer and easier. Get to know Army aviators, and how to use Army aviation assets in performing ministry.

COMMUNICATIONS. At most disaster scenes the means for communication normally used by civilians have been either destroyed or are very limited. One senior chaplain said combat zones had better communication. Sometimes, the only means of communication are via military channels. Few UMTs have radios on their vehicles or even field phones. The nature of ministry demands that UMTs have a reliable means of communication; preferably a mobile, cellular telephone. Chaplains interviewed cited communication problems as one of their greatest hindrances to performing quality ministry.

CHAPTER IX

LESSONS LEARNED

Chaplain roles in HCA operations have been examined in four examples as much as limited resources and experiences of actual participants would allow. For UMTs HCA operations are a lot like combat, and training for war ministry will be put to good use in HCA. Yet, hopefully, this paper has pointed out some subtle differences that UMTs should understand. The lessons learned discussed in this chapter are not extrapolations or summaries from other sources. (Many articles, books, and other publications are readily available about OOTW and these four HCA operations).[1] Rather, the lessons learned listed below apply primarily to UMTs, because they are not discussed in other literature.

SOMALIA RELIEF. Forming the "horn of Africa," the region now known as the nation of Somalia has had a dismal history of inter-tribal conflicts, colonialism, civil war, and over-riding all else, poverty. American knew or cared little about Somalia, until television aroused the public conscience with scenes of

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1. The following Army agencies will gladly provide interested parties with additional materials:

a. The Center for Army Lessons Learned has many publications. Commander, USACAC, ATTN: ATZL-CTL, Building 325, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-7000; telephone for publications, DSN 552-2255 or COM (913) 684-2255.

b. The Strategic Studies Institute has completed studies and special reports on current topics. Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5050; telephone for publications, DSN 242-4133 or COM (717) 245-4133.

drought, famine, and dying children. Half of all Somali children born between 1988 and 1993 died. Malnutrition among the living half was estimated at ninety-five percent. Three-fourths of the population were affected by clan wars, resulting in two million persons displaced from their homes. Nearly one half million people had died from civil conflict, disease, or starvation. When the economy and all other societal institutions shut down, banditry, looting and thievery became the most common means of obtaining food. Fifty cases of gunshot wounds were being treated everyday in Mogadishu. Fifteen different factions disputed each other for control of the country, using food and weapons as power. The only working distribution system in the land provided *khat* (a mild narcotic) and arms; otherwise, the common people resorted to black marketing to obtain anything. UN, NGOs, and PVOs efforts to help were wasted. For example, one twenty-five truck convoy of food failed to deliver any food to the people. The supplies were either extorted or hijacked. Anarchy reigned.

Beginning in August 1992, Operation Provide Relief attempted to air-drop enough food to prevent starvation. UN troops arrived in the country to protect food convoys, but proved totally inadequate. U.S. Marines landed the night of 9 December 1992 to take control of the air and sea ports of Mogadishu. The military mission of Operation Restore Hope was to

> Secure major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, provide for open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief

organization operations and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.[1]

Eventually, more than 33,000 allied soldiers served in the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The U.S. supplied up to 24,000 members of its armed forces, although only 16,000 served on the ground in Somalia.[2] Military objectives were to

1. Keep factional militias neutralized.
2. Provide sufficient, appropriate force.
3. Support political plans without creating vulnerabilities.
4. Ensure against the reemergence of violence.
5. Help rebuild the infrastructure.
6. Safeguard the flow of relief supplies.[3]

Operation Restore Hope had all the characteristics of a major invasion, with the added challenges of simultaneously supporting humanitarian relief operations. The theater was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors for command and control of the coalition forces. The United Task Force (UNITAF) of twenty nations had their own problems of fuel, maintenance in dusty conditions, and potable water. To help restore order as well as hope, a policy of the "four nos" was instituted; the "four nos" were no bandits, no Somali checkpoints, no "technicals" (civilian type vehicles with mounted heavy weapons), and no visible weapons.[4]

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1. Taken from a slide used in the Command Lecture Series on OOTW given to Class of 1994, U.S. Army War College.

2. Dennis Steele, "Army Units Deploy to Assist Starving, War-Torn Somalia," Army, 43 (February, 1993), pp. 24,25.

3. Taken from a slide used in the Command Lecture Series on OOTW given to Class of 1994, U.S. Army War College.

4. Tom Donnelly, Katherine McIntire, and Sean D. Naylor, "Warriors or Angels," Army Times, July 5, 1993, p. 13.

When the decision was made to use military forces for implementing political plans, their role subtlety shifted from a HCA operation to that of peacemaking. General Mohammed Farah Aideed and other warlords organized effective resistance against further outside intervention. UNITAF forces faced a "devious" enemy determined to derail any peace plan. U.S. forces became the focal point of attacks, and the rest is history. After an October raid failed to capture General Aideed and resulted in significant numbers of American casualties, national will to continue helping the hopeless situation in Somalia diminished. President Bill Clinton announced the plan to have all U.S. forces withdrawn from the country by 31 March 1994, which has happened.

While the numbers of Army UMTs in Somalia were never large compared to Operation Desert Storm or even JTF Andrew, the lessons learned were significant. To date only one AAR written by a chaplain on Operation Restore or Continue Hope has surfaced; and unfortunately, permission could not be obtained for its publication. Some lessons learned are offered below:

1. Before departing on any deployment OCONUS, develop a logistical support plan and staff it with the installation chaplains office. Take sufficient amounts of religious and SSSC supplies.

2. Malaria was epidemic in Somalia.[1] UMTs cannot perform ministry when they become ill or injured. Sleep discipline is

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1. Al Venter, "Testing the Waters," International Defense Review, 26 (May,1993), p. 362.

important. UMTs should take the combat life-savers' course or emergency medical technician (EMT) training.

3. The technical chain appeared confused and weak to some chaplains who served in Somalia. Having separate, but equal commands probably added to the confusion. Before UMTs are committed to future HCA operations OCONUS involving combined, joint, or UN forces, OCCH should establish with ARFOR some kind of understanding about who is in charge, and which chaplain will be the task force command chaplain.

4. In spite of the organizational problems, most chaplains reported a high degree of collegiality amongst the UMTs. UMTs must continue to support one another and model professionalism to other staff sections. Internally, chaplains and chaplain assistants must look out after one another and work together as a team. Both have critical responsibilities to perform, even though their roles are different.

5. UMTs must be strong spiritually and deploy with their "cups full." No one can share what he does not possess. During HCA operations soldiers are faced with new life experiences and many serious challenges. They are open to exploring religious faith for answers and strength. HCA operations present many opportunities for nonsectarian evangelism. By their very nature, they also have the possibility for casualties.

6. While visiting guards during the night, one chaplain discovered soldiers sleeping on duty at their posts. Several female soldiers were repeat offenders. As part of Independence

Day celebration, rules on drinking alcoholic beverages were relaxed by the command, and considerable indulgence followed. Two days later on 6 July the unit was attacked during the night. What if the attack had occurred on 4 July when many soldiers were drunk? No doubt some fratricide would have happened. UMTs must be prepared to address ethical matters with commanders. It is sometimes easier to die for one's country than to place one's career on the line, but UMTs are the Army's "prophets" and sometimes "prophets" must "speak with a prophetic voice." See AR 165-1, 2-3c, "Chaplain Activities in the United States Army," dated 31 August 1986.

7. UMTs must do solid staff coordination to accomplish their mission. Develop working relationships with the primary staff.

8. Every UMT should develop their own security plans (in conjunction with the unit's, of course). Those plans should make provision for knowing where each other will go and how to contact the other team member in event of hostile action.

9. UMTs must assume every HCA operation can turn into a low-intensity conflict with actual combat. Chaplains must know how to drive and maneuver military vehicles. UMT members should receive training about manning military checkpoints, mine safety, and rules of engagement.

10. Boredom comes with some HCA operations. UMTs should go prepared to teach classes, conduct RRs, and involve soldiers in wholesome R&R.

HURRICANE ANDREW. American lifestyle, the good life as it is known and expected, can be disrupted suddenly and deteriorate quickly. In the early morning hours of 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew slammed into southern Florida. The eye of the storm passed directly over Homestead Air Force Base and the communities of Homestead and Florida City with wind speeds exceeding 160 mph. The air base was totally destroyed, trailer parks were completely demolished, and the majority of housing in surrounding communities sustained heavy damage. The area lost all basic services.[1] "Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive storm of its kind to ever hit the United States."[2] Property damage was estimated at between twenty and twenty-five billion dollars. Nearly 30,000 dwellings were destroyed, and another 108,000 were damaged.

Five days after Hurricane Andrew cut its swath of destruction across southern Florida, conditions remained chaotic. Three days passed before the first federal military help arrived. In the meantime, there was no electricity, potable water, working sewers, telephone service or passable streets. Looters took what they wanted. Relief operations got underway slowly in a disorganized and uncoordinated manner. It became obvious very quickly that state agencies and the state national guard required assistance.

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1. LTC Douglas L. Horn and MAJ Robert M. Ralston, "Engineers Respond to Operations Other Than War," Engineer, PB 5-93-2, pp. 8,9.

2. COL W. D. McGlasson, "To the Rescue," National Guard, LXVII (July, 1993), p. 32.

About 25,000 DoD military service members and civilians were sent to Florida to provide domestic support operations. Over 6,300 FLARNG members worked four months to assist in the disaster relief and recovery efforts. In the first ten days of the military's response, United States Air Force (USAF) planes flew in 14,000 tons of supplies, which was nearly identical to the volume of shipments brought to Saudi Arabia at the start of Operation Desert Shield. "Officials said the scale of the relief effort rivaled a combat operation."[1]

From the moment of arrival, soldiers had to take back the streets from looters. In addition to providing security, the military cleared 14,000 cubic yards of debris from more than 2,000 miles of streets. They constructed camps to house more than 160,000 homeless victims. DoD agencies furnished victims more than 100,000 blankets, 55,000 cots, 1,000,000 meals, ready to eat (MREs), 900,000 hot meals, and 20,000 radios. Relief workers treated 50,000 patients and repaired more than 250 schools.[2] Opening Dade County schools became a major milestone in the recovery process. Helping to restore public services such as schools was the fourth major objective of JTF Andrew. Finally, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) organized the massive

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1. David J. Lynch, "When the Mission Is Aid," Air Force Magazine, 76 (February, 1993), p. 63.

2. Heike Hasenauer, "The Army's Response," Soldiers, 49 (March, 1994), p. 34.

amounts of civilian donations pouring into Florida from all across America and gave the entire relief effort logistical support through its logistics support groups (LSGs).[1]

Nearly one hundred UMTs from the AC services took part in JTF Andrew. Appendix G contains copies of JTF Andrews Chaplains Office official AAR and other reports. Care has been taken to not duplicate subjects covered in that material. Listed below are some lessons learned drawn from the experiences of the chaplains interviewed.

1. HCA duty requires UMTs to be spiritually fit to handle the shock and stresses of disaster and suffering. UMTs must remain professionally objective, be flexible, and patient.

2. UMTs should always be ready to deploy within two days. Such a readiness state requires advance planning and preparation. The unit's operational plan and order should have a religious annex outlining the religious support plan (RSP) and unit support for office space, communications, and transportation.

3. UMTs must learn to pace themselves for the long run. Though military involvement does not usually last long periods of time (a few days or weeks in CONUS; a few weeks to several months OCONUS), HCA operations are demanding. The schedule is hectic and the hours are long. UMTs should take care of each other.

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1. See the article, "Army Aids Disaster Victims" by MG Thomas B. Arwood and Bob Hunt in the January-February, 1993, Army Logistician, for an insight into the enormous problems associated with providing logistical support for HCA operations.

4. Telling the UMT story is vitally important. Carry a pocket notebook and document actions, dates, events, names, etc. The data will come in handy when the AAR is written. Keep a daily journal.

5. Upon arrival at the scene UMTs must report up the technical chain their status and location. That practice must be also followed after unit moves, for emergency notifications of casualties, and to obtain guidance.

6. The primary mission of UMTs is to serve soldiers, but never neglect helping anyone in desperate circumstances.

7. UMTs shou . initiate contact and coordination with local civilian churches and clergy, who are often victims, too. Assist them in every legitimate and appropriate way possible.

8. Soldiers and victims alike seem more receptive to UMTs and religion in the wake of a tragedy. UMTs must be prepared to meet spiritual hunger and openness.

9. After the first days of response have passed, routine and boredom set in as the adrenalin fades. Soldiers usually work twelve-hour shifts. Plan R&R and/or RRs for them.

10. HCA operations are emotional experiences that change people and the way they look at life. UMTs should prepare soldiers for redeployment and post-deployment with classes on PTSD, reunions, and spiritual values.

MIDWESTERN FLOODS. Distant lands with unfamiliar names filled with starving people seem remotely unreal. Riots in American

cities seldom threaten more than a few square miles. Hurricanes and tornadoes tear up a fairly narrow slice of civilization, but floods cover vast regions. The all pervasive waters destroy or ruin everything: animal, human, plant, and property.

Over ten thousand NG members from nine Midwestern states fought the raging Mississippi River and her tributaries during the summer of 1993. Another five hundred NG volunteers from Alabama, Arkansas, Ohio, North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia joined in the battle. Defending homes and work places against soaking rains and rising rivers proved to be a different kind of war, but also a costly one. More than fifty people died and over twelve billion dollars worth of crops and property were lost.[1] Much of the Midwest from Wisconsin south to Missouri and west to Kansas lay under muddy water. Vice-President Albert Gore called Iowa another one of the "Great Lakes."[2]

The NG did more than provide communications, evacuations, logistical support, medical assistance, transportation, and security. In Missouri the NG food distribution points were dubbed "the National Guard IGA."[3] They gave aircraft to help with rescue efforts, equipment to make pure drinking water, and

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1. PFC Angela Bowman and others, "The Flood of '93," National Guard, LXVII (September, 1993) p. 20.

2. Ibid., p.

3. Ibid., p. 2 IGA is [illegible] Independent Grocers of America, a retail [illegible].

manpower to reinforce work on the levees and for sandbagging. But most importantly, their presence represented solidarity with the communities they were working to protect. LTC Ken Gonzales, commander the Missouri Northeast Task Force, stated,

> From the day we arrived on site, there were requests to help, and we moved with a sense of urgency, with a purpose. The soldiers have told me they feel gratified about the work they did... they were dealing with real problems and making a real difference in the community.[1]

Besides the STARC chaplain, eleven IAARNG UMTs served their units in the drenching rains, summer heat, and weary hours. Chaplain (COL) John Hemann's driver summed up their experience much like LTC Gonzales did in the statement above. He said, "Every summer camp should be like this. This is for real!"[2] Listed below are some lessons learned from IAARNG UMTs:

1. Duty with the NG is no weekend picnic; it can be very serious business and demands total dedication and readiness. Civilian church responsibilities may have to take a backseat to the needs of soldiers and victims.

2. UMTs who have been called up should check in with the communications center of the state operations headquarters as soon as possible to report status and location.

3. Chaplains must minister to civilian care-givers. UMTs can assist in giving inter-faith services in the wake of tragedy, though preferential treatment for any faith group is prohibited.

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1. Ibid., p. 18.

2. Chaplain (COL) John W. Hemann, telephonic interview conducted during February, 1994.

4. Plan post-deployment ministry for participating units. Discuss events, personal problems (pay), and traumas encountered. LOS ANGELES RIOTS. The streets of American cities are the real skirmish line on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) for the defense of the USA. Violence is not an American way of life, though the criminal element in the U.S. would lead one to believe that "he who has the gun rules." The situation today parallels the social conditions in ancient Israel under King Manasseh's evil reign. The prophet Isaiah accurately portrayed the times then and now with these words:

> "We look for justice, but find none; for deliverance, but it is far away. For our offenses are many in Your sight, and our sins testify against us... Justice is driven back, and righteousness stands at a distance... Truth is nowhere to be found, and whoever shuns evil becomes a prey."[1]

During the 1993 Los Angeles riots, the 40th Division and the 49th Military Police Brigade of the CAARNG conducted a no-notice deployment into an AO of nine hundred square miles of urban terrain in which civil authority was under siege. The AO contained approximately 100,000 gang members armed with automatic weapons.[2] "Strong animosity prevailed between the gangs and the Guard," reflected Chaplain (COL) Gary Coad.[3] During Operation

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1. Isaiah 59:11-15, The Holy Bible.

2. MG Raymond F. Rees, "Whether Crisis, Support, or Mercy, Guard Moves Out," Army, 42 (October, 1992), p. 118.

3. Chaplain (COL) Gary H. Coad, telephonic interview conducted during February, 1994.

Garden Plot soldiers were shot at, harassed, and provoked; yet they showed outstanding discipline and control. "The Los Angeles situation has significant implications for future civil disturbance missions."[1] UMTs might as well get used to fighting with their fellow countrymen for control of American streets and cities. Listed below are some lessons learned:

1. UMTs must ensure that unit alert rosters have current data on them, and that SOPs call for their being contacted.

2. It is imperative every UMT contact his supervisory chaplain and report his status and location just as soon as he can after being deployed. Ideally, the UMT should check in at least daily. Reporting should become command policy.

3. Only full UMTs should be called up.

4. Whenever five hundred or more NG members are activated on any kind of a mission, a UMT should accompany them. Easier procedures must be devised for federalizing UMTs or activating USAR UMTs to supplement the ARNG when needed.

5. Chaplain representation is needed at JTF headquarters.

6. The Army and states must find ways to improve how it supports NG members called out to serve in crises. Benefits and pay must be promptly made available.

7. There are really "no victors in civil disorder."[2]

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1. MG Raymond F. Rees, "Whether Crisis, Support, or Mercy, Guard Moves Out," Army, 42 (October, 1992), p. 119.

2. Joel J. Sokolsky, "Domestic Disturbances and the Military: The Canadian Experience," Parameters, XXIII (Spring, 1993), p. 98.

CHAPTER X

TRAINING

Wartime mission training is the basis of the Army's capability to conduct HCA missions. Most HCA operations can be accomplished by a disciplined force, proficient in performing the combat skills contained in the unit's METLs. Assessing the Army's activities in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, GEN Gordon R. Sullivan said,

> The Army's approach to combat is effective, with minor modification, in many noncombat missions of this nature. The Army's doctrinal emphasis on mission orientation, initiative down to the small unit leader, creative problem-solving, discipline, readiness and rapid deployability provides a sound framework for approaching both combat and noncombat missions.[1]

The Army Chief of Staff's assessment is supported by experiences from the field. Speaking of the mission in Somalia, one company commander said, "It was a lot like rear area combat operations in a normal battlefield. It was everything we ever trained for, and it was the best live fire training exercise we could ever get."[2] Another Gulf War veteran noted the similarities between the Flood of '93 and the war.

> The river is certainly the enemy, reclaiming territory all across the state. As waters flood the towns, communication, transportation and supply lines are cut off - just like in combat. Also, drinking water is at a premium. These are all basic problems of combat... Soldiers work at

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1. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army, 43 (January, 1993), p. 20.

2. SSG Larry Lane, "Celebrating Success," Soldiers, 48 (July, 1993), p. 31.

> least twelve hours a day. Working the day shift, they deal with the blazing sun and high heat. Working the night sift, they deal with not being able to see the snakes or spot dangerous breaks in the levees.[1]

From a military standpoint HCA missions are similar to warfighting. According to the officers of the 36th Engineer Group, "Operation Restore Hope had all the characteristics of a major invasion, with the added challenge of simultaneously supporting humanitarian relief operations."[2] Engineers from the 10th Mountain Division concurred from their experience in Florida that disaster relief efforts were similar to a wartime situation.

Even while deployed, training on METLs can continue. 1SG Herschell C. Humble of the Arkansas National Guard said, "his soldiers were doing exactly what they would do in wartime; so there was no shortage of MOS training here [Iowa floods]."[3] In some situations like Operation Provide Comfort, concurrent training actually had an additional deterrent effect on the Iraqis.[4]

The Army is taking steps to better prepare for the unique requirements of OOTW. Classes on the subject are being introduced at West Point and in the various service schools.

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1. PFC Angela Bowman and others, "The Flood of '93," National Guard, LXVII (September, 1993), p. 20.

2. Officers, "36th Engineer Group in Somalia," Engineer, PB 5-93-3, p. 3.

3. PFC Angela Bowman and others, "The Flood of '93," National Guard, LXVII (September, 1993), p. 17.

4. LTC John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," Military Review, LXXIII (March, 1993), p. 18.

The Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC) helps commanders with disaster relief planning packages. Using spatial weapons system analytical database, SSDC adds geographic information from satellite imagery to develop digitized maps and vital information banks on high-risk, disaster-prone areas.

The Army Chaplains Corps should train UMT members in OOTW as well. Courses should be added to the curriculum on all levels at USACHCS. Installations should conduct at least one block of instruction annually on OOTW to raise awareness and readiness. Every base Emergency Operations Center (EOC) must include chaplains in their SOPs and exercises. No-notice mass-casualty drills can effectively test UMTs' responses. Crisis response training can be enhanced by joint training with nearby USAF bases, U.S. Navy (USN) bases, or local civilian agencies.

Readiness for HCA missions boils down to good training at the home base. "Train as you would go to war," advises CSM Robert Sexton of the 10th Mountain Division (Light), "then you can always modify once you get into the country when you get the rules of engagement."[1]

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1. SSG Larry Lane, "Celebrating Success," Soldiers, 48 (July, 1993), p. 31.

CHAPTER XI

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS. Reflecting on the trends of the times as revealed in the literature and experiences related, the following recommendations are offered for the future involvement of Army UMTs in HCA operations:

1. Every UMT should be aware of unit contingency plans for OOTW, and keep a current annex in those plans about religious coverage. They should work with command to ensure unit FSGs are organized and active. A personal bag and religious supplies should be kept on hand ready to load within twenty-four hours.

2. UMTs must advise commanders and staffs on ethical, moral, and religious matters affecting those HCA operations engaged in by their units. Soldiers should be taught about area religions and showing respect for local beliefs, customs, and sacred places. Ethical issues should be explored; i.e., distributing aid to favorites or politically correct groups, or taking gratuities for aid given. "Quickie" marriages between "shining knights" and "rescued victims" should be discouraged, particularly overseas.

3. Installation chaplains should ensure UMTs are included in EOC crises reaction plans. Annual mass casualty drills and other type crisis training should be conducted. Sufficient religious supplies should be set aside to support any UMTs deploying on HCA operations, and policies for resupply should be clearly spelled out. Mobilization and religious coverage plans for replacing deployed UMTs must be kept current.

4. Supervisory chaplains offices who task UMTs for deploying on HCA operations should always send full teams, and ideally those UMTs should have worked together for awhile. Consideration should also be given to equitable distribution of taskings. One chaplain left for Somalia (his third OOTW in a year) within ten days of returning from the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth. His newborn daughter was over six months old before he really got to spend time with her.

5. Major Army Command (MACOM) chaplains should maintain current rosters of UMTs with special skills useful in OOTW. They might consider setting up UMT crisis response teams like those established by the AMC Chaplains Office. (See Appendix F for details of the AMC plan). CONUSA and STARC chaplains must provide sufficient training for RC UMTs in HCA operations. According to some observations reported, unit level NG chaplains are fine pastors, but lack training in military and staffing skills.

6. Unified Command chaplains should develop contingency plans and tentative organizations for chaplains to eliminate delays in implementing structure and *ad hoc* technical chains.

7. USACHCS should include courses on OOTW at all levels of training. Instructional materials and lesson plans for classes on reunions and world religions such as Islam need to become more readily available to UMTs in the field.

8. The Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) should work at getting chaplains some kind of communication means for field.

Every UMT in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson now has a radio mounted on their HMMWV. In lieu of a radio, cellular/mobile telephones are essential for ministry in CONUS HCA operations.

9. The U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services and Support Agency (USACSSA) should maintain a data bank of current information on cultures, geography, and religions of various regions in which the Army might conduct HCA operations. Current listings of denominational mission boards, NGOs, and PVOs should be kept. The information could be accessed electronically. Resource materials like the book, A Framework for Survival by Dr. Kevin M. Cahill, should be distributed to every UMT.

10. OCCH should update AR 165-1 to include policies on OOTW. Furthermore, none of the many joint publications recently published mention chaplain roles and responsibilities. Chaplains must get on board the joint train before it gets too far down the tracks to catch. OCCH should attach a chaplain to the DOMS when crises develop, or better yet obtain an authorized position there fulltime. Chaplains should be sent TDY to the week-long training course on disaster response activities offered each year in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

11. A chaplain should be assigned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CALL serves the Army well collecting, writing, and distributing AARs and lessons learned. Only one draft CALL publication discusses

chaplains and/or religion.[1] Too many AARs written by chaplains never get circulated, and other UMTs are not privy to their content. The proverbial wheel just keeps reinvention rolling around and around, spinning on and on. UMTs must learn to tell their story better. That starts with prompt and accurate reporting of duties performed and ministry provided by the battalion UMT through the technical chain to OCCH.

12. UMTs must never loose their sense of collegiality for one another and their fellow civilian clergy. Care-givers also need care, and that comes best from another pastor. Receiving ministry is as important as giving ministry.

If this paper raises awareness among UMTs about OOTW, then it has been worth the time invested to write it. If it stimulates UMT thinking about HCA issues, then even greater good has been gained; and if perchance, UMT readiness for HCA missions is improved, then the ultimate purpose for it will have been fulfilled.

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1. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope, Lessons Learned Report (For Official Use Only) (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1993), p. XII-11

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

President Bill Clinton correctly summarized the world's future when he said, "The world has not seen the end of evil."[1] And to paraphrase Disraeli, British prime minister at the turn of the twentieth century, the easiest way for evil to triumph is for the good to do nothing. The U.S. is committed to doing good in this world, and military forces are usually the means employed by the U.S. Government to do that good. "The Army can expect its involvement in disaster relief operations to continue... The Army must, therefore, be ready to respond effectively and efficiently on short notice," says its Chief of Staff, GEN Gordon Sullivan.[2] "Well-disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready units ready for instant deployment remain the Army's forces of choice when called upon for disaster relief."[3] JTF Andrew and Operation Restore Hope, rather than the Persian Gulf War, may be the best indicators of Army actions in the future.

The harsh realities and complexities of humanitarian crises make military HCA operations both dangerous and necessary, especially overseas. Countries that seek aid are invariably underdeveloped with totally inadequate infrastructures. With

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1. SSG Larry Lane, "Celebrating Success," Soldiers, 48 (July, 1993), p. 31.

2. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army, 43 (January, 1993), p. 22.

3. Ibid., p. 20.

independence, they inherited fragile economies made worse by internal conflicts, drought, famine, high birth rates, inadequate health care, poverty, limited economic/manufacturing development, excessive military spending, and government mismanagement. Their underdevelopment not only perpetuates low living standards, but in times of emergencies actually hinders relief operations and serves to retard the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes.

HCA programs must be moved from the periphery into the center ring of foreign policy. Until the United States and the world community develop a better response mechanism, military forces should continue providing HCA. Most major HCA operations will be conducted by joint or combined forces. Though complicated to organize and administer, great strides have been taken to make combined and joint HCA missions function well. The Army will continue to be the military's lead force, particularly in CONUS.

HCA activities are demanding physically, emotionally, and spiritually. Through the ministry of presence, Army UMTs represent God in human form (the incarnation) to soldiers struggling to alleviate human misery in the midst of destruction and suffering. Their presence brings assurance and quietly answers many unspoken questions. UMTs help soldiers meet the challenging rigors of crisis intervention by helping them be spiritually ready and by helping them maintain spiritual fitness.

Chaplain roles in the Army are prime examples of the kind of dual function today's Army can perform in HCA operations

and in tomorrow's world. Though a warrior, the chaplain does not fight; endorsed by a church, he works for an army; and he is an officer soldiers can trust. These principles from chaplain roles could serve as the catalyst for developing new ways to achieve peace. Perhaps, now is the time for international cooperation to heal the wounds of war and eliminate the causes of disease, poverty and violence. Then the wonderful advantages and strength of military forces can be used also for peaceful purposes rather than just destructive ends. Even though HCA programs may not be the traditional military method, when it performs HCA operations, the Army is defending the nation and its interests. No stranger to war, President Abraham Lincoln once asked, "Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?"

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APPENDIX A

HCA ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS

APPENDIX A - HCA ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS

Military Functions:
- Force structure (joint)
- Combined forces (compatible and interoperability)
- Command, control, communications, and computers
- Intelligence and counterintelligence
- Rules of engagement for all forces involved
- Force protection against snipers and terrorism
- Security for sector (checkpoints, rapid response teams)
- Explosive ordnance disposal (mines)
- Reconnaissance, patrolling, and escorting (convoys)
- Noncombatant evacuation
- Search and rescue
- Air traffic control
- Area accessibility

Support Functions:
- Distribution of food and drink
- Camp layout and housing
- Engineer support (construction and maps)
- Well-drilling and water purification
- Sanitation procedures
- Medical organization and care
- Insect control
- Electrical power
- Contracting authority
- Equipment, fuel and supplies
- Collection and distribution points (warehouses and storage)
- Aviation support and ground transportation
- Area accessibility (road-building/clearing)

PSYOPs and Civil Affairs:
- Area experts and linguists
- Liaison with local government/leaders
- Law and order (riot control)
- Authority (curfews)
- Intimidation (military presence/show of force)
- Refugee and crowd control
- Rising expectations on part of victims
- Plan and mechanism for hand-off
- Integration of NGOs and PVOs
- Public affairs, press corps, and public relations

Other Critical Functions:
- Federal and state interoperability
- Interagency coordination and teamwork
- Allocation of assets
- Priority and unity of effort

ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN HCA OPERATIONS
(LIST NOT ALL INCLUSIVE)

Dates	Major HCA Operations
On-going	Counterdrug efforts in USSOUTHCOM area
May 92	*Garden Plot: restoring civil authority and order during riots in Los Angeles
Nov 91 - Jul 92	GTMO: interdicting and assisting Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
Aug - Dec 92	JTF Andrew: providing disaster relief to victims of hurricane in southern Florida
Jun 92	JTF Fiery Vigil: evacuating U.S. personnel at Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines from dangers of volcanic eruption
Sep and Oct 92	JTF Hawaii: providing disaster relief after a Typhoon Iniki struck the island of Kauai
Aug and Sep 92	JTF Marianas: aiding relief operations after Typhoon Omar hit Guam
Jun - Aug 93	*Midwestern floods: helping stem the rampaging Mississippi and other rivers in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin; aiding victims, cleanup and rebuilding
Mar 91 - Present	Provide Comfort: feeding and protecting Kurdish refugees in Iraq and Turkey
Feb 92	Provide Hope III: setting up hospitals in the new Republic of Georgia
Aug 92 - Feb 93	Provide Relief: humanitarian aid for Kenya and Somalia
Jan 94 - Present	Provide Promise: supporting UN peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovnia
Dec 92 - Mar 94	Restore Hope and Continue Hope: feeding starving thousands and supporting UN peace keeping efforts in Somalia
May and Jun 91	Sea Angel: airlifting relief supplies and preventing outbreaks of disease

Mar 91 - Present	Southern Watch: enforcing an air exclusion zone in Iraq
Aug and Sep 93	Strong Road: helping build civil improvement projects in El Salvador

Other Domestic HCA Operations (Oct 92 - Jun 93)

*Atlanta, Georgia: rescuing stranded motorists on I-75 from the cold of a major winter storm

*Hiles, Wisconsin: erecting a temporary bridge for local use while the state finishes a permanent structure

*Jacksonville, Florida: securing I-295 to stop random shootings of motorists

*Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Utah, and West Virginia: helping in many ways combat the disastrous effects of winter storms

*Lancaster, Kansas: providing water when the city's pump on its main well became inoperative

*Lucasville, Ohio: quelling a prison riot lasting eleven days without loss of life

*Marquette, Michigan: performing community and environmental services

*Polk County, Tennessee: searching for survivors of heavy snowstorm in remote mountain regions

*Porter County, Indiana: planting trees along highways

*Primarily performed by Army National Guard units.

NOTE: At any given time around 25,000 soldiers are deployed to more than 60 nations for military OOTWs.

APPENDIX B

ITEMS FOR UMTS TO TAKE

APPENDIX B - ITEMS FOR UMTS TO TAKE

During interviews, the items listed below were deemed necessary for UMTs to take on HCA deployments, though National Guard chaplains tended to rely on much less (go-as-you-are). Obviously, a number of factors affect choices about which items are essential to take: advance notice, duration of the deployment, level of responsibilities, mode of transportation, billeting, base camp facilities, location and type of HCA operation.

Most of the chaplains interviewed stressed the importance of having prepacked bags and supplies ready to deploy on very short notice (two days or less, in some cases four hours). In other words, have a plan that can be executed quickly.

Personal

- Hygiene items
- Medications (prescriptions)
- Sun glasses and eye goggles for dusty land travel
- *Changes of fatigues, socks, and underwear
- Appropriate attire for the climate

Professional

- *Sermons (a dozen or more that can be easily modified)
- Bible study/devotional resources
- *Plans for funeral/memorial service (TC 16-2)
- New combat chaplains kit or pastor's visitation communion kit with oils for anointing
- Communion items (tray holder for individual cups)
- *Musical accompaniment (hymn-player)
- Cassette recorder with tapes of military/patriotic songs such as the national anthem and "Taps"
- *Pocket-size Bibles for distribution (camouflaged covers requested most; New Testaments not that popular)
- Religious items (crosses and rosaries) and literature
- *Lesson plans for classes on area religions and reunions
- Religious census of the unit to ensure faith coverage
- UMT Handbook RB 1-1

Military

- *Cellular/mobile telephone or radio on vehicle
- *Pocket notebook for writing (keep a daily journal)
- Portable computer with laser printer
- Surge protector and voltage regulator
- Disposable camera for PR and documenting reports
- SSSC items for office
- Small supplies of frequently used military forms
- TA-50 as directed by unit commander
- *Chaplain resupply kit (NSN 9925-01-326-2855)

*Items repeatedly mentioned as helpful.

APPENDIX C

CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING MISSION SHIFT

APPENDIX C - CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING MISSION SHIFT

Mission "creep" or shift makes HCA operations dangerous and frustrating. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia illustrates a classic example of mission shift. The initial mission to provide security for humanitarian assistance shifted into peacekeeping, which erupted occasionally into "shootouts." Shifts can occur rather suddenly, even though the transition may have been weeks or months in the making. Then "helpers" often become the hated. Soldier "angels" must reverse roles and become warriors again.

Presently, published criteria to help determine when such transitions have occurred appears undeveloped. Commanders on the ground usually can sense when the situation has crept into a different type of OOTW, but they are not empowered to change missions. Committing U.S. armed forces to HCA operations overseas generally involves complex and lengthy diplomatic/political negotiations. Agreements are not easily changed, particularly in the international arena. Even domestic support operations are governed by many legalities and public expectations.

Listed below are some suggested criteria for identifying the culmination point of any HCA operation, and when it is time for the military to pass its role to civilian agencies.

1. A clear mission statement that delineates principle U.S. objectives provides the basic means for determining culmination points. Mission statements must be formulated for all levels of the HCA operation: strategic, operational, and tactical.

The primary mission of U.S. armed forces is to guarantee defense of the nation and its interests. That mission requires constant training and vigilance. Will the HCA operation become an undue burden that detracts from the combat readiness capabilities of the military forces? Does the mission over-commit human energy, create manpower shortages, and cost a disproportionate amount of the defense budget? Does the HCA operation serve national values and interests? If so, can they be articulated easily?

In a HCA operation the fundamental operational mission of military forces is to provide security for humanitarian relief efforts. Depending on the circumstances of the crisis, the armed forces can also render support to the humanitarian relief efforts and assist victims. Which role is taking precedence?

2. The objectives must clearly define the desired end state. Have those objectives been negotiated with the recipients of military assistance? Do all parties involved understand the objectives? Do they accept the parameters of military aid? Have the objectives at each level been achieved?

3. In cases of over-whelming need urgent tasks should be prioritized for military attention. Have life-threatening crises been resolved for the victims? Can either the local government or the survivors provide adequate care and safety for the victims without additional U.S. military intervention and direct support? Are masses of people and/or property still in danger from civil disobedience, disease, the elements, or lack of food and water?

4. All governments owe their people reliable protection and sufficient services. A failed state cannot provide its citizens either. Can the local government resume security and services at a level similar to what existed in the region before the crisis? What do intelligence reports say about local stability?

5. While military forces assist individuals indirectly, their primary mission aids government and public institutions. Have essential public facilities (churches, government buildings, hospitals, and schools), transportation networks, and basic utilities been restored? Has the situation returned to normalcy?

6. In many emergencies residents flee the scene and require temporary shelter. Disasters often attract many nonresidents of the afflicted area. They converge on the scene with various motivations. Some come to assist; others are merely curious. The devious seek to take advantage of the situation. Establishing control and order are important functions of the military. Are curfews and checkpoints still necessary to continue? Have residents who left the area begun returning? Are most victims and/or refugees adequately housed in shelters or homes other than temporary camps erected by military engineers? Are recovery and restoration stages of the relief effort progressing according to plan and schedule?

7. After military forces have initially intervened and helped stabilize a crisis situation, civilian agencies and contractors can perform most roles performed by military forces.

What tasks can be handed over to them easily? How much of the relief efforts conducted by the military are being duplicated by civilian agencies, and vice versa? Have military relief efforts shifted from providing security and immediate emergency aid to longer-term problems of business, education, and health?

8. Military forces can rapidly deploy tremendous amounts of assistance into a disaster region. Because they are so effective in providing HCA, victims develop a dependency on their services. Are relief efforts continuing beyond the scope of an immediate, emergency response? Would redeployment of the U.S. military from the region appear as abandonment of the relief efforts?

9. Some disasters cover vast regions, crossing geographic, political and social boundaries at random. The need for help may vary greatly. Recovery may progress at differing rates throughout the territory. Consequently, end-state conditions must be established to mark the completion of disaster relief missions. As milestones toward those end-states are reached, is it expected military support will be reduced? Can armed forces be withdrawn from regions that have recovered without jeopardizing mission success in regions still working toward restoration? Have standards for termination been attained? Do civil authorities recognize the time has come for diminished military support?[1]

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1. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 5-6. This reference is the only official statement found on the subject of criteria for identifying culminating points in HCA operations.

10. Public opinion and support are important ingredients for successful military involvement in HCA operations. How would possible U.S. fatalities affect American support? Do victims see U.S. military forces as rescuers rather than invaders or an occupying army? Have opinions changed?

The ten criteria are summarized as follows:

Mission clarity
Objectives defined
Assistance prioritized
Security and stability
Normalcy restored
Control and order
Transition to civilians
Dependencies avoided
Milestones accomplished
Public opinion and support.

"Three principles are uniquely important to peacetime contingency operations - coordination, balance, and planning for uncertainty."[1] Perhaps, readiness to switch roles and being prepared for conflict are the most crucial military aspects of HCA operations.

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1. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990), p. 5-1.

APPENDIX D

DEFINITION OF TERMS

APPENDIX D - DEFINITION OF TERMS

Area of Assistance - The geographic location for which a civil authority has requested some form of military assistance.

Assembly Point - The designated location near a disaster-affected area where newly arriving personnel register, are oriented to the situation, and are assigned to a specific duty station. Once established, the AP can be located at the POA or at the DFO.

Base Camp - The designated location under local or state control within a disaster area that is equipped and staffed to provide sleeping facilities, food, water, and sanitary services for response personnel.

*Civil Affairs - Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, dated December 1990.

Civil Defense - All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to minimize the effects caused, or that would be caused, by an attack upon the United States or by a natural or technological disaster; to deal withy the immediate emergency conditions that would be created; and to effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack or disaster.

Civil Disturbances - Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of federal armed forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15, Title 10, United States Code.

Civil Emergency - Any natural or man-made disaster or emergency that causes or could cause substantial harm to the population or infrastructure. This term can include a "Major disaster" or "emergency" as those terms are defined in *The Stafford Act*, as amended, as well as consequences of an attack or a national security emergency. "Major disasters" and "emergencies" are defined substantially by action of the President in declaring that extent circumstances and risks justify his implementation of the legal powers provided by statute.

Community Assistance - The authorized use of Army assets to provide support, enhance relations, and promote mutual understanding between the Army and the civilian community.

Disaster Field Office - The primary field location in each affected state for the coordination of response and recovery operations. The DFO houses the FCO and staff comprising the ERT. It will operate 24 hours a day, as needed, or with a schedule sufficient to sustain federal response operations. Except where facilities do not permit, the FCO will be collocated at the DFO with the state coordinating officer.

Federal Response Plan - The interdepartmental planning mechanism, developed under FEMA leadership, by which the federal government prepares for and responds to the consequences of catastrophic disasters. Federal planning and response are coordinated on a functional group basis, with designated lead and support agencies for each identified functional area.

Field Services - Logistical soldier sustainment functions such as food preparation, water purification, bakery, clothing and light textile repair, laundry and bath, airdrop and parachute rigging, and mortuary affairs.

Force Protection - Security program developed to protect soldiers, civilian employees and family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations. This is accomplished through the planned integration of terrorism [*sic*] physical security, OPSEC, protective services, and law enforcement operations, supported by foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

Force Provider - A transportable support system, operated by a company-size unit, equipped to provide services (food, hygiene, billeting, morale support) for up to 3300 soldiers.

Humanitarian Assistance - Assistance provided by DoD forces, as directed by the proper authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property; assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities who have primary responsibility for providing such assistance. (Several other definitions are also used).

HUMIT - Human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

Imminently Serious Conditions - Emergency conditions in which, in the judgment of the military commander or responsible DoD official, immediate and possibly serious danger threatens the public and prompt action is needed to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Under these conditions, timely prior approval from higher headquarters may not be possible before action is necessary for effective response.

Insurrection - The act of unlawfully rising in open resistance against established authority or government or against the execution of the laws of government.

Major Disaster - Any disaster caused by flood, drought, fire, earthquake, storm, hurricane, or environmental hazard of catastrophic magnitude that has major impact on life and property.

Marshalling Area - An area used for the mobilization and assemblage of personnel and resources prior to their being sent to the disaster-affected area.

Mobilization Center - The designated location at which response personnel and resources are received from the POA and prepositioned for deployment to a local staging area or an incident site. An MC also provides temporary support services, such as food and billeting, for response personnel prior to their deployment.

Nation Assistance - Diplomatic, economic, informational, and military cooperation between the US and the government of another nation, with the objective of promoting internal development and the growth of sustainable institutions within that nation. This corrects conditions that cause human suffering and improves the quality of life of the nation's peoples.

National Security Emergency - Any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or threatens the national security of the United States.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations - Operations that relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation. These operations normally involve US citizens whose lives are in danger. They may also include selected host nation natives and third country nationals.

*Nongovernmental Organizations - Predominantly European organizations of private citizens that consult with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UN). NGOs may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in HA activities (development and relief). FM 100-XX, Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Draft version 3, dated October, 1993.

Operations Other Than War - Military activities during peacetime that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.

Peace Building - Postconflict diplomatic and military action to identify and support structures that tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into combat.

Peace Enforcement - Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat.

Peacekeeping - Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel, at the request of the parties to a dispute, to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties.

Peacemaking - The diplomatic process or military actions to gain an end to disputes.

Postconflict Activities - Those operations other than war that are conducted in the period following conflict and the cessation of active combat; activities focused on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing the host nation infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve overall strategic aims.

*Private Voluntary Organizations - Private, US-based, nonprofit HA organizations involved in development and relief activities. FM 100-XX, Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Draft version 3, dated October, 1993.

PSYOP - Psychological operations.

Regional Operations Center - The facility established at a FEMA regional office (or a federal regional center) in response to (or in anticipation of) an event that may require federal assistance under the FRP. The ROC is staffed by FEMA re-

gional personnel and representatives from the ESF primary agencies as required. it serves as an initial point of contact in the region for the affected state(s), the national emergency support team, and federal agencies.

Risk - An expression of possible loss over a specific period of time or number of operating cycles.

Risk Assessment - The process of detecting hazards and systematically assessing their overall risk. It is a part of the risk management process.

Risk Management - The process whereby decisions are made and actions implemented to eliminate or reduce the effects of identified hazards.

Rules of Engagement - Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces.

Staging Area - The facility at the local jurisdictional level near the disaster site where personnel and equipment are assembled for immediate deployment to an operational site within the disaster area.

Unit Ministry Team - A team consisting of a chaplain and a chaplain's assistant with the mission of providing religious support.

NOTE: Unless indicated by an asterisk, definitions are quoted from the glossaries of FM 100-5, "Operations," June 1993; and FM 100-19, "Domestic Support Operations," July 1993.

APPENDIX E

INTERVIEWS

INTERVIEWS

Nearly two hundred chaplains have participated in various types of HCA operations in the 1990s. Half of that number serve on active duty. National Guard chaplains frequently deploy with their units that conduct domestic support operations. Therefore, interviews were obtained with UMT members representing a wide variety of backgrounds and experience levels.

For interviews with active duty chaplains a letter was first sent to installation chaplains asking for their assistance in contacting UMT members assigned on that post (copy enclosed). The installation chaplain was called later for the names and office telephone numbers of prospective contacts. The installation chaplain was asked to furnish those names with a copy of another memorandum and list of questions (copies enclosed). Then the chaplain was contacted and a time was scheduled for a telephonic interview, which generally lasted close to an hour. Calls were made over DSN. TDY funds were not available for visits.

Though not the easiest method of obtaining data (very laborious and time-consuming for everyone involved), every UMT member gladly offered their assistance. Without the willing support from my colleagues in the field, this paper would not be possible. Their thoughtful input and keen insights have provided the basis for much of the paper.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STUDENT DETACHMENT, CLASS OF 1994, BOX 97
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013-5000

USAWC-94-B97 14 January 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg,
ATTN: AFZA-CH (COL) Richard Adams, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina 28307-5000

SUBJECT: Request for Information/Interviews

1. During my year at the United States Army War College, I have undertaken a special project for an advanced course focusing on operations other than war (OOTW). Very little is in print on chaplain roles and functions in humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. I am endeavoring to write on that subject.

2. I would appreciate being able to interview via telephone (DSN) any unit chaplains at Fort Bragg that have experience in working with units that conducted HCA programs such as Operation Provide Comfort or Restore Hope or assisted with the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. Later this month I will call your office for their names and DSN numbers, and would like to speak with them early in February.

3. Would you be willing to make copies and pass on the enclosed memorandum and questionnaire to each of the Unit Ministry Teams you suggest be interviewed. That would enable them to prepare their responses in advance.

4. I have completed a review of literature on the subject of HCA programs in general, but need chaplain specific information. If you have copies of after-action reports and would be willing to share them, I would appreciate that support. In turn, I am willing to send copies of the finished paper to your office.

5. I can be contacted easiest at my quarters: 552 Craig Road, Carlisle, PA 17013; telephone (717) 240-0281.

ENCLOSURE

GARY R. COUNCELL
Chaplain (LTC), USA
Student, USAWC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STUDENT DETACHMENT, CLASS OF 1994, BOX 97
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013-5000

USAWC-94-B97 14 January 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR Unit Ministry Teams Who Have Participated in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs

SUBJECT: Request for Information/Interview

1. During my year at the United States Army War College, I have undertaken a special project of writing on chaplain roles and functions in humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs.

2. Your installation chaplain has identified you to me as having participated in a HCA operation since the Persian Gulf War. I would appreciate your sharing any insights you have gained from past experience that would benefit UMTs serving in future HCA operations. I have completed a thorough review of literature dealing with operations other than war (OOTW). However, primary sources are always the best, especially firsthand input from those who have actually served in HCA operations.

3. Sometime during early February I wish to call your office via DSN and interview you and your chaplain assistant (if he/she participated with you) over the telephone (TDY funds are not available for a visit). I have attached a list of questions for your convenience that can serve as a guide to our discussion. Please do not feel it necessary to write out answers to all these questions. Your experience may include areas I have overlooked in the questions; feel free to address those topics as well.

4. Your participation is completely voluntary. Any information used in the paper from the interview and/or other documents received from you will be appropriately acknowledged as to the source. The purpose of the paper is to help facilitate ministry during HCA operations. The Army is being committed more and more to these kinds of programs. Thank you for any assistance you may give me and your fellow UMTs in the Chaplains Corps.

ATTACHMENT

GARY R. COUNCELL
Chaplain (LTC), USA
Student, USAWC

QUESTIONNAIRE ON UMT INVOLVEMENT IN HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

01. In what HCA operations have you participated?

02. How much advance notice did you receive before deploying?

03. What preparations did you make to deploy?

04. What preparatory activities did you provide for unit members such as classes, religious services, etc.?

05. What family-care programs were provided for the unit? Did any special problems develop while families were apart?

06. Did you have on hand sufficient religious supplies to take with you? If so, what type of items were they? If not, where did you get the required items? How were they transported, and resupplied? What do you suggest be taken?

07. What was your means of transportation while deployed?

08. How did you protect yourself emotionally from reaction to the effects of tragedy on victims and property?

09. Who was the focus of your ministry - unit soldiers or the people/victims the unit was assisting?

10. What types of ministry did you provide for the unit during the HCA operation? While deployed, did you need funding for chaplain activities; and if so, what was your source?

11. Do you know of other UMTs who have served in HCA operations? While deployed, were other UMTs involved in the operation?

12. Describe your working relationship with the G/S-5 (Civil Affairs Officer and Staff) and commander. Were you kept informed about the situation? Utilized? Supported?

13. What contacts did you have with non-governmental relief agencies such as the Red Cross or religious organizations?

14. What liaison did you have with civilian religious leaders in the area? Were they receptive to your ministry?

15. Describe your after-deployment ministry for the unit?

16. Would you be willing to share a copy of your after-action report? If so, please mail to my quarters: 552 Craig Road, Carlisle, PA 17013; telephone, (717) 240-0281.

APPENDIX F

CRISIS RESPONSE TEAMS

CHAPLAIN CRISIS RESPONSE TEAM
U.S. Army Materiel Command

REGULATORY REFERENCES:

AR 165-1 "Chaplain Activities in the United States Army"
AMC NWOSCERP (1990 revision)
AMCCOM/DESCOM CSRFCERP (1990 revision)
DA PAM 50-XX "Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations" (revised 31JUL90)
AR 50-5 "Nuclear Surety" (AMC recommended changes dated 31AUG90)
AR 50-6 "Chemical Surety" (AMC recommended changes dated 31AUG90)
TC 3-15 "Nuclear Accident and Incident Response and Assistance (AMC recommended changes dated 7SEP90)
OCCH Guidance, "Religious Support in Combat, Mass Casualty, and Other Trauma Setting" dated 23AUG90 (Prepared by USA HSC)

INTRODUCTION:

Chaplain support during a crisis incident in AMC requires a broad range of experise in operations in a crisis ministry environment. In any incident or accident (such as Chemical or Nuclear Response and Assistance operations), there is a requirement that includes the immediate presence on the Accident/Incident site of a trained Chaplain Crisis Response Team (CCRT). The use of the CCRT is not limited to Nuclear or Chemical Incidents/Accidents, but may be utilized in any AMC crisis requiring ministry by specially trained and skilled chaplains.

SERVICE RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS:

In a crisis requiring a Service Response Force (SRF), the CCRT will be a part of the SRF. This team has been trained to function effectively in a rapidly changing situation. Additional specialized pastoral skills are required for ministrations and pastoral counseling in the crisis environment. Because crisis operations will inevitably involve emotional trauma of military and civilian personnel, the US Army Materiel Command's CCRT members of the SRF will support its own local chaplains and chaplains' assistants who are members of the Initial Response Force (IRF) at the accident/incident (AI) site, hospital, and mortuary, as necessary. The IRF chaplains' assistants and chapel support staff will provide administrative and logistical support to the SRF chaplains.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CCRT:

The type of operations required by chaplains at an AI mandate that the chaplains involved be highly skilled individuals in providing crisis ministry. The training and skills of these chaplains will exceed that normally acquired by the majority of chaplains in the army. In CRT planning, areas that need to be considered are: providing chaplains trained in trauma intervention ministry; size and composition of CCRT (to include possible chaplain assistants to support chaplains); capability of high mobility; establishment of a base of operations on the AI site; transportation assets; communications assets; ministry and support to other members of the Service Response Force (SRF); assisting in Notification of Next-Of-Kin; possible augmentation of CCRT by chaplain assets provided by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains; transportation and funding for deployment of the CCRT to the accident/incident site; on-going training for chaplain required to maintain an effective CCRT in the MACOM.

CCRT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SRF PERSONEL:

The occurrence of a Accident or Incident may involve a mass casualty event. The event may include both physical injury and emotional trauma. The spiritual resources within each individual are often overlooked when the treatment of victims is viewed from a wholestic standpoint. History and experience have proven that members of Special Response Forces (SRF) often experience a feeling of being overwhelmed by the work load and human tragedy involved in mass casualties. Not only is it necessary to provide spiritual and emotional support to victims, but emotion/spiritual support is also often necessary for the members of the SRF and other individuals, both military and civilian, at an accident site.

MISSION:

The mission of the SRF's CCRT is to provide emotional/spiritual support for accident/incident victims, their families, and members of the SRF in the event of an AI. The mission includes coordination with medical personnel of the SRF and with local civilian clergy for overall pastoral care/emotional support and for denominational specific ministry that may not be available from the CCRT.

ORGANIZATION:

The Staff Chaplain of the United States Army Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible for providing a trained team of chaplains to function on short notice as a Chaplain Crisis Response Team. This team is deployed with the Service Response Force in the event of an Accident or Incident. One chaplain is designated as the team leader by the AMC Staff Chaplain. The CCRT Leader is on the Special Staff of the On Site Commander (OSC) and has direct access to the OSC in accordance with AR 165-1. Chaplains who are members of the Initial Response Force (IRF) will be integrated into the CCRT of the SRF, unless other missions prevail.

RESPONSIBILITIES:

To accomplish the CCRT mission, the CCRT Leader:

1. Reports directly to the OSC at the AI site.

2. Responds immediately as a part of the SRF to the AI site and makes assessment of need for and/or number of other AMC Chaplain Crisis Response Team members at the AI site, if not determined prior to movement to the site. If accident/incident requires more crisis ministry trained chaplains than can be provided from the CCRT and local chaplains/clergies, the CCRT Chaplain will coordinate, through the AMC Staff Chaplain, with the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains for additional chaplain personnel. The CCRT Leader will also coordinate with the local Installation Staff Chaplain for concerning ministry efforts if the AI is located on a military installation.

3. Acts as advisor and consultant to OSC and staff on matters of religion and morale.

4. Provides pertinent information on overall morale of SRF members and religious requirements of personnel at the AI site.

5. Ensure that pastoral care is provided or available from specially trained chaplains at hospitals and other health care facilities at or near the AI site.

6. Acts as liaison between the SRF and local community clergies for coordination of ministry requirements.

7. Ensures that special denominational requirements of major faith groups are provided at or near the accident/incident scene.

8. Provides for special worship and memorial services as required.

9. Ensures that adequate pastoral care and support is provided for SRF personnel during an AI.

10. Provides for on-going training of chaplains of AMC who are identified as members of the Chaplain Crisis Response Team prior to an AI.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

The first member of the CCRT to arrive on an AI site will be the CCRT Leader. The first priority of the CCRT Leader is to evaluate the scope of the AI and determine if a need exists for argumentation of the CCRT by other chaplains trained in crisis ministry. If the CCRT Leader determines augmentation to be necessary, he/she will brief the OSC and make a recommendation as to the number of augment chaplains needed. The CCRT Leader will implement the decision of the OSC through the AMC Staff Chaplain.

Locations where CCRT chaplains will be needed will include, but not be limited to: 1) the accident/incident site; 2) the mortuary; 3) hospitals and other medical facilities; 4) areas established for survivors and families involved in the AI; 5) other locations as directed by the OSC.

The CCRT chaplains will provide emotional/spiritual support for: SRF personnel; injured persons; mortuary workers and families arriving for the identification process; family members of casualties.

As needed, the CCRT Leader will arrange for: funeral and memorial services; grief awareness instruction; group and individual pastoral counseling; notification support; mutual support of other team members with a clear plan for rest and reconstitution in order to maximize the overall effectiveness of the team.

RESOURCES:

The initial resource for the CCRT will be the small cadre of chaplains from the US Army Material Command who have had training in operations in nuclear and chemical environments and in providing crisis ministry. If the OSC and the CCRT Leader determine that augmentation is necessary, the requirement will be communicated to AMC Staff Chaplain and he/she will coordinate with the

Office of the US Army Chief of Chaplains for the requested additional chaplains. Upon the arrival of additional chaplains to augment the CCRT, the CCRT Leader will integrate these chaplains into the CCRT and assign ministry responsibilities. As augmented members of the CCRT, the additional chaplains will be under the operational control of the CCRT Leader.

The CCRT Leader will coordinate with appropriate staff sections of the SRF for transportation, communications and other types of support needs.

TAB A (CCRT) TO APPENDIX V (CHAPLAIN)
TO ANNEX C (SRF COMMANDER/ON-SCENE COORDINATOR)
TO AMC CSRFCERP

1. PURPOSE. To provide guidance and prioritize responsibilities and staff relationships of the Chaplain Crisis Response Team (CCRT) and the Team Leader during an AI.

2. MISSION. The mission of the SRF's CCRT is to provide emotional/spiritual support for accident/incident victims, their families, and members of the SRF in the event of an AI. The mission includes coordination with medical personnel of the SRF and with local civilian clergy for overall pastoral care/emotional support and for denominational specific ministry that may not be available from the CCRT.

3. OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS. Specialized pastoral skills are required for ministrations and pastoral counseling in the crisis environment. Because crisis operations will inevitably involve emotional trauma of military and civilian personnel, the U.S. Army Materiel Command's CCRT members of the SRF will support its own local chaplains and chaplain assistants who are members of the Initial Response Force (IRF) at a accident/incident (AI) site, hospital, and mortuary, as necessary. The IRF chaplain assistants and chapel support staff will provide administrative and logistical support to the SRF chaplains.

4. CONCEPT OF CCRT OPERATIONS. The first member of the CCRT to arrive on an AI site will be the CCRT Leader. The first priority of the CCRT Leader is to evaluate the scope of the AI and determine if a need exists for augmentation of the CCRT by other chaplains trained in crisis ministry. If the CCRT Leader determines augmentation to be necessary, he/she will brief the OSC and make a recommendation as to the number of augment chaplains needed. The CCRT Leader will implement the decision of the OSC through the AMC Staff Chaplain.

a. Locations where CCRT chaplains will be needed will include, but not be limited to: 1) the accident/incident site; 2) the mortuary; 3) hospitals and other medical facilities; 4) areas established for survivors and families involved in the AI; 5) other locations as directed by the OSC.

b. The CCRT chaplains will provide emotional/spiritual support for: SRF personnel; injured persons; mortuary workers and families arriving for the identification process; family members of casualties.

c. As needed, the CCRT Leader will arrange for: funeral and memorial services; grief awareness instruction; group and individual pastoral counseling; notification support; mutual

support of other team members with a clear plan for rest and reconstitution in order to maximize the overall effectiveness of the team.

5. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. The occurrence of an Accident or Incident may involve a mass casualty event. The event may include both physical injury and emotional trauma. The spiritual resources within each individual are often overlooked when the treatment of victims is viewed from a holistic standpoint. The type of operations required by chaplains at an AI mandate that the chaplains involved be highly skilled individuals in providing crisis ministry. The training and skills of these chaplains will exceed that normally acquired by the majority of chaplains in the army. In CRT planning, areas that need to be considered are: providing chaplains trained in trauma intervention ministry; size and composition of CCRT (to include possible chaplain assistants to support chaplains); capability of high mobility; establishment of a base of operations on the AI site; transportation assets; communications assets; ministry and support to other members of the Service Response Force (SRF); assisting in Notification of Next-Of-Kin; possible augmentation of CCRT by chaplain assets provided by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains; transportation and funding for deployment of the CCRT to the accident/incident site; on-going training for chaplains required to maintain an effective CCRT in the MACOM.

6. SRF PERSONNEL MINISTRY. History and experience have proven that members of Special Response Forces (SRF) often experience a feeling of being overwhelmed by the work load and human tragedy involved in mass casualties. Not only is it necessary to provide spiritual and emotional support to victims, but emotional/spiritual support is also often necessary for the members of the SRF and other individuals, both military and civilian, at an accident site.

7. ORGANIZATION. The Staff Chaplain of the United States Army Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible for providing a trained team of chaplains to function on short notice as a Chaplain Crisis Response Team. This team is deployed with the Service Response Force in the event of an Accident or Incident. One chaplain is designated as the team leader by the AMC Staff Chaplain. The CCRT Leader is on the Special Staff of the On Site Commander (OSC) and has direct access to the OSC in accordance with AR 165-1. Chaplains who are members of the Initial Response Force (IRF) will be integrated into the CCRT of the SRF, unless other missions prevail.

8. RESPONSIBILITIES. To accomplish the CCRT mission, the CCRT Leader:

a. Reports directly to the OSC at the AI site.

b. Responds immediately as a part of the SRF to the AI site and makes assessment of need for and/or number of other AMC Chaplain Crisis Response Team members at the AI site, if not determined prior to movement to the site. If accident/incident requires more crisis ministry trained chaplains than can be provided from the CCRT and local chaplains/clergies, the CCRT Chaplain will coordinate, through the AMC Staff Chaplain, with the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains for additional chaplain personnel. The CCRT Leader will also coordinate with the local Installation Staff Chaplain for continuing ministry efforts if the AI is located on a military installation.

c. Acts as advisor and consultant to OSC and staff on matters of religion and morale.

d. Provides pertinent information on overall morale of SRF members and religious requirements of personnel at the AI site.

e. Ensure that pastoral care is provided or available from specially trained chaplains at hospitals and other health care facilities at or near the AI site.

f. Acts as liaison between the SRF and local community clergies for coordination of ministry requirements.

g. Ensures that special denominational requirements of major faith groups are provided at or near the accident/incident scene.

h. Provides for special worship and memorial services as required.

i. Ensures that adequate pastoral care and support is provided for SRF personnel during an AI.

j. Provides for on-going training of chaplains of AMC who are identified as members of the Chaplain Crisis Response Team prior to an AI.

9. RESOURCES. The initial resource for the CCRT will be the small cadre of chaplains from the U.S. Army Materiel Command who have had training in operations in nuclear and chemical environments and in providing crisis ministry. If the OSC and the CCRT Leader determine that augmentation is necessary, the requirement will be communicated to AMC Staff Chaplain and he/she will coor-

dinate with the Office of the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains for the requested additional chaplains.

a. Upon the arrival of additional chaplains to augment the CCRT, the CCRT Leader will integrate these chaplains into the CCRT and assign ministry responsibilities. As augmented members of the CCRT, the additional chaplains will be under the operational control of the CCRT Leader.

b. The CCRT Leader will coordinate with appropriate staff sections of the SRF for transportation, communications and other types of support needs.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

CHAPLAIN CRISIS RESPONSE TEAM
United States Army Materiel Command

The Chief of Chaplain's initiative for Mass Casualty Ministry was received at the Office of the AMC Staff Chaplain. In July 1990 the AMC Staff Chaplain assigned Chaplain (LTC) John F. Teer, AMC Director of Chaplain Operations, Personnel and Training to develop a training program and implement a Chaplain Crisis Response Team (CCRT) within AMC.

Chaplain Teer researched the issues and requirements and wrote and coordinated the appropriate changes to applicable Army Regulations, AMC Emergency Response Plans, DA Pamphlets and Circulars. These change were approved. He then developed the basic objectives and concept of operations for the CCRT.

Coordination with Health Services Command (HSC) was implemented on mass casualty ministry and then working documents of the AMC plan were submitted to the HSC Chaplain for his information. The HSC Chaplain concurred telephonically with the AMC plan.

AMC installations were identified that would most likely be involved in a Crisis Ministry accident or incident. The Commanders of those installations were contacted requesting their chaplain's positions be identified as being a part of the permanent AMC CCRT. The chaplains who would serve on the CCRT were also contacted. The AMC CCRT will be trained not only for ministry in chemical and nuclear accidents and incidents, but also for any other type of mass crisis ministry event that may occur in AMC.

Each commander and chaplain involved were sent copies of the CCRT Concept of Operations and a request for concurrence. All commanders concurred and a Memorandum of Understanding between the AMC Staff Chaplain and the respective commanders was signed.

Chaplain (LTC) Teer was appointed by the AMC Staff Chaplain to serve as the AMC Chaplain Crisis Response Team Leader.

AMC planned a Service Response Force Exercise (SRFX) to be held at Tooele Army Depot during the period 10-14 June 1991. The AMC CCRT participated in the SRFX. In addition to the CCRT participating in the SRFX, time was also be utilized during the exercise period for additional training in this specialized ministry. The HSC Staff Chaplain was the primary instructor working with Chaplain Teer in the chaplain training phase of the SRFX.

Many changes took place in FY92 in AMC. There was a large turnover of personnel. Many of the DESCOM chaplain authorizations were removed. It was time for the CCRT to take on a new look. Chaplain (LTC) Paul I. Pease took over as the team leader. He

recommended and received approval from the Command Chaplain to have the team made up of members from multi-chaplain installations from throughout AMC. Four other team members were appointed with memorandums of understanding from Selfridge, Monmouth, Aberdeen, and Redstone.

Training was received in March 1993 in San Antonio from Health Services Command on the subject of "Ministering to Trauma Victims." The team participated in a chemical mass-casualty exercise at Anniston Army Depot 17-21 May 1993. A separate after-action report was written on the exercise.

MEMO THRU Kuehne
Deputy
To Chief of Chaplains

SUBJECT: AMC Chaplain Crisis Response Team (CCRT)

1. The Army Materiel Command CCRT is very active. During FY 1993 the team was reorganized because of personnel changes. Chaplain (LTC) Pease, HQ AMC, is the team leader and the members are from Major Subordinate Commands within AMC.

2. As part of their training this year the CCRT attended the Trauma Response Training Course conducted by Health Services Command at Brooke Army Medical Center in March. This is a course that provides an excellent opportunity to receive quality training for mass casualty and natural disaster situations.

3. The exercise the CCRT participated in last week is explained in the enclosed SRFX/CCRT-93 After Action Report. It lists the CCRT members, preparation, how the play unfolded, some of the highlights, observations, and recommendations. The recommendations do not require any action from your office.

4. AMC -- America's Arsenal for the Brave.

Encl

DONALD W. GOVER
Chaplain (COL) USA
Command Chaplain

AMCCH (500b) 25 May 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR Chaplain (COL) Gover, Command Chaplain, U.S. Army Materiel Command

SUBJECT: SRFX/CCRT-93 After Action Report

1. A joint effort exercise known as the Anniston Community Full Scale Exercise 1993 (FSX 93) was conducted 17-20 May 1993 on and around the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), Anniston, Alabama. This was a combined effort of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) of the Department of the Army (DA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Service Response Force (SRF), the Chaplain Crisis Response Team (CCRT), as well as state and local community governments and groups. The exercise was co-directed by Mr. Dan Civis, USA Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS), and Mr. Bill McSwain, FEMA Region IV.

2. The CCRT is made up of the following members: Chaplain (LTC) Pease, team leader; Chaplain (MAJ) Van Ingen, assistant team leader; Chaplain (MAJ) Ayers; Chaplain (MAJ) Roberts; and (for this exercise only) Chaplain (CPT) Donohoe, Alabama National Guard. Chaplain (MAJ) Boshen will join the team this summer.

3. The team leader attended several briefings and preparatory meetings prior to the exercise. They included a meeting on 15 April in Anniston with representation from the organizations mentioned above and controller/evaluator training/planning the week prior to the exercise. Because of this Chaplain Pease became a controller/evaluator and Chaplain Van Ingen became the team leader for the exercise.

4. The CCRT was given permission to arrive on Sunday, 16 May 1993, for training and coordinating with local clergy. At 0900 on 17 May 1993 the CCRT met at the Christian Servicemen's Center, directed by Rev. Karl Volz, in Anniston, AL. The meeting included interested clergy from the area. There was some difficulty making contacts since there is no local ministerial association in Anniston. I gave them appropriate (public) information as to the purpose and nature of the exercise. I explained that if it were necessary to use them it would be in the civilian community to help with civilian casualties. We also found they were well organized for natural disasters and their capabilities were tested during last year's hurricane season. They were willing to leave their names and phone numbers in the event they were needed. However, none were called during the exercise. Rev. Volz and his wife hosted breakfast.

5. The exercise began at approximately 1100 on 17 May 1993 with a truck accident. It was a tractor-trailer with chemical surety materiel on board. A fire was started by the accident. At 1136 12 rounds exploded and a large quantity of chemical surety materiel was released into the air. At approximately 1237 the AMC Chief of Staff notified the EOC at Depot System Command (DESCOM) to form the SRF and the DESCOM EOC reported at 1245 that the SRF would deploy to ANAD with an ETA of NLT 1900 CST.

6. The CCRT was notified at 1335 only after AMCCH called the AMC OP Center about a rumor of a chemical accident at ANAD. No notification was attempted by the OP Center for the SRFX Chaplain prior to this time.

7. The ANAD Community Counseling Center and Ministry Task Force were never notified of the accident by the ANAD EOC. The Director of the Community Counseling Center was not a member of the EOC and had to rely on a casualty representative (later the CCRT team leader) for information. At 1355 a ANAD Chaplain representative called the ANAD EOC requesting information on casualties (due to a rumored accident) and to offer appropriate spiritual support. Two minutes later the EOC began sending plays.

8. No outside lines were available in the Community Counseling Center at the start of the exercise to include DSN (Building 95). The director, Mr. Webb, was able to get it corrected as soon as it was discovered. Apparently they were removed to support the control staff without thought to the mission of the counseling center or the chaplains.

9. The second and final accident took place at approximately 1430 when lightning struck a truck carrying a load of 210 rounds of 105mm-GB and the electric discharge caused 25 rounds to detonate.

10. The CCRT arrived at the reception center at 1800. They were unable to go immediately to the Depot because of a chemical plume that was between the two locations. They were given clearance at 2030 and arrived at the Community Counseling Center at 2115. Chaplain Van Ingen reported to the EOC at 2130. Mobile communications was not provided for the CCRT. Without this critical resource communications was very difficult when chaplains were out visiting sites. Facilities were provided by giving them full use of the counseling center and its staff. Protective masks were issued.

11. The SRFX did demonstrate that the CCRT was able to meet its objectives during a mass casualty environment. They were able to provide: Pastoral care and spiritual and emotional support to the injured and ill persons, their family members, and SRF personnel; Liaison between SRF and local community clergy; Special denominational requirements of represented faith groups; Assistance to NOK notification officer's visits; Worship services as required (Chaplain Pease conducted a service for the control group on Sunday prior to the exercise at the hotel. Chaplain Donohoe conducted mass on Thursday, Ascension Day, during the exercise); Advise and expertise on matters of religion and morale to the SRF commander and staff.

12. There were two events that are worthy of special note. First, the use of civilian clergy to minister to non-DOD civilians. The CCRT was very careful to use the Ministry Task Force members (volunteer civilian ministers) of ANAD to minister to those other than military and DOD civilians and their family members to the complete satisfaction of LTC Foote, the JAG controller. Second, the use of one debriefing session was conducted with players representing the

initial rescuers on the scene within 48 hours of the first accident. This was effectively led by Chaplain Ayers and demonstrated the need for and the advantages of debriefing.

13. As in SRFX-91 there appeared to be an assumption that the counselors and chaplains/ministers were going to make NOK notifications. It is never a good idea to have the counselor make the notification since that associates the counselor as the source of pain rather than the comforter and therefore impedes the effect of follow-up counseling. In addition it is a violation of AR 165-1 to use a chaplain as the notification officer. The chaplain may accompany the notification officer but not serve as one. Counselors did make the notifications and the chaplains and ministers accompanied them to offer support to the bereaved.

14. The makeup of the CCRT was unique for this exercise because Chaplain (CPT) Donohoe from the Alabama National Guard and a Roman Catholic priest from the Sacred Heart Of Jesus Catholic Church, Anniston, Alabama was a member. His unit funded him because they saw the value in the training he would receive. Chaplain Pease approached him because he was interested in having a priest on the team. Chaplain Donohoe was invaluable as a chaplain, priest, and as a local resident of the community.

15. The exercise revealed an operational deficiency with the CCRT in that there were no chaplain assistants (71M) on the team. It is the opinion of the CCRT that at least two or three 71Ms with a minimum grade of E5 should be added to the team. Doctrinally, one chaplain and one assistant make up one Unit Ministry Team. The chaplain's emphasis is on ministry and the chaplain assistant on ministry support. Chaplain assistants on the team would free the chaplains' time of much of the support tasks, give the chaplains better support than they can provide themselves, and assist the chaplain in providing better quality ministry.

16. Ground transportation (one vehicle per chaplain) was a tremendous asset for maximum mobility and greatly appreciated.

17. Lessons learned and recommendations for the future:

a. A chaplain controller/evaluator is vital for maximum CCRT training and evaluation.

b. 71M support is critical. The ANAD Community Counseling Center staff were able to give administrative support but that kind of assistance may not always be available, nor could they do all that chaplain assistants do.

c. Individual vehicles for all team members is critical for mobility.

d. Mobile communications (phones or radios) is an absolute necessity.

f. Civilian clergy must be part of the plan. A Pre-positioned plan and contact with local clergy and/or ministerial associations is needed for those locations where there is a potential for incidents or accidents.

g. Use normal AG Casualty procedures for NOK notifications. The counseling center doesn't make them on a routine basis. Fort McClellan has the mission for active duty casualties in the Anniston area, which would therefore include their chaplains for assisting the NOK notification officer.

h. One New design chaplain kits for each CCRT chaplain and two chaplain resupply kits sent to the site upon activation of CCRT.

i. The Interservice Support Agreement (ISA) with neighboring installations should include chaplain support when an AMC chaplain is not locally available and should be applicable to disasters. This would be especially valuable when the installations involve more than one MACOM.

j. Plan to make the Reserve Component and National Guard chaplains part of CCRT as needed in the future.

Paul I. Pease

PAUL I. PEASE
Chaplain (LTC) USA
CCRT Leader

APPENDIX G

AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

AFKD-CH (165) 1 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Forces Command, ATTN: Command Chaplain, Fort McPherson, GA 30330

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew

1. PURPOSE: To provide information on religious support operations during JTF-Andrew, Miami, FL, Aug-Oct 92.

2. SUMMARY:

a. Mission. The Second Army Staff Chaplain deployed and became the JTF Chaplain on 31 Aug 92. His mission was to provide religious support for Operation JTF Andrew.

b. Concept of Operation.

(1) Joint Task Force Andrew was formed on 28 Aug 92 to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage/distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local/line haul transportation operations, and other logistical support to the local population in south Florida near Miami. Commander, Second U.S. Army, had OPCON of all DOD forces supporting hurricane relief operations and on 29 Aug 92 became, Commander, Joint Task Force Andrew. The JTF structure is at enclosure 1.

(2) The operation consisted of three phases: Phase I, Relief; Phase II, Recovery and Phase III, Reconstitution.

(3) The JTF Chaplain coordinated all religious support activities for joint services personnel deployed to the area of operation and served as a point of contact for local civilian religious organizations.

(4) The JTF Chaplain implemented Operation "Added Dimension" to provide crisis counseling and support to local pastors and other care givers.

(5) The JTF Chaplain served as the senior staff officer for religious support and the technical supervisor for all chaplains assigned to elements of JTF Andrew.

3. REVIEW OF ACTIONS:

a. Deployment.

(1) The Second U.S. Army staff deployed to serve as the nucleus for the JTF headquarters. The JTF eventually occupied the Eastern Airlines Building, Miami Airport, Miami, Florida.

(2) Chaplain (COL) Mangham, the Second Army Staff Chaplain, deployed on 31 Aug 92 to Miami to visit the Second Army staff and conduct a needs assessment in the area of operation. Upon his arrival he was appointed JTF Staff Chaplain.

b. UMT Operations

(1) The JTF Chaplain established and organized a chaplain section in the JTF headquarters. He determined the religious support needs and requested a staff to support the operation. He linked up with the Florida National Guard staff chaplain and conducted a needs assessment. He then began to contact the local religious community for coordination and liaison.

(2) Chaplain (COL) Mangham requested UMT personnel through the JTF J1. He coordinated with the JTF Chief of Staff and the FORSCOM Chaplain then made requests thru the JTF J1.

(3) Initially, requests for UMT personnel went from the JTF to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Second Army, Fort Gillem, GA. The EOC then contacted the Second Army Chaplain's Office at Fort Gillem, GA, to see if the needs for the JTF Chaplain could be filled with Second Army assets. If they could not, the EOC forwarded the requests to FORSCOM. The JTF Chaplain could not make personnel requests directly to the FORSCOM Chaplain without coordination and approval.

(4) The JTF Chaplain requested a senior chaplain (0-5 or 0-6) to serve as a plans and operations officer. FORSCOM sent Chaplain (COL) Paul Mason to serve in that position. The JTF Chaplain requested a senior chaplain assistant supervisor to serve as NCOIC and resource manager for the JTF Chaplain's office. The tasking went to Second Army Chaplain's Office which deployed SGM Will Rogers. The JTF Chaplain requested an administration chaplain and chaplain assistant and FORSCOM tasked Fort Lewis for a UMT. Fort Lewis sent Chaplain

(CPT) John Gibbon and SGT Robert Spoelstra. The JTF Chaplain requested an administration clerk and received a Specialist 71L from Fort Hood, TX. When the U.S. Navy forces arrived the JTF Chaplain Office received an petty officer (E5) from the USS Hunley.

(5) The JTF Chaplain requested a Jewish chaplain and a Catholic chaplain to ensure faith group area coverage and to facilitate coordination with their respective faith groups in the area. Chaplain (LTC) David Zalis served as the Jewish chaplain 8-21 Sep 92. Chaplain (LTC) Coindreau served as the Catholic chaplain 3-12 Sep 92. Chaplain (1LT) Chana Timoner served as the Jewish chaplain from 29 Sep to 11 Oct 92. Chaplain (LTC) Jose Santillanes served as the Catholic chaplain 9 Sep to 7 Oct 92.

(6) The JTF Chaplain requested ten UMTs who were specially trained in trauma ministry. He coordinated with the JTF Chief of Staff and forwarded the request to the FORSCOM Chaplain. The JTF Chaplain called the initiative "Operation Added Dimension" (see para. 3,c).

(7) The size of the chaplain staff was adequate and worked well, however, an additional NCO for administrative support would have enhanced the staff's efficiency. The USS Hunley left on 14 Sep 92 and as a result the office lost the Navy petty officer. The final personnel and equipment structure of the JTF chaplain section is at enclosure 2.

(8) A total of 95 chaplains and 74 chaplain assistants deployed to the area from the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force plus one Canadian chaplain. Assigned chaplains represented 32 religious denominations. The Florida National Guard (FLNG) was not a part of the JTF but the FLNG Chaplain coordinated closely with the JTF Chaplain who was the senior chaplain supervisor in the area of operation. The FLNG staff chaplain also coordinated with 12 civilian Catholic priests and one civilian rabbi from the local area who volunteered their services to augment support to deployed military personnel. The U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) senior chaplain was the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Chaplain, CH(COL) Richard Adams. The senior U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine chaplains changed as the ships entered and left the area of operation. The U.S. Air Force chaplains were two chaplains assigned to Homestead Air Force Base. The U.S. Navy also deployed a Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) which had two chaplains assigned, one Catholic and one Protestant.

(9) Accurate reporting and accountability of chaplain personnel and services were difficult initially. Local telephone networks were disabled by the storm and consequently the JTF Chaplain did not know when subordinate unit UMTs arrived in sector. During the first week, it was difficult to get status reports, worship schedules, and attendance figures and there was no standard report form. The UMTs were out in the communities where there was no communication. The JTF needed daily status reports for accurate tracking of chaplain and chaplain assistant personnel and for establishing an area coverage plan.

(10) The JTF Chaplain provided religious support to military personnel, Department of Defense civilian employees, local clergy, and civilians in the disaster area and coordinated with local helping agencies and religious organizations.

(11) During Phase I, UMTs provided religious support to military personnel who were providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to civilian victims. The UMTs talked with victims, assisted with food distribution, counseled with children, picked up debris, and visited the elderly in the community. As they met civilians in the affected area, UMTs provided counseling and comfort. In some cases, civilian victims invited UMTs into their private homes and requested UMTs to offer prayer. This raised the issue of the relationship of military chaplains to civilians in disaster relief operations and their role as clergy when approached by civilians requesting their services in spiritual matters (see para 3, f).

(12) Chaplains provided religious services and counseling support in Life Support Centers (LSCs) which were "tent cities" set up for the homeless. During Phase I, military chaplains conducted religious services for military personnel in the LSCs and civilians were free to attend. During Phase II, as support for LSCs was turned over to civilians, military personnel were withdrawn and chaplains coordinated with civilian clergy to provide religious services for civilians remaining in the LSCs.

(a) The counseling load for chaplains was heavy among military personnel and disaster victims. Soldiers experienced stress from the rigorous work schedule and the emotional impact of seeing so much devastation. Disaster victims seemed to have a need to express and share their experiences. Since local counselors and clergy were among the victims, chaplains and counselors from outside the affected area were the primary source for counseling throughout Phase I.

(b) During Phases II and III, as the surrounding communities mobilized and recovered, local pastors, priests and civilian professionals took over the counseling.

(c) There was a critical need for UMTs who spoke Spanish. Spanish-speaking military chaplains and chaplain assistants were extremely helpful in counseling and assisting local Spanish-speaking migrant workers. In some cases, the chaplains were instrumental in persuading migrant workers to come in to the care centers for medical care and food. They seemed to have a positive identification with the chaplains.

(13) An important function of the JTF Chaplain and staff was the interaction with religious organizations which mobilized at local, state and national levels to send relief and assistance.

(a) During Phase I, the JTF Chaplain was a key coordinator with local religious organizations. In many cases, church organizations needed transportation support to get supplies to the affected area. Chaplain coordination with Movement Control was helpful.

(b) In Phase II, Recovery, the JTF Chaplain worked with local religious organizations and specifically with the Religious Community Committee which was part of the "WE WILL REBUILD" Program. The Religious Community Committee consisted of six sub- committees. The committee coordinated and facilitated the transition of work to local agencies.

(c) The JTF Chaplain coordinated with Inter-faith Disaster Coalition and other organizations to enlist the service of local ministers to take over some of the pastoral ministry.

(14) The inclusion of Catholic and Jewish chaplains on the JTF staff provided critical liaison with key persons of their respective faith groups in the local communities. This facilitated initial interaction during Phase I and enhanced transition during Phases II and III.

(a) The Catholic chaplain on the JTF Chaplain's staff, visited troop areas to provide Catholic area coverage and to conduct Mass as needed. He made contact with local priests and church officials within the Archdiocese of Miami and Dade County.

(b) The Jewish chaplains in the JTF Chaplain section visited troop areas to provide Jewish area coverage. They moved throughout the area conducting Jewish services as needed. Chaplain (LTC) David Zalis working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Materiel Command (AMC), negotiated a contract for Kosher food for Jewish military personnel. Chaplain (1LT) Chana Timoner even went out of her way to purchase Kosher food and conduct a Yom Kippur service for one Marine. In addition, Chaplain Timoner and SGM Will W. Rogers presented a program of "Jewish and Yiddish Traditional Songs" for Miami Jewish Hospital and Home for the Aged on 9 October 1992. Chaplain Timoner entertained 60 to 75 people in the auditorium and then visited each ward and presented the same program.

(15) At first, UMTs lacked information on specific kinds of assistance available for victims. They did not know the full range of helping agencies or what repair materials and services were available for churches. This was corrected through coordination with FEMA, Red Cross, JTF J5, AMC and logistical supply channels. Chaplains worked effectively in guiding religious organizations to proper helping agencies.

(16) The lack of a detailed crisis reaction/disaster relief religious support standing operating procedure (SOP) for operating in a civilian environment presented some difficulties for the JTF Chaplain and staff. Existing mobilization plans for religious support did not address the issues faced in South Dade County with regard to ministry to disaster victims and the relationship of military chaplains to local clergy and religious organizations.

(17) Chaplains conducted worship services for military personnel of all faith groups throughout the area of operation. Chaplains met with small groups of soldiers for brief worship services and counseled with soldiers. It was difficult to get accurate records of services; however, chaplains recorded a total of 465 worship services (136 Catholic, 306 Protestant, 7 Jewish, 16 denominational).

c. Operation "Added Dimension".

(1) Upon his arrival in the area, the JTF Chaplain made an assessment of the magnitude of the disaster and determined a need for additional, specialized support for the mission. The Army Chief of Chaplains offered 10 UMTs with training in disaster relief, crisis counseling, death and dying, and trauma ministry to reach out to the community. The JTF Chaplain quickly took advantage of this innovative approach.

(2) The storm had destroyed both homes and churches striking the people who were the spiritual care givers in the community. The church and pastor normally come to the aid of the family experiencing tragedy, but, in this case, the church and pastor could not help because they themselves were victims. The UMTs with special training in Family Life, Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) and similar disciplines helped meet this need.

(3) One of the early proposals was to send CPE students to minister to the disaster victims. After much discussion, the idea of CPE students coming to the disaster area was discouraged since it might cause the victims to feel they were being observed by the students as case studies. It was also felt that the situation was so serious it required more experienced personnel. If problems had developed out of the effort, the JTF Chaplain would have been required to explain why he had used students rather than professionally trained, experienced counselors. That was a risk he could not take. This was the first time any program of this type had been tried and it had a lot of visibility. It was essential to get the best people available.

(4) The JTF Chaplain drafted a proposal and on 1 Sep 92,requested 10 UMTs with CPE and Family Life training to conduct crisis and trauma ministry. These 10 UMTs consisted of one chaplain and one chaplain assistant each. They were deployed specifically to assist pastors and other spiritual care givers who were disaster victims. Chaplain (LTC) Diana James was assigned to be the team chief and supervisor.

(5) The teams arrived between 9 and 13 September and were assigned to the JTF Chaplain section. Following a briefing by LTG Ebbesen, Commander, Second Army, and Chaplain (BG) Shea, Deputy Chief of Chaplains, the teams were briefed by the JTF Chaplain and given their mission.

(6) The teams received an orientation held at a local church in Coral Gables, FL, where the teams were introduced to key civilian leaders of religious organizations with whom they interacted throughout the operation. They received briefings from local pastors and officials who provided background information on the area, the disaster and the demographics of the local population. The training was coordinated with the assistance of the Inter-faith Disaster Coalition in Miami, FL.

(7) A decision had to be made on where to assign the Added Dimension Teams.

(a) The options were: (1) assign them to the JTF Headquarters under the supervision of the JTF Chaplain or, (2) assign them to Army Forces (ARFOR) Headquarters to provide direct support under the supervision of the ARFOR Chaplain. In either case, the adding of 20 personnel to the chaplain section increased the personnel strength for that unit considerably. The decision was to assign them to the JTF Chaplain Section. This proved to be the right choice. They were under the control of the JTF Chaplain and could be sent where they were needed.

(b) It seemed most advantageous that the JTF Chaplain have supervisory responsibility for the teams. On one occasion a local school requested a team to come on the day of the reopening of the school to talk to children and provide counseling for those who might need to talk to someone. The JTF Chaplain sent a team to the school for a day.

(c) There was some misunderstanding on the part of subordinate unit commanders and chaplains concerning the role and responsibilities of the Added Dimension Teams (ADT). Due to the lack of good communication capability, the speed with which the teams were deployed, and the number of people who had to be briefed on the purpose of the teams, not everyone in the chain of command was informed about the teams.

(8) The teams were assigned areas of responsibility within the disaster area. Assignments were coordinated with leaders of the Interfaith Disaster Coalition, local hospitals and unit commanders at the LSCs. Assignments were as follows:

(a) One team in each of three LSCs,

(b) One team in each of two local hospitals in the affected area.

(c) Three teams working with churches and local pastors.

(d) Two teams working with the Christian Community Services Agency and the Interfaith Disaster Coalition.

(9) These UMTs provided specialized counseling and

support to other care givers and the more severe cases among victims. One of the very first contacts was made by Chaplain (CPT) Ken Werho who called on a pastor and his wife. Before Chaplain Werho could explain the program to them, the pastor's wife said, "I am so glad you are here. We now have food, water and shelter but nobody has addressed our emotional needs." Chaplain Werho conducted his first counseling session listening to a pastor and his wife in Florida City talk about their pain and grief.

(10) The teams who served in local hospitals spent a significant amount of time ministering to the hospital staff. Local hospitals were short of staff. Some of the people on the staff had lost their homes and were either taking care of their own families or in some cases had temporarily left the area. Ministry to hospitalized victims was not as great as expected. Fortunately, injuries to the local citizens were kept to a minimum due to the evacuation.

(11) The ADTs proved also to be valuable in helping the religious organizations get in touch with the help that was available. One team discovered that a local Catholic church had received several truck loads of relief supplies but was unable to move the items to the affected area. The need was relayed to the office of the JTF Chaplain who in turn contacted movement control personnel on the JTF staff and U.S. Army trucks were dispatched to move the goods.

(12) During the Recovery, Phase III, the mission for the ADTs was to help the local pastors resume their ministry role and then to make a transition to disengage the ADTs from the community. As the local care givers recovered enough to begin their counseling and clerical roles they were encouraged to do so. The Red Cross was a key player in this area since they assumed responsibility for counseling services in the LSCs.

(13) Once it was evident the pastors and local counselors were assuming their roles in the community, the teams were redeployed. Five teams left on 30 Sep and the other five teams left on 2 Oct.

(14) These chaplains and chaplain assistants worked very closely as a single entity. The ten teams practiced the doctrine of "Unit Ministry Team" and each member of the team was proactive and supportive of the other.

d. Logistics.

(1) The Second Army chaplain section deployed with one Zenith laptop computer which was inadequate for the amount of correspondence required. On 5 Sep, the office received a second laptop from the JTF Headquarters Commandant's Office. On 12 Sep, a complete 386 system with laser printer was obtained from JTF J6. The three systems were adequate.

(2) The Chaplain section received 10 cellular telephones which were a critical link between the JTF Chaplain and other chaplains in the disaster area.

(3) Office space in the Eastern Building was a premium. During the first week, the section had only one room for office space. This office was shared with the FLNG liaison officer. A second room was later acquired and used as the administrative office.

(4) All of the chaplains brought in for the staff and "ADTs were authorized rental cars. This was key to their being able to fulfill their missions.

(5) The JTF Chaplain requested and received shipments of Bibles from Gideons International and American Bible Society for distribution to troops.

e. DACH Funds Grant.

(1) On 1 Sep 92, the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain
notified the JTF Chaplain that the Army Chief of Chaplains had authorized a special non-appropriated fund grant for JTF Andrew in the amount of $5,000 to purchase needed off-the-shelf religious supplies to support the troops. The grant was maintained through the Second Army Consolidated Chaplains' Fund, Fort Gillem, GA. Limitations were placed on the fund by the Chief of Chaplains. Religious items and Bibles could not be purchased and distributed to civilians.

(2) Items purchased from the fund included hosts, rosaries, and video and electronic equipment. The video and electronic equipment were purchased to record historical data about the ADTs. The Public Affairs Office was asked about covering chaplain activities with photos and video. They could only support the request on a limited basis. Normal acquisition of this type of equipment is made through the TASC or purchased with a statement of non-availability. This was not possible due

to the immediate requirement. The non-appropriated fund was useful and necessary to meet immediate needs faced by the Task Force UMTs.

(3) The Jewish chaplain, Chaplain (1LT) Timoner, purchased kosher food for a Marine who was unable to get kosher food through her unit.

f. Special Considerations. Chaplains deployed to provide religious support to soldiers and to serve as crisis counselors for disaster victims. The role of the military chaplain in disaster situations, however, in the opinion of the JTF Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), creates the potential for conflict, in that, chaplains normally provide religious support to military personnel but not to civilians. Therefore, occasions arose where the disaster victims sought spiritual solace while undergoing crisis counseling. In such situations, many chaplains felt a moral and ethical obligation to minister to the victims. However, it was the view of the SJA that providing spiritual counseling (e.g. prayer) could possibly constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The SJAs opinion is at enclosure 3.

4. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Deployment.

(1) The CONUSA should deploy the staff chaplain with

the advance party to assess the situation and establish the religious support requirements.

(2) The JTF Chaplain Office should have a minimum of six personnel including one Jewish and one Catholic chaplain.

(3) Staff chaplains of all units should ensure there is a plan for UMTs to deploy with the unit staff. Chaplains are needed in the affected area immediately because of the trauma, stress and injury experienced by the victims.

(4) Units should ensure that orders for chaplains and chaplain assistants deployed to a joint task force area of operation include instructions to report to the JTF Chaplain.

(5) The JTF Chaplain should request bilingual chaplains and chaplain assistants for disaster relief operations.

b. UMT Operations.

(1) The Chaplain Corps should educate "the system" on the capabilities of UMTs in disaster relief.

(2) The Chaplain Corps should review the role of the military chaplain in disaster relief situations and particularly ministry to American civilians within CONUS. This issue is not specifically addressed in Army doctrine.

(3) Regulations should authorize chaplains in disaster relief operations to provide pastoral care and counseling and distribute religious literature and religious items to both civilians and military personnel upon request.

(4) Second Army chaplain section should revise the religious support annex to the disaster relief SOP to address the employment of crisis ministry teams and ministry to disaster victims.

(5) The staff chaplain should prepare a briefing during the first week of operation to accommodate visitors.

(6) The JTF Chaplain Office should be fully equipped and staffed consistent with the level of mobilization and operation.

(7) The JTF Chaplain should brief incoming chaplains on available supplies and services and the points of contact for sources of assistance as UMTs interface with the local community.

(8) Branch and MOS training for chaplains and chaplain assistants should include instruction on joint operations and the resulting changes in the technical chain. The "wiring diagram" can change rapidly and drastically during deployment.

c. Operation Added Dimension

(1) Deploy trauma/disaster ministry teams, modeled after the "Added Dimension Teams", in two phases: Phase I, Relief, UMTs trained in trauma ministry and disaster relief (first 6-10 days) and Phase II, Recovery, UMTs trained in family life ministry and CPE (day 11 through the end of the operation).

(2) Department of Army should identify and track both chaplains and chaplain assistants who are qualified for

deployment on disaster relief operations. Ensure they are accessable and their commanders know they could be requested on short notice. Investigate the possibility of using volunteer Reserve Component UMTs who have the required training and skills.

(3) Develop a religious support mobilization table of distribution and allowances (MTDA) which provides for "Added Dimension" type UMTs as a part of the JTF chaplain section in disaster relief operations.

(4) Deploy a senior supervisor (O5) with the Added Dimension Teams to advise the JTF Chaplain and to serve as a supervisor and trainer for the other crisis ministry teams.

d. Logistics.

(1) Contract for rental vehicles to support the crisis ministry teams.

(2) Obtain Army Chief of Chaplain's non-appropriated fund grants with expenditure guidelines.

5. POC: CH(LTC) Kitchens or SGM Rogers, (404) 362-3297/8, DSN 797-3297/8.

3 Encls

GERALD M. MANGHAM
Chaplain (COL) USA
Joint Task Force Chaplain


DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
HON MICHAEL STONE
GEN GORDON SULLIVAN
CINCFOR
GEN EDWIN BURBA
PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE
HON ANDREW CARD
JTF ANDREW
COMMANDER
LTG SAMUEL EBBESEN
DCO
COL LAY
FEMA
PHIL MAY
GOVERNOR
OF FLORIDA
HON L. CHILES
DEPUTY
COMMANDER
MG CRUMLEY
JOINT TASK
FORCE STAFF
MG GRIFFITTS
FLORIDA
NATIONAL GUARD
MG HARRISON
ARFOR
LTG LUCK
NAVFOR
CAPT WILLIAMS
USAMC
MG ARWOOD
MARFOR
COL RODRIGUEZ
AFFOR
BG GRAY
CANFOR
CAPT McCLEAN

Encl 1

AS OF: 11 SEP 92

TOTAL FORCE

ARMY-	513
NAVY-	36
AIR FORCE-	19
USMC-	10
CIVILIANS-	14
TOTAL-	592



JTF CHAPLAIN

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW



Encl 2

JTF CHAPLAIN

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
5109 LEESBURG PIKE
FALLS CHURCH, VA 22041-3258

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DASG-JA

22 JAN 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, HEADQUARTERS, SECOND US ARMY
ATTN: AFKD-CG, FORT GILLEM, GA 30050-7000

SUBJECT: Utilization of Chaplains in Disaster Relief Operations

1. As you will recall, during JTF Andrew operations in South Florida, an issue arose as to the proper utilization of chaplains in the disaster area.

2. This issue was subsequently raised through Chaplain tech channels to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains who, in turn, sought the advice of the Office of The Judge Advocate General. After careful consideration, it was the opinion of OTJAG that the position taken by the undersigned (Encl 1) accurately stated the Constitutional limitations on the role of chaplains in disaster relief operations (Encl 2). In effect, OTJAG opined that use of chaplains should be limited to ministering to the spiritual and secular needs of deployed soldiers. Moreover, even though it had been determined that the provision of purely secular services, e.g., counseling, by chaplains to civilian victims was permissible, OTJAG believed such activity created the appearance of a constitutional violation and thus should be avoided.

3. I bring this matter to your attention for your information and use in future planning relating to disaster relief operations.

Encls

VAHAN MOUSHEGIAN, JR.
Colonel, JA
Legal Advisor

CF:
SJA, 1st Army

Sir, I have also provided copies to MG Griffits. I trust that you are enjoying Atlanta and that all is going well.

Encl 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DAJA-AL 1992/2922 (27-1a) 23 NOV 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS, ATTN: DACH-PPZ (COL KUEHNE)

SUBJECT: Utilization of Chaplains in Disaster Relief Operations

1. This responds to your request for our review of a memorandum from the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate to the JTF Andrew Staff Chaplain advising that chaplain involvement in spiritual activities with civilian disaster victims is prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.

2. In our opinion, the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate's memorandum accurately states the Constitutional limitation on the role of military chaplains in disaster relief operations. Ministering to the spiritual needs of civilian disaster victims fails to meet the Supreme Court's three-part test for determining whether a governmental action violates the Establishment Clause's prohibition on government sponsorship of religion (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Such activity by chaplains fails the first two parts of the test because it does not have a secular purpose and has as its primary effect the advancement of religion. Failing these two parts of the test renders the activity Constitutionally invalid even if it does not create an excessive entanglement of government with religion, thereby meeting the third part of the test.

3. Unlike in the case of the chaplaincy itself, there is no competing interest in preserving the right to free exercise of religion that would make chaplains' spiritual activities with civilian disaster victims Constitutionally unobjectionable. In Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985), which considered the Constitutionality of the chaplaincy, the court found the three-part test to be inapplicable because of the need to give effect to the free exercise rights of military personnel. While military personnel and their dependents are frequently placed by the government in situations where, without the chaplaincy, the practice of religion would be denied as a practical matter, the same is not true of disaster victims. Even in the unlikely event that there was a shortage of civilian clergy in the aftermath of a disaster, the disaster could not be construed as governmental inhibition of religion, as could military service without a chaplaincy.

4. We also share the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate's concern that future involvement of chaplains in activities designed

to meet the spiritual needs of members of the civilian community could result in litigation and court-mandated restrictions on the chaplaincy of an unpredictable scope. It is this concern that should guide the development of policy governing chaplains' role in disaster relief operations. In this regard, we recommend a continuation of the current Chaplain Corps policy of avoiding even the appearance of any establishment of religion (AR 165-1, paragraph 2-3a). This would mean restricting chaplains to ministering to the spiritual and secular needs of soldiers deployed on disaster relief operations and refraining from any official involvement with civilian disaster victims, even that of a secular nature. Although, as the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate correctly pointed out, secular counseling or the provision of other secular services by chaplains to civilian victims would not violate the Establishment Clause, these activities could create the appearance of a violation. Additionally, assigning chaplains to secular counseling or other missions involving civilians would place chaplains in the uncomfortable position of having to adhere to a strict bifurcation of their spiritual and secular roles, often against the wishes of the person receiving the counseling or other secular service.

5. Neither this opinion nor the opinion of the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate should be read as infringing on the free exercise rights of chaplains while they are in an off-duty, private capacity not representing the United States Army. In this context, chaplains could pray with civilian disaster victims or preach at civilian churches without raising Establishment Clause concerns.

FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

RONALD J. BUCHHOLZ
Lieutenant Colonel, JA
Chief, General Law Branch
Administrative Law Division

JTFA-SJA 30 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR JTF CHAPLAIN

SUBJECT: Utilization of Chaplains

1. This memorandum memorializes the oral guidance previously provided you regarding the utilization of chaplains in disaster relief operations.

2. As a result of a picture appearing in the Miami Herald, it came to my attention that a chaplain had prayed, along with a chaplain's assistant and a disaster victim, in the home of the victim. Though unclear, it appears that the chaplain had been invited into the home for that or other purposes. In exploring this particular incident, it also became apparent that other chaplains were engaged in like activity under similar circumstances and that Bibles and crosses were being distributed to disaster victims. It was futher determined that chaplains were perhaps assisting the local clergy by conducting services in local churches. As I have indicated to you, the above activities are viewed as ministering to the spiritual as opposed to the secular needs of the disaster victims.

3. I have advised you that the above or similar activities are prohibited as such conduct is in violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. The Clause, in essence, bars governmental sponsorship of religion. In determining whether certain action or conduct is in violation of the Clause, the courts have generally concluded that the activity is permissible if it has a secular purpose, its primary effect does not advance religion, and it does not create an excessive entanglement of government with religion. In the instant case, it cannot be concluded that the activities in question are in furtherance of a secular purpose or that such conduct does not represent the advancement of religion by a governmental entity. Rather, it is clear that the activities are intended to address the spiritual needs of the disaster victims. Consequently, such activity is constitutionally prohibited.

4. I would hasten to point out that chaplains do have a role in disaster relief operations. They can provide counseling and other services (e.g., furnishing information as to where shelter, food, etc. can be found) to disaster victims. Such activities are secular in nature and therefore permissible as part of an overall humanitarian relief effort.

In fact, given the background and training of our chaplains, they are especially well suited to provide crisis counseling to those who have suffered losses. However, in performing such services, chaplains must ensure that they are performing in a secular as opposed to a spiritual role.

5. Failure to operate within the above prescribed Constitutional parameters could result in further judicial challenge by those who would see the Chaplaincy abolished or further constrained. I would note that the courts have confirmed the constitutionality of the chaplaincy but did so, in part, on the basis that the mission of the chaplaincy was to engage in activities designed to meet the religious needs of a pluralistic military community. It would not appear that a court would consider activities designed to meet the spiritual needs of a civilian community, even under the unique circumstances presented here, as being appropriate and proper.

6. In conclusion, if the chaplains are unable to segregate the two roles, chaplain participation in disaster relief operations must be limited to ministering to the needs of only those military personnel who are located in the disaster area.

Vahan Moushegian Jr

VAHAN MOUSHEGIAN, JR.
Colonel, JA
Staff Judge Advocate

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

CHAPLAIN SECTION (TAB T)

AFTER ACTION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

101007OCT92

1. SCOPE.

The Joint Task Force (JTF) Chaplain Section began operations on 31 August 1992. The staff chaplain coordinated chaplain activities for the joint services in the area of operation providing religious support to the JTF. The JTF Chaplain also served as a point of contact for civilian religious organizations to coordinate with the JTF for relief assistance. The staff chaplain implemented Operation "Added Dimension" to provide crisis counseling and support to local pastors who were themselves disaster victims.

2. SUMMARY.

a. Personnel:

(1) Chaplain (COL) Gerald Mangham arrived on 31 August and became the JTF Staff Chaplain. He determined the need and requested a staff to support the operation and provide liaison with civilian religious organizations.

(2) Between 3 and 9 September, the chaplain staff personnel arrived at JTF Headquarters. (see enclosure 1) This configuration worked well but an additional NCO would have enhanced the staff's efficiency.

(3) In addition, 10 Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) consisting of one chaplain and one chaplain assistant each were deployed as crisis ministry teams. These teams were designated Operation "Added Dimension". (see para 2,c)

(4) Accurate reporting and accountability of chaplain personnel and services were difficult due to work loads in the disaster area and the lack of standardized report forms. Daily status reports were needed for accurate tracking of chaplain and chaplain assistant personnel.

(5) A total of 95 chaplains and 23 chaplain assistants from all branches of service, including one Canadian Chaplain, deployed to the AO. The chaplains represented 32 denominations. Seven civilian Catholic priests and one civilian rabbi from the local area volunteered their services to augment support to deployed military personnel.

b. UMT Operations:

(1) The Staff Chaplain did not deploy with the initial elements of Second U.S. Army on 25 August. He arrived in Miami on 31 August. His first task was establishing and organizing a staff in the JTF Headquarters and coordinating with the local religious community.

(2) The JTF Chaplain section focused on religious support to military personnel and the local pastors and priests in the disaster area. Coordination was made between helping agencies and local religious organizations.

(3) Chaplains initially provided religious support to the military personnel working in the Life Support Centers (LSCs). During Phase II, as the support for the LSCs was turned over to civilians and military personnel were withdrawn, the chaplains coordinated with civilian clergy to provide religious services.

(4) A major need was for UMTs who could speak Spanish. Military chaplains were extremely helpful in counseling and assisting the local Spanish speaking migrant workers.

(5) The counseling load for chaplains was extensive among military personnel and disaster victims. The need for victims to express and share their experiences of this operation and disaster led to numerous counseling situations. In some cases, chaplains were invited into private homes. Since many counselors and clergy were among the victims, chaplains were the primary source for counseling throughout Phase I. During Phases II and III, as the local pastors and priests recovered and the surrounding communities mobilized, civilian professionals took over the counseling.

(6) One important area where the JTF Chaplain and staff assisted the relief effort was in their ability to interact with the religious organizations that mobilized at local, state and national levels to send relief assistance. During Phase I, the chaplain section was a key coordinator for directing religious relief efforts where it was most needed. In Phase II the JTF Chaplain supported the efforts of the "WE WILL REBUILD" Religious Community Committee and other religious organizations. (see enclosure 3) This allowed for the transition of the work to local agencies.

(7) The inclusion of Catholic and Jewish chaplains on the JTF staff provided critical liaison with key persons of these faith groups in the local communities. This facilitated initial interaction during Phase I and enhanced transition during Phases II and III.

(8) At first chaplains lacked information on specific kinds of assistance for victims including the full range of helping agencies and what repair materials were available for churches. This was overcome and chaplains worked effectively in guiding religious organizations to the proper helping agencies.

(9) The lack of a detailed crisis reaction/disaster relief religious support Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) presented some difficulties for the JTF Chaplain and staff.

(10) Chaplains conducted a total of 465 worship services (136 Catholic, 306 Protestant, 7 Jewish, 16 denominational).

c. Operation "Added Dimension":

(1) On 1 September, the JTF Chaplain requested 10 UMTs to conduct crisis and trauma ministry. These 10 teams were designated as Operation "Added Dimension" and were deployed specifically to assist other counseling professionals and religious care givers who were themselves disaster victims.

(2) The teams arrived between 9 and 13 September. They were assigned to the JTF Chaplain section. Following a briefing and orientation at a local church, they were introduced to several key civilian religious organizations with whom they interacted throughout their mission. The teams were assigned areas of responsibility within the disaster area. Assignments were as follows: one team in each of three LSCs, one team in each of two local hospitals, three teams working with churches and local pastors and two teams working with the Christian Community Services Agency and the Interfaith Disaster Coalition.

(3) These UMTs had special training in family life and hospital ministry. Their training enabled them to provide more specialized counseling and support to other care givers and the more severe cases among victims.

(4) Toward the end of September, the critical need for the teams came to an end. Many of the local care givers had recovered enough to take up their counseling and clerical roles. There were also many other professionals throughout the area from the surrounding community providing the same services.

(5) The teams were redeployed in two sections. Five teams left on 30 September and the other five teams left on 2 October.

d. Logistics:

(1) The JTF Chaplain section received electronic support from the JTF J-6. Equipment included computers, a printer and 10 cellular phones.

(2) The section deployed with only one Zenith laptop computer. This proved to be inadequate for the amount of correspondence and reporting required. On 5 September a second laptop was issued through the JTF Headquarters Commandant's Office. On 12 September a complete 386 system with laser printer was issued through J-6. With the three systems, the section was able to fulfill its administrative requirements.

(3) During the first week, the section had only one room for office space. This office was shared with the National Guard LNO. A second room was later acquired and used as the administrative office.

(4) The Chaplain section received 10 cellular telephones. These were a critical link between the JTF Chaplain Office and other chaplains traveling throughout the disaster area.

(5) All of the chaplains brought in for the staff and "Added Dimension" teams were authorized rental cars. This was key to their being able to fulfill their missions.

e. Department of the Army Chaplain Funds Grants:

(1) On 1 September 1992, the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain stated that the Army Chief of Chaplains had authorized a special non-appropriated fund grant for JTF Andrew in the amount of $5,000 to purchase needed off the shelf religious supplies to support the troops. The grant was maintained through the Second U.S. Army Consolidated Chaplains' Fund, Fort Gillem, Georgia.

(2) Items purchased from the fund included hosts, rosaries, and video and electronic equipment. The video and electronic equipment was purchased to record historical data about the Added Dimension Teams. The PAO was asked about covering chaplain activities with photos and video. They could only support the request on a limited basis. Normal acquisition of this type of equipment is made through the Training Aid Support Center (TASC) or purchased with a statement of non-availability. This was not possible due to the immediate requirement. The fund was useful and necessary to meet immediate needs faced by the Task Force UMTs.

f. Special Considerations: Chaplains were deployed to provide religious support to soldiers and to serve as crisis counselors for disaster victims. The role of the military chaplain in disaster situations, however, creates the potential for conflict, in that, chaplains may provide religious support to military personnel but not to civilians. Therefore, occasions arose where the disaster victims would seek spiritual solace while undergoing crisis counseling. In such situations, many chaplains felt a moral and ethical obligation to minister to the

victims. However, to provide spiritual counseling (e.g. prayer) could possibly constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This issue should be reviewed so as to determine the proper role of the chaplains in future deployments involving disaster relief operations.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Personnel:

(1) The chaplain staff should consist of six personnel. (see enclosure 1) These should include one Jewish and one Catholic chaplain. Orders for chaplains and chaplain assistants deployed to a joint task force should include instructions to report to the JTF Chaplain.

(2) Crisis UMTs should be included in requirements for joint task forces as part of the JTF chaplain section and the senior member of the crisis ministry teams should supervise and coordinate utilization of these teams.

(3) Bilingual chaplains and chaplain assistants should be considered a priority for deployment in future operations.

b. UMT Operations:

(1) The staff chaplain should deploy with the advance party to assess the situation and establish the religious support requirements.

(2) Chaplains should be authorized to provide pastoral care and counseling to civilians in disaster situations and distribute religious literature and items to both civilians and military personnel.

(3) A disaster religious support SOP should be prepared.

(4) A visitor's brief should be prepared by the chaplain staff during the first week of operation.

(5) The JTF Chaplain's office should be fully equipped. (see enclosure 2)

(6) Chaplains should be knowledgeable of available services and who the contacts are for sources of assistance as they interface with the local community.

c. Logistics:

(1) Rental vehicles should be contracted in support of the crisis ministry teams and authorized on their orders for functional support to their mission.

(2) Special Army Chief of Chaplain's non-appropriated fund grants should be made available for future operations with clear guidelines on what can or cannot be purchased.

Enclosures

1. Organizational Chart
2. Equipment Requirements
3. Religious Community Committee

JTF CHAPLAIN

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW



JTF CHAPLAIN

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW



We Will Rebuild
Religious Community Committee

Committee Missions

1. Identification of Churches and Needs Committee

The mission of this committee is to seek out churches who have been damaged by hurricane Andrew, and to establish their needs beyond what is covered by insurance.

Chair: Rev. Walter Richardson/Rev. Jose Hernandez
Staff: Carla Carter

2. Identification of Resources Committee (Adopt A Church)

The mission of this committee is to identify those churches who have resources which they are willing to use for a church in need; to match the resources with the needs.

Chair: Bill Primus/Michael Madsen
Staff: Sister Marie Carol Hurley, OP

3. Family Adoption Project Committee (Adopt A Family)

The mission of this committee is to identify families who are in need of special assistance, and who desire to establish a long term relationship with a sponsoring family, and match them with those families or persons who desire to adopt a family in need, and are willing to establish a long term relationship with them.

Chair: Anne Marie Elefthery/Michael Lenaghan
Staff: Sister Rosa Monique Pena, OP

4. Disaster Counseling and Spiritual Support Committee

This committee will seek to provide leadership in identifying resources to give counseling and spiritual support to individuals and groups suffering from the disaster.

Chair: Rev. Luther Jones/Rabbi Glickstein
Staff: Sister Peggy Albert, OP

5. Church Supply Committee (Gifts In Kind)

This committee will solicit, warehouse and distribute church supplies, as well as identify sources which can provide them to churches in need.

Chair: Robert Birmingham
Staff: Mary Louise Cole

HOMESTEAD GENERAL HOSPITAL
POC: DALE YOUNG, CHAPLAIN
666-6511, EXT 4404 OR 4400

MENNONITE DISASTER SERVICE
30695 SW 162D AVE
HOMESTEAD, FL
POC: WALTER & JOY SAWATZKY
248-1659

HOMESTEAD COMMUNITY CENTER (CCSA)
212 NW 1ST AVE
HOMESTEAD, FL 33030
POC: GERI KING, 248-3995

INTERFAITH COALITION
195 SW 15TH ROAD, SUITE 405
MIAMI, FL 33129
POC: MARY LOUISE COLE, COORDINATOR
BETTY HUTCHINSON, ASST COORDINATOR
858-4649

UNITED PROTESTANT APPEAL
195 SW 15TH ROAD, SUITE 405
MIAMI, FL 33129
POC: CHARLES EASTMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
CLAUDE HURST, PRESIDENT
858-4649

PARENT RESOURCES CENTER
75 SW 8TH ST, SUITE 303
MIAMI, FL 33130
POC: MARY OLDIGES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
358-8238

MOBILIZING FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF MINISTRY

CH (COL) Paul Mason

Introduction:

The paradigm for this paper is OPERATION ANDREW, a governmental disaster response mission directed by the President of the United States to assist recovery in South Florida in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. It is not an after action report per se. It contains a general description of the operation. It is Army Unit Ministry Team (UMT) oriented, although the military side of the mission was purple (joint services). Some assumptions, observations, and suggestions are included which may prove helpful for future operations of this nature. The major focus of this paper is mobilization and personnel requisition procedures and dynamics.

Background:

As a result of the devastation of Hurricane Andrew, a Presidential Task Force was created to provide disaster assistance relief for South Florida. The task force, headed by the Secretary of Transportation, was composed of various federal and state governmental agencies. As a part of the relief effort, the military was tasked to create a joint task force. It was given the name "JTF ANDREW" and consisted of organizations and service members from all the armed services, to include the U.S Coast Guard. At the peak of the relief operations, JTF ANDREW contained just under [illegible] military personnel.

Second Army was assigned the primary mission of implementing the JTF directive with the 2nd Army Commander becoming the JTF Commander. Eleven flag officers were assigned to the JTF HQ staff. The 18th ABN Corps was assigned the ARFOR mission. The 82d ABN DRB, the 10th MTN, plus units from the 101st ABN and 24th ID [illegible] with the 841st EN BN, a USAR Bn, filled out the ARFOR. The Florida National Guard, not federalized, maintained a large presence. Several Naval ships were deployed to the Port of Miami, bringing with them a contingent of Navy personnel as well as a battalion of Marines. The Air Force already had a presence at Homestead AFB. Canada sent the equivalent of a construction battalion (CANFOR) and brought a chaplain with them. With the inclusion of the CANFOR, the operation became a Combined Task Force, although its name remained JTF ANDREW.

The JTF HQ was housed in a vacated Eastern Airlines building near Miami International Airport, located approximately 25 miles from the heart of the disaster area. Communications in the early days of the operation were almost nonexistent, except up the chain to FORSCOM. Eventually the JTF Chaplain was able to ensure that almost all the UMTs had vehicles. In addition, cellular [illegible]nes were furnished to many of the UMTs. These two measures greatly enhanced UMT capability to network, communicate, and minister.

UMTs were deployed with their units to the hurricane stricken area of operations (AO) (only the Coast Guard did not bring a Chaplain). Additionally, ten Army UMTs with special training in trauma ministry were sent to the AO.

These special UMTs, named "Added Dimension", were assigned to minister directly with and to local clergy, religious organizations, and churches. At the peak of OPERATION ANDREW there were 86 Chaplains and 63 Assistants engaged in relief support ministry.

Acquisitions:

When a CONUS disaster assistance mission is assigned to the Army, FORSCOM aids in the design of the task force construct. If it is a joint task force, FORSCOM aids in the design of the Army requirements. However, once the task force is on location, all additional requirements must originate from its HQ, especially in the area of personnel. There is no "push" system in this type of operation.

When JTF ANDREW initially stood up only a skeleton staff was in place. The JTF Chaplain was required, in quick fashion, to assess ministry needs and requisition additional UMTs, supplies, and equipment. Personnel requirements were to be filled as follows:

-If AC: 18 ABN must fill requirement.

-If RC: 2d Army would fill requirement.

-Once these personnel assets were exhausted, and such occurred early on, requests were referred to FORSCOM.

-If an AC UMT was desired, FCCH tasked its installations.

-If an RC UMT was desired the following occurred:

If UMT was in TPU, mission requirement was handled through USARC.

If UMT was IRR, mission requirement was filled by ARPERCEN.

-If FORSCOM, through these means, could not meet fill requirements from its assets, request was forwarded to DACH.

-National Guard UMT needs were to be filled by the Florida National Guard (FLNG).

-Requisition path or channel for UMT fill was as follows:

JTF-CH > JTF-J1 > JTF-J3 > FCJ3 > FCJ1 > FCCH

Observations:

During unit mobilization and personnel requisition, informal technical communication is essential. The Chaplain must not only be an integral part of the MOB team, he must be in continuous communication with other MOB team members. It is equally critical that Chaplain mobilizers, up and down the chain, be in "off line" communication (so long as operation classification does not prohibit). Such informal networking and team effort prevent misinformation or glitches in the system.

During OPERATION ANDREW, the following UMT MOBproblems occurred. On one occasion two taskings were meshed into one. On another, a tasking was misrouted. Still on another occasion a request was about to be filled twice. Finally, another request was not fully understood as to whether the fill was to be done by FORSCOM or DACH. In every single case, off line communications unscrambled the issue and solved the problem. The time worn maxim, "Use the system but check on the system," is indeed worth its weight in gold when it comes to MOB issues.

Assumptions:

-Military services will be tasked in the future to assist with disaster/humanitarian relief support.

-Such missions in the future will probably be purple, as was OPERATION ANDREW.

-A Corps, CONUSA, or Installation may be called to form a task force or be the Army element in a joint task force.

-UMTs will be an integral part of any major mission of this type in the future.

-Catholic, Jewish, or Chaplains with special language skills may be required with little lead time.

-An updated database for Active and Reserve Component UMT's will be available.

Suggestions:

-Be prepared to minister in a disorganized, chaotic AO.

-Move quickly to create capability to communicate both up and down the chain.

-Assess the needs.

-Call immediately for help and augmentation, making it a team effort.

-Talk informally up the chain for guidance and balance.

-Use multiple means of communication.

-Check to see that formal taskings are moving and understood.

-Share responsibility; build the JTF UMT.

-Establish ministry guidelines and reporting requirements.

-Pace yourself.

-Ensure that caregivers are given care.

-Stay closely in touch with JTF Cmd Gp; attend all briefings Cdr calls; be an integral part of the staff.

-Work very closely with PAO, J1, J3, MOB cell.

-Orient/brief all UMTs coming into disaster AO.

-Be prepared to do reporting requirements to higher headquarters.

-Develop a spiritual support base; be spiritual support to peers.

Conclusion:

Deploying, reinforcing, and managing a large UMT in a quick response disaster relief mission are taxing indeed. Such calls for extended work hours, quick, but accurate decisions and constant networking. A hundred tasks will appear to need to be accomplished at one and the same time. If permitted, frustration can rule the day. However, with prayer and perseverance, the mission will be accomplished. The inner joy and spiritual fulfillment that will accrue, as a result, will be reward enough.

APPENDIX H

STUDY PAPER

UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CARLISLE BARRACKS,

PENNSYLVANIA

A STUDY ON

USING MILITARY FORCES IN

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

A Paper Presented in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for Course 2,
War, National Policy and
Strategy

Chaplain (LTC) Gary R. Councell
Seminar II
Box 97

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A STUDY ON

USING MILITARY FORCES IN

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

by

Chaplain (LTC) Gary R. Councell

PURPOSE. This study will attempt to develop a national military strategy for deploying United States Armed Forces to assist in rendering humanitarian aid, whenever and wherever such assistance is determined to be an essential element of national security policy and strategy.

INTRODUCTION. Today's world and the world of tomorrow are times of political and economic VUCA.[1] When nature adds her capricious power to the VUCA brew, the recipe often results in a disastrous crisis for humanity. Perhaps the greatest cause of human misery results from civil war or other undefined internal conflicts.

Humanitarian emergencies[2] seem to pose demands that exclude the military; and in fact, many emergencies actually

---

1. VUCA is an acronym meaning "volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous."

2. As defined by Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p.1., "a humanitarian emergency is a situation where a human group is made vulnerable immediately or within a short time to a possibly mortal threat; the situation impels either appeals for assistance by authoritative figures in the affected group or offers of aid from third parties."

result from military actions or are exacerbated by them. Yet recent events[1] have demonstrated the usefulness of military forces as part of a more comprehensive response to humanitarian crises.

Americans place high value on individual human life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The foundational basis of the American Republic (our spiritual heritage, the Declaration of Independence, and United States Constitution) guarantees respect for the dignity and quality of life as each citizen's inalienable right. A democratic form of government is cherished as best serving those ideals. During the twentieth century defending democracy and promoting democratic principles became a dominant theme of national purpose.

Historically, Americans have been a generous people, sharing national resources with less fortunate neighboring nations and even defeated enemies. At the end of World War II the United States was undisputedly the most powerful nation on earth. With the atomic bomb and over eleven million persons in its victorious military forces the United States could have imposed its will on any country. Instead, the nation retooled its war-honed industry for peace. American taxpayers funded reconstruction of a war-torn world and turned Germany and Japan

---

1. United States Armed Forces provided assistance for victims of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, helped restore order during the Los Angeles riots, and conducted Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope to name a few.

into thriving economic powers that today ably compete with their former benefactor. (Though it is a mute question, history gives us some clue how France or Russia would have responded had either nation been in America's situation at the close of World War II).

During the Cold War era a degree of predictable order was maintained by the balance of powers in a bipolar world. Both superpowers competed to enlarge their ideological spheres of influence. The well-being of peoples in emerging Third World countries became a focus of national interests and strategy.

> The United States has assisted many nations around the globe in building their own self-defense capabilities, thus countering the sense of vulnerability that tends to spur arms races and weapons proliferation. The USA has also assisted in humanitarian efforts following natural disasters, in peacekeeping operations, in infrastructure development and through military-to-military programs, in helping numerous countries make the transition to democratic systems.[1]

The United States must remain engaged in support of the developing democracies and in their economic and social progress. The post-cold war international system is not simple. Disorder and even chaos threaten national interests and security. Natural disasters and conflicts cause unimaginable, mass human suffering. Lacking a familiar framework of where and when to exert national power, national leaders are forced to consider each crisis situation on a "piecemeal" basis.

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1. U.S. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1993), p. 14.

INTERVENTION. According to General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given."[1] The following references from U.S. Government documents include military intervention for other than combative purposes:

> To meet our unilateral and alliance responsibilities, the United States needs a diverse spectrum of military options. A smaller total force requires flexibility in planning...
>
> Adaptive planning provides a range of preplanned options, encompassing all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic and military) to clearly demonstrate US resolve... There are four general categories of operations combatant CINCs must plan for and be prepared to execute; one of which is to actively employ resources on a day to day basis to build military and alliance readiness; foster stability; promote peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; protect lives and property; help our friends, allies, and those in need of humanitarian aid. This includes evacuation of non-combatants.[2]
>
> The Total Army will continue to focus on our Title 10 responsibilities to provide trained, ready, and versatile forces for decisive land combat, secure in the knowledge that embedded in this capability are the skills needed to provide the Nation other new and traditional services such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.[3]

The latest edition of FM 100-5 acknowledges the full range of military operations from war to operations other than

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1. Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993), p. 2.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 12,13.

3. Department of the Army, Army Initiatives Group, State of America's Army on Its 218th Birthday (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 1993), p. 12.

war and the Army role in multiservice and coalition operations worldwide. As military forces are increasingly committed in diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives, leaders must expand their orientation on warfare beyond the battlefield to precrisis and post crisis situations. Concepts of decisive victory may need translating into establishing the conditions for success in operations like those in Somalia, Northern Iraq, and Bosnia.

> Increasingly, US forces will be called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on us for assistance. Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but as seen recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.[1]

Clearly, our national security strategy and foreign policy will continue to actively involve United States Armed Forces in providing humanitarian relief planning and support as well as the full spectrum of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. In 1988 the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/131 unanimously approved the free passage of humanitarian aid to regions and persons afflicted by natural or man-made disasters. UN Security Council Resolution 757 (August 13, 1992) authorized the use of force to deliver humanitarian aid in

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1. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 15.

Bosnia. Such actions are within the scope of international humanitarian law (IHL).

Dating from its origin at the battle of Solferino, June, 1859, modern IHL is upheld by three organizations: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human Rights. After eight years of international effort and study the International Law Agency adopted the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (September, 1984). These standards intend that no state will suspend any of sixteen basic human rights[1] even during a bonafide declared state of emergency.

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1. Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law (Hants, Great Britain: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), chaps. 1 and 3. The sixteen non-derogable human rights are:
   1. The right to legal personality (inherent dignity of the human person; everyone has the right of recognition).
   2. Freedom from slavery or servitude.
   3. Freedom from discrimination (equal protection before law).
   4. The right to life (restrictions on use of death penalty).
   5. The right to liberty (detention only per established law).
   6. Freedom from torture (cruel, degrading, or inhumane treatment or punishment).
   7. The right to fair trial with defense and presence.
   8. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or not to believe.
   9. Freedom from imprisonment for inability to fulfill a contractual obligation (debts).
   10. Rights of minorities (ethnic, linguistic, and religious).
   11. Rights of the family (natural and fundamental unit of society, entered into only with free consent of spouses).
   12. The right to a name.
   13. Rights of the child (protected status as a minor).
   14. The right to nationality (can change citizenship).
   15. The right to participate in government (access to public services, representation, and voting).
   16. The right to remedy (*habeas corpus*, civil courts for civilians).

An emergency was defined in terms of declaration, duration, and control. Emergency situations were envisaged in three different circumstances: a serious political crisis (armed conflict and internal disorder), *force majeure* (disasters of various kinds), and particular economic circumstances, notably those relating to underdevelopment. A public emergency has four basic elements: territorial scope, magnitude of the threat, provisional or temporary status of the crisis, and official proclamation.

The power of states to take derogatory measures was recognized, but subject to five conditions: notification, the rule of proportionality, no inconsistency with other obligations under international law, derogation measures must be nondiscriminatory, and basic human rights are non-derogable even during an emergency.[1]

NATIONAL LAW. As a law-abiding nation, the foreign policy of the United States is constrained to observe international law as well as its own governing legislation. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs are normally instigated by the executive branch of government subject to funding by Congress. "Congress has provided statutory authority in public law for the military to conduct humanitarian and civic action assistance initiatives in conjunction with military operations if they promote national

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1. Ibid., p. 90.

security interests."[1] The Defense Authorization Act of 1986, 10 USC 2547, authorized the Humanitarian Assistance Program which allocated specific appropriations and allowed the Secretary of Defense to make available for humanitarian relief purposes any nonlethal excess supplies in DOD's system.

The U.S. State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) approves and controls all HCA operations.[2] Obviously, HCA programs require all the inter-agencies involved to mutually communicate, coordinate, and cooperate in order to avoid deadlock in their inter-locked play and accomplish the mission.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. During the last decade a growing understanding of the global environment has prompted our national leaders to involve U.S. Armed Forces in humanitarian operations. Such intervention is seen as serving U.S. interests and providing increased national security. When Western powers won the cold war, they succeeded only in reducing certain military aspects of the conflict between the superpowers. But the American way of life is still being seriously threatened today by hostile means.

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1. Colonel Ernest L. Sutton, U.S. Army, "The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make It Work" (unpublished study project, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 18.

2. Colonel Lee D. Schinasi, U.S. Army, "America's Unfocused Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs: Is Anybody in Charge? Where Are We Going?" (unpublished study project, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. War College, 1993), p. 4.

The end of the cold war simply transformed the tactics and weapons to economics and politics. Unless Americans come to understand this change and stop fighting the last war of military threat, we can still lose. "HCA is a new philosophical approach to a new category of conflict."[1] Effectively used and properly executed, HCA can provide a way out of that dilemma and become another form of deterrence, like the Marshall Plan.

The United States must energize all the elements of national power in a synergetic effort of renewal and application in order to win on this new battlefield. The entire domestic environment must be mobilized to sustain the U.S. as a superpower and respected world leader. As attention and resources are directed to other elements of national power from the military, the U.S. will have smaller armed forces with which to project military power in support of national objectives. The former strategy of forward defense has been replaced. Fewer American military troops remain overseas. The bulk of our military forces are stationed on CONUS-based "power projection platforms."

One strategy for maintaining national defense with an economy of force is through forward presence. The U.S. can redefine its presence abroad by providing humanitarian assistance. "Our forward presence forces and operations lend credibility to our alliances and ensure the perception that a collective response awaits any threat to our interests or to those of our

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1. Ibid., p. 11.

allies."[1] Forward presence engages our armed forces in peacetime and enhances their capability for responding to crisis. Mid-term in his office, President George Bush said,

> And what we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing, without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and cold war. And in this world, America remains a pivotal factor for peaceful changes.[2]

SITUATION ANALYSIS. Humanitarian concerns present themselves in many forms; assistance is needed for relieving the effects of natural disasters, resolving civil wars/internal conflicts, supporting nation assistance (building), and caring for refugees.

> Many specialists argue that disaster/relief/rehabilitation/reconstruction/development form a conceptual continuum. Effective humanitarian responses would thus necessarily entail longer-term development inputs (sensitivity to causes, which opens the way to prevention and consideration of the relations between individuals and governing authority).[3]

Numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) are quick to respond in providing aid to these humanitarian needs. While they have nobly

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1. U.S. President George Bush, National Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1993), p. 14.

2. Colonel Ernest L. Sutton, U.S. Army, "The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make It Work" (unpublished study project, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 6.

3. Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 8.

performed in assisting with refugee problems and aiding victims of natural disasters, NGOs and PVOs have limitations giving assistance for long-term nation building or during combat and hostilities. On the other hand certain statutes, public perceptions, and international images limit military intervention. No one single relief organization, no matter how well recognized and organized can assist in all situations. Hence, the need for cooperative work.

Recently, the politics of international humanitarian relief has attained greater significance for two reasons: wars tend to occur in countries where living conditions are precarious even in the best of times; and the media can easily and graphically portray the attendant horrors worldwide to the public as those events are occurring.

Public Perceptions. Global coverage of atrocious violence can create a vital interest in the public mind when a less emotional analysis would suggest less intensity of interest. Agitated by television and other media representations of human misery, American public opinion impels our government to respond to suffering. This sets up a chain-reaction of events based not so much on the actual scale of the tragedy as of the world view as to what that scale is. International expectations are raised about what needs to be done; which in turn, affects the response of the government of the country where the disaster occurs.

In reality, attention to human need is sporadic and reactions seem to be based on five background factors:

a. The notoriety of the incident (mass media attention).
b. The reaction of local and national authorities.
c. The international political context (man-made/natural).
d. Accessibility and familiarity of the disaster site.
e. Leadership (coordination is required).[1]

The need for new approaches to meeting humanitarian needs is more urgent now than ever. A window of opportunity is open for international endeavor; many nations appear more ready to cooperate internationally than to score cheap ideological victories.

Political Considerations. Most elites in Third World countries are indifferent to the living conditions of the masses under their control. Whether their multitudes survive is usually deemed less crucial than successful economic, political or military achievements. Therefore, planning and initiatives for international relief occur almost exclusively in First and Second World countries for application in the Third World.

Despite recent emphasis on human rights, most nation states are vulnerable to charges of infringing the human rights of some part of their population; and so most nations refrain from pushing that issue too hard. It is rarely used as rationale for international intervention.

Any international intervention for humanitarian purposes raises serious questions that have secondary and tertiary ramifications. By their very nature emergencies suggest rapid response based on some standing policy, but whose - the local

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1. Ibid., pp. 5-8.

government's or the provider's? Is aid actually wanted and on what terms? Who defines the boundaries of disaster areas and identifies who is included in the stricken population? Who will be in charge of multinational relief efforts? What types of intervention are most feasible? When does humanitarian aid in a civil strife become intervention in a country's internal affairs? When insurgents are involved, then aid to them gives defacto recognition and power. If aid is rejected by a state inspite of apparent need, providing relief implies an attack on that target state's integrity and on its ability to care for its citizens. In areas where hostilities are on-going, will single-minded efforts to provide relief actually increase the total sum of suffering by prolonging conflict? The results of humanitarian aid can raise questions about the influence of outsiders and long-term dependency.

Failure to adequately address these questions and many others will seriously impair the desired results of humanitarian assistance. For example, "humanitarian operations, much praised in the West, are being regarded more and more cynically in the Middle East; Provide Comfort and Restore Hope are coming to be seen as imperialist power grabs."[1] Opinions of Third World natives cannot be ignored because U.S. policymakers may feel

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1. Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Humanitarian Operations and the Middle East: The Hostility Factor (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993), p. 1.

convinced their actions are correct. Native sensitivities matter a great deal to the soldier performing duties in their country. "If Middle Easterners come to see the United States as a neo-colonialist power, they are likely to react violently. U.S. troops serving in the region will come under attack, and once this happens, matters will be hard to control."[1]

With the demise of the cold war some civil conflicts will test not only American-Russian goodwill, but also international cooperation. Referring to events in Somalia, the UN Security Council Resolution 794 noted, "The magnitude of the human tragedy constitutes a threat to international peace and security."[2] Yet strife between contenders can inhibit responses.

Consent of the government concerned is a precondition for assistance. UN Charter (Article 2/7) enjoins any state from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. Because the introduction of outside military forces symbolizes the lack of sovereign control or lack of adequate administrative capacity to respond to a crisis, humanitarian aid can be seen as offensive.

During civil conflicts political goals and military targets almost always take precedence over humanitarian relief-

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1. Ibid., p. 9.

2. Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993), p. 3.

oriented objectives. Leaders on both sides tend to hide or downplay human misery. Even with altruistic motives, donor nations often place their perceived national interests above humanitarian concerns. Relief efforts are sometimes interpreted as political in impact; *vis-a-vis* in 1972-1973 the Burundian government viewed humanitarian assistance as aiding the rebels.[1] Consensus on the objective need by all parties is required for effectual intervention. Since that rarely occurs, military intervention is often the only reasonable and practical method of bringing aid to suffering peoples.

Military Intervention. The introduction of armed resistence to aid situations has fundamentally affected the nature of humanitarian operations. "Food terror" has become widespread. Governments and guerrilla groups utilize food deprivation to improve their relative positions. Armed attacks on food convoys or shooting down commercial or transport aircraft have become all too commonplace. When self-determination claims trigger an armed conflict that becomes a humanitarian crisis, getting food, medicine, and shelter to thousands or millions of civilians requires action.

The purpose of military intervention for humanitarian reasons is not to engage in combat, but rather to provide adequate protection for relief workers to do their job of delivering

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1. Morris Davis, ed., Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 7.

aid directly to the persons who need it. Separating humanitarian from the political objectives of a military intervention may not always be possible in the purest sense. Armed conflicts and disasters are commonly linked. Many humanitarian emergencies result from military operations. Regimes prevent the delivery of aid to citizens living in areas outside their control while guerrillas prevent assistance from reaching regions under central government influence. Some situations may require direct engagement of aggressive forces by intervening military forces to accomplish the humanitarian mission.[1] During 1960-1964 UN peacekeeping forces became heavily involved fighting rebels in Zaire.

While humanitarian assistance can be rendered during peacekeeping and other similar operations, HCA is not the same. HCA is a uniquely distinct international function. For a definition of terms, see the glossary in Appendix I.

MILITARY STRATEGY. Several authors pointed out the dearth of academic literature on the relationship between military security and relief provided in humanitarian aid operations. Before our nation commits military forces to any further humanitarian assistance programs objectives, concepts and resources must be clearly identified and articulated in order to facilitate operations and requirements planning and obtain positive domestic

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1. Morton H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer, and Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 108.

and international support. Each of the three phases[1] of military humanitarian assistance must be well-planned for successful execution.

> American military commanders ought to rethink their approach to humanitarian operations. Rather than looking on them as limited affairs, they might want to think of them as being open ended. Ideally, a humanitarian operation should be completed expeditiously. However, that may not always be possible and then the commander must be ready to take emergency measures. The commander's bottom line should be, what do I do, if this affair suddenly, and unexpectedly escalates?[2]

Objectives/Ends. A review of the literature surveyed failed to uncover clearly stated and logical objectives for military humanitarian support operations. From my study I would submit three "ends" for consideration in formulating national military strategy: (1) Save human life. Disregard for any human being lessens respect for all human life. (2) Alleviate suffering. The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37 in the Gospels of the Holy Bible) applies to nations as well as individuals. (3) Assist the local population in returning as quickly as possible to normalcy. Normalcy is defined as a similar or improved quality of life that existed prior to the situation which caused the requirement for HCA.

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1. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance," Newsletter, No. 92-6, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1992), p. i. The three phases are emergency, sustainment, and withdrawal.

2. Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Humanitarian Operations and the Middle East: The Hostility Factor (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993), p. 11.

Concepts/Ways. Perhaps due to experience from the increasing number of HCA operations, more has been written about concepts (methodology) than about the other two legs of the military strategy triad. I suggest the following principles and procedures guide HCA ways: (1) A national interest must be served. National military strategy must meet the test of defending/sustaining a national interest, rather than be used solely for responding to perceived public emotionalism. (2) Military forces should be used only as a last resort to safe life and/or peace. National military power should only be projected into situations in which stated political goals can be successfully achieved. (3) Multinational actions should be undertaken whenever possible, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations. The U.S. should avoid unilateral intrusions. Participation by U.S. Armed Forces will require much prior interagency and international coordination and cooperation. (4) Human rights must be observed. Military operations should fall within the parameters of the Geneva Conventions and IHL. Obviously, assistance providers do not want to lose sight of the very persons they are trying to help by denying human rights. Strict adherence to the Geneva Conventions is necessary to protect victims. IHL defines the scope of legitimate military action and entitles non-combatants to protection and welfare. (5) Fully developed strategies must be developed prior to implementation of HCA operations that also include contingency plans for peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-

enforcement, or total withdrawal. As more Somalia graphically (6) U.S. Armed forces must be able to defend themselves and the parties they are serving militarily, even if that requires offensively eliminating a threat. (7) Once an operation has been determined, theater CINCs, or possibly down to corps commanders, must have total authority for its implementation and over all participating U.S. military personnel. (8) Operations must be sufficiently resourced for the duration of the event to meet all stated objectives.

Resources/Means. While the literature discusses conceptual aspects of military HCA programs at considerable length, their resourcing was neglected. Questions about the size of the force needed, types of units, equipment, etc. were noticeably absent. Armed forces providing humanitarian assistance programs perform two primary functions: security and technical services. These two functions are described in greater detail in Appendix II. Security and technical services must be provided during all three phases of the aid.

Military forces have readily available logistical capacities and technical expertise to overcome the challenges of delivering short-term relief to third World countries or regions whose infrastructures have been disrupted by natural disasters, disturbances, lack of ports, shortage of warehouse facilities, and inadequate ground transportation systems constantly plague humanitarian relief efforts. Often, getting relief items to a region

quickly is not as difficult as distributing and implementing the aid once it has arrived.

Most armies have substantial military government units (civil affairs) that can assist in reestablishing administrative functions. Sweden and Switzerland have trained units dedicated only to performing short-term tasks in emergency humanitarian aid: restoring communications, managing relief logistics, providing medical care, transportation, etc.[1] Special Operations Forces (SOF), Civil Affairs (CA) units, and PSYOPS units of the U.S. Army are best suited to providing humanitarian assistance support. Blended together, their unique training and experience already provide a rich repository of skills necessary to conduct HCA operations.

Moral imperatives. Providing humanitarian assistance is a task fraught with the many dangers of manipulation, misinterpretation, and misperceptions. Even with the purest intentions benefactors can find themselves the hated foreigners occupying the homeland of the victims. What holds true for NGOs and PVOs is doubly true for military forces providing HCA.

The purpose of humanitarian assistance is not to replace or undermine the local culture. Nor should military forces giving HCA do for the victims what they can do for themselves.

1. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance," Newsletter, No. 93-6 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1993), pp. 14-18.

> They (humanitarian organizations) should make use of available, or help create indigenous, societal or other infrastructures for the management of the aid. They should avoid creating undue long-term dependence on external aid. They should design short-term assistance so as to facilitate rather than distort the process of long-term development.[1]

Where civil conflict exists, military forces providing aid walk a political tightrope. As possible they should try to adopt a balanced relationship with all parties so as not to jeopardize their own legitimacy. In the very least military forces of third parties should contribute to the resolution of ongoing conflict.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. The New World Order is currently in disorder, and will certainly remain chaotic well into the twenty-first century. Even though the United States has provided much HCA during the decades since World War II, my study revealed the United States has no real comprehensive policy for using military forces in conducting humanitarian assistance programs. Basically, each administration reacts to crises piecemeal. As an afterthought of lessons learned from those experiences, an embryonic strategy is slowly developing. That U.S Armed Forces will be increasingly used in HCA programs is a given fact. A national military strategy for that purpose is not a fact.

Nearly twenty years ago thinking men correctly surmised the coming world situation and set forth some policy implications

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1. Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 124-125.

for humanitarian assistance in the future (now). Listed below are their key points:

a. Nation states are loathe to violate sovereignty; when powerful states practice noninterference, other states frequently increase their level of hostility.

b. The chasm separating the elite from the miserable masses is widened and deepened by ethnic, racial or religious cleavages.

c. Dissidence of internal affairs and adventurism of adjacent regimes even in modern nations is the greatest cause of civil wars.

d. The end of bipolarism has unloosed the seething undercurrents of various movements for self-expression and determination.

e. Legitimate and illicit sources of arms abound. Guns still kill; wars can be fought with what strategists in the U.S. consider for their purposes totally outmoded equipment.

f. Those in bureaucratic power are not giving an inch for fear of losing the proverbial mile.[1]

Those existing conditions listed above are causative contributors towards international and internal conflicts that result in mass suffering and death for hundreds of thousands of people. Regions of conflict are not promising arenas for relief work, which makes development of a national military strategy on humanitarian assistance most urgent. Some study should be made on predicting civil wars/internal conflict and preparing for meeting the human need resulting from conflict.

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1. Morris Davis, ed., Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 91-102.

The world in the twenty-first century will be one of increasing calorie insufficiency and shortages of resources for ordinary living. Though empty stomachs are unpromising stuff for coups or revolutions, persistent marginality is predictive of chaos once the fragile survival structure is seriously disturbed. Two thousand years ago the New Testament writers foretold the increase of disasters and wars in the last days. See Matthew 24, Mark 13, Luke 21, and Revelation 13-19 in the Holy Bible. The Apostle Paul accurately described our day: "Just when people are saying, 'Peace and security,' destruction will come to them with the suddenness of pains overtaking a woman in labor, and there will be no escape." I Thessalonians 5:3.

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY

Humanitarian Assistance - No specific definition was found, except for one in the second footnote on page one. "Assistance" and "emergencies" were generally used interchangeably. Attempts to define this term and related ones usually described their function; i.e., "an economy of force," "directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level." Another source defined it as "programs designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or other non-governmental agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing basic human civic services."

Peace-enforcement - The use of international military forces to sustain or to reestablish peace in the face of at least some local opposition. Peace-enforcement entails the physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does not exist. The UN uses the term to refer to actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. Military efforts to impose peace.

Peacekeeping - The dispatch of military and civilian contingents in situations of recent conflict, under conditions in which all parties to the dispute, in theory, welcome such UN presence. Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants, It proceeds in an atmosphere where peace exists and where the former combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war.

As defined by the International Peace Academy: "The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational military, police, and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace."

Peacekeeping duties - Monitoring uneasy border buffer zones in the aftermath of regional wars, implementation of oversight of agreements that have settled long and bitter civil wars, the implementation of political transitions to independence, maintain security conditions essential to the conduct of free and fair elections, demobilizing fighting forces, and investigating abuses of human rights.

Preventive peacekeeping - "Deterrent deployment" through the use of a small force of UN military force as observers in a region of potential conflict in hopes of deterring war by threatening to draw the wider international community into opposing any aggression that subsequently occurs.

Peacemaking - Conflict mediation. According to the UN peacemaking means using diplomatic means to end fighting.

The author drew from his preparatory reading various definitions of the terms listed below. The proliferation of definitions and the accompanying vagueness compounds the problem of defining objectives and concepts in formulating a national military strategy for humanitarian assistance. The imprecise language has no doubt contributed to fuzzy strategic planning. Until a consensus on definitions is achieved the purpose and ends of strategic planning will probably remain just as uncertain. See Donald M. Snow, "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order" (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993), p. 20, for further explanation and a chart relating stages of conflict and tools available.

APPENDIX II

MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Information on functions and phases is taken from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance," Newsletter, No 92-6, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1992).

Security Related Functions -

1. Improving physical security which enables non-military assistance agencies, both public and private, to operate in a situation that would otherwise be too hazardous.

2. Policing, establishing an environment for civilian authorities to resume control.

3. Ensuring temporary asylum for threatened persons.

4. Gathering intelligence relevant to future programs of aid.

5. Providing armed escorts for international personnel engaged in liaison between forces, relief tasks, and search and rescue.

Admonition from Lessons Learned on Technical Services -

1. Phase I (Emergency) - Use Special Forces to conduct an initial assessment of the situation. Establish effective command and control by using full staffs. Allow nationals to assist in building camps; be sure they are not so comfortable people settle and stay. Work through the local health care system; do not invent a new system with Western standards that the population cannot possibly maintain after we leave. Use local transportation assets, but monitor compliance with time schedules closely. Insert CA teams into the operations early; PSYOPS units are also essential. Integrate NGOs and PVOs support; educate military leaders of their value. Initiate a safety program on mines and munitions.

2. Phase II (Sustainment) - Construct the camp according to plan. Conduct supply point operations. Distribute food and water. Organize camp inhabitants. Provide law and order inside the camp, and external security. Female soldiers are needed to deal with female nationals.

3. Phase III - Close temporary relief shelters and evacuate refugees to safe havens or receptive countries.

Negative Factors -

1. Two constraints to using military aid are discontinuity and control.

2. Humanitarian assistance is very expensive to provide.

Positive Spinoffs -

1. Generally, the relations between nations improves.

2. Such assistance also enables combat-like training for donors' troops.

3. During Kurdish relief efforts in April, 1991, no comprehensive procedures for humanitarian support requirements were in existence. As a result, the U.S. Army's 353rd Civil Affairs Command and the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, in cooperation with other national and international agencies, developed a software program to track humanitarian support. A DOS-based logistics inventory system (DALIS) is the result of those efforts. DALIS version 2.0 has been upgraded to enhance the operations of one or more Logistics Coordination Centers supporting multiple world-wide humanitarian relief operations. DALIS provides in-depth tracking of relief supplies that are required and provided by humanitarian assistance organizations and agencies.

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6 June 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR See Distribution

SUBJECT: Corrections to Student Research Paper

1. Last month I sent you a copy of a paper written as a student directed study research project, "Chaplain Roles in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations." Somehow in the computer reproduction of the abstract an entire line was omitted. The sentence in line ten should read, "UMTs should possess some *understanding of the present world situation, differences between domestic and international* missions, legal issues, the roles of other players, and Army doctrine on operations other than war." (Underlined words in italics should be added to complete the sentence).

2. The enclosed abstract is a corrected copy.

3. On page five, Joint Task Force Andrew has been incorrectly referred to as Andrew*s* (plural form) in line thirteen and the footnote.

4. I apologize for these errors and ask that other comments and or corrections be directed to 8750 College Avenue, Berrien Springs, Michigan 49103 before 5 July 1994. After 5 July please send correspondence to Commander, HQ, 26th ASG, ATTN: Office of the Chaplain (COL) Councell, Unit 29237, APO AE 09102.

Gary R Councell

GARY R. COUNCELL
Chaplain (COL), USA
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ABSTRACT

When called upon to intervene in crises, United States Armed Forces effectively provide humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) for fellow countrymen and suffering people around the world. Missions to protect and preserve life are very demanding physically, emotionally, and spiritually. Sometimes, the helper becomes hated in the process. Army Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) minister to military members, relief workers, and civilian victims in these stressful situations. Even though their ministry is acknowledged as essential for mission accomplishment, almost nothing has been written about chaplain roles during HCA operations. UMTS should possess some understanding of the present world situation, differences between domestic and international missions, legal issues, the roles of other players, and Army doctrine on operations other than war. This paper reviews chaplain ministry and duty performance during four HCA operations: Restore Hope in Somalia, JTF Andrew in southern Florida, National Guard response to Midwestern flooding, and Garden Plot in Los Angeles, California. It also discusses chaplain organization, responsibilities, logistical support, and training. The best training for HCA duties is combat readiness. An extensive review of literature and UMT experiences was used to develop lessons learned and suggest some recommendations for improving chaplain readiness and ministry in HCA operations.

END

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